Legal certainty between tradition and algorithm – A comparative analysis
Abstract
This article analyzes in depth the concept of legal certainty in the context of the confrontation between classical legal theory and modern algorithmic governance systems based on artificial intelligence. Starting from the premise that legal certainty is essential for the rule of law, the paper highlights the epistemological and normative tensions between traditional models – based on clear rules, interpretive reasoning and human responsibility – and the new forms of decision-making generated by opaque, predictive and distributed algorithms. The essential differences in terms of the origin of the norm, transparency, legitimacy, accountability and democratic control are analyzed, and a comparative framework on ten epistemological dimensions is proposed. The paper proposes a series of legislative, institutional, professional and technical reforms aimed at protecting the fundamental values of law in the digital age. At the same time, urgent research directions are identified, such as the development of algorithmic explanation standards, the reconfiguration of legal education and the rethinking of the epistemology of law in the context of automation. The article argues that only through a critical and responsible integration of artificial intelligence can legal certainty be maintained as the foundation of human dignity and institutional legitimacy.
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