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## ‘Security’ and ‘Crisis’ in Populist Discourse-a brief exploratory study-

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**Abstract:** Prior to the COVID pandemic and the more recent conflict in Ukraine, populist parties in the European Union enjoyed a growing popularity among voters. Some of them became part of government coalitions or held executive power alone. This article aims to provide a comparison of six populist parties’ narratives on security, based on content analysis of official English-language party documents. Quantitative findings indicate some clear differences between left and right-wing populist parties in terms of references to key words “security” and “crisis”. A qualitative exploration of collocations further suggests which security sectors - societal, military, political, economic, or environmental - these parties tend to prioritize.

**Keywords:** discourse; security; crisis; security sectors; FPÖ; Fidesz; EK; PS; Syriza; Podemos

### 1. Introduction

In 2017, Rogers Brubaker talked about “an extraordinary pan-European and trans-Atlantic populist moment” (2017, p. 357) and described the growing popularity of populist movements, parties, and leaders. Indeed, after the financial and the European sovereign debt crises, populist parties in Europe have enjoyed increased voter support, which propelled them to government, either alone or as part of coalitions. In 2016, populist parties were part of governments in nine EU countries (Boros et al., 2016, p. 18). By 2020 left-wing populist support had declined and right-wing populists had strengthened their positions. Between 2015-2020 the general trend for populists governing alone was to retain power and for those in coalitions with centre-parties to lose support (Boros et al., 2020, p. 7).

Against this background, this article aims to contribute to better understanding populist discourse by analysing official English-language documents of six populist parties who held executive power at some point between 2015–2021 to investigate (I) which parties use more often references to security and crisis, and (II) which security sectors they reference – societal, military, political, economic, or environmental. Findings offer some insights into populists’ relationship with security at discursive level. The article is structured as follows: a short discussion of studies regarding European populism, an overview of the concepts of populism and security, a presentation of data and methods, a findings and discussion section, and some concluding remarks.

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## 2. Studies on European Populism

One thing populism is not short of is research concerning it. The number of studies on populism has increased from an average of 95 per year between 2000–2015 to 615 in 2018 (Noury & Roland 2020, 421). The growing literature includes both theoretical and empirical cases. The reports of Pew Research (Wike et al. 2019), German Marshall Fund (Balfour et al. 2019), Foundation for European Progressive Studies (Boros et al. 2016), or those of the Institute for Global Change (Eiermann et al. 2017) have already classified types of populism, electoral results of populist parties and have even discussed some foreign policy implications as a result of more populists gaining executive power.

A large body of scholarly literature has also been devoted to European populist parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2018; Kitschelt, 2018). For example, Taggart (2017) points out that in Western Europe populist parties focus on issues related to ethnic, regional, or national identity, while Stanley (2017) notes that populists in Central and Eastern Europe are more centrist and not necessarily Eurosceptics. Hutter et al. (2018) explore the changes in key themes in debates between parties in Southern European countries, as a result of both economic and political crises. The experiences of countries like Hungary and Greece with populism are explored in several books and articles, which focus on rhetoric and exposing foreign policy practices (Mudde, 2016; Antal, 2019). Academic work has also been conducted on how increased migration becomes a factor fuelling the emergence of right-wing radical parties (Dinas et al., 2019). Some papers have attempted combining the study of populism with that of security issues (Berezin, 2009; De Spiegeleire, Skinner & Sweijts, 2017). In general, they target right-wing populism and how it interacts with state defence policy or migration (Lazaridis & Campani, 2016; Liang 2007; Wojczewski, 2020).

And there is no shortage of discourse analysts trying to unpack populist leaders and parties' constructed meanings. One of the more famous books, Ruth Wodak's 2015 *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* uses 'discursive-historical analysis' to investigate the main rhetorical strategies used by right-wing populist parties and politicians in Europe. The author's argument is that right-wing populist discourse has different meanings in different local contexts and there is no unitary explanation for the resurgence of populism in Europe. Other articles look at populist parties' manifestos to "assess the impact of populism in the creation of foreign policy narratives" (Exadaktylos, 2020, p. 179), to identify features of these political parties (Font, Graziano & Tsakatika, 2019, p. 1) or how they frame different political issues (Lugosi 2018; Kantola & Lombardo, 2019).

This paper adds to previous work on populism and its relationship with security by looking at the actual references populist parties make in their official discourse to *security* and the five security sectors theorized by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (1998, p. 5).

## 3. Theoretical Framework- Grappling with Security and Populism

Seldom discussed together, populism and security have been two recurrent themes in public and scholarly debates, giving rise to a series of competing theories. While security has mostly been analysed by International Relations scholars, populism has been studied within a variety of disciplines from Political Science to Linguistics and Sociology.

Despite attracting many researchers, (Wodak 2015; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Kaltwasser, Taggart, Espejo & Ostiguy, 2017), the **concept of populism** has hardly been clarified. This conceptual fragmentation derives from regional differences in meaning (Latin America versus Europe), differences in classification, as well as in the manifestations of populism in certain contexts (Gagnon et al., 2018, v). Populism is seen as a thin ideology (Mudde, 2004, 543), as a discursive style (Mudde & Kaltwasser,

2017, p. 5), or as a form of strategy and political organization (Weyland 2001, p. 14), approaches that are not mutually exclusive according to some authors (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011).

This paper draws on Mudde's understanding of populism as a thin ideology according to which "society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure people' versus the 'corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004, p. 543). Being a thin ideology, populism is compatible with other ideologies. This implies it can be catalogued according to left-right political orientations (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 21). Following this approach, the referent objects are parties and political leaders, and the research methodology is generally the qualitative or quantitative analysis of partisan literature (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013, p. 17).

The **concept of security** was developed within the International Relations field by authors who have tried to explain and clarify its meaning (Baldwin, 1997; Huysmans 1998; Wolfers, 1962). The sub-field of Security Studies (Wæver, 2004) includes explanatory, interpretative and normative approaches that have turned security into a debated and problematic concept. The debate is largely based on how these approaches relate to its most popular definition: "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked." (Wolfers, 1962, p. 150).

The present paper takes an extended approach to security, namely that it is built and rebuilt through inter-subjective human understandings (Smith, 2006, p. 51), and not an objective condition, in which the object of security is stable or unchanging (Krause & Williams, 1996, p. 242). Following Buzan and the so-called Copenhagen school securitization theory<sup>1</sup>, this research starts from the assumption that the sovereign state is no longer the main referent and security agent (Buzan & Hansen 2009, pp. 187–88). It also draws upon the idea that security can be divided into five sectors: military, political, economic, societal, and environmental (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 5), which "do not operate in isolation from each other" (Buzan 1991, p. 433). In *People, States and Fear* (2008) Buzan explains each of the sectors and potential types of threats. The military sector refers to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. The political sector refers to the relationship between the state and the citizens as well as to the political aspects of international relations. The economic sector may have a narrow meaning related to military power or, it can be seen as a separate sector of security in itself. The societal dimension refers to the security of non-state communities. The environmental sector refers to the environment potentially becoming subject to extended notions of security as a result of war or disasters caused by climatic factors (Buzan, 2008, pp. 119–130).

#### 4. Data and Methods

This exploratory article uses quantitative and qualitative content analysis of official English-language documents of six populist parties in power at some point between 2015-2020. While the number of populist parties who entered EU states' governments in the aforementioned period is higher, only six had some form of official partisan documents in English, either party platforms, party presentations, principle programmes, or manifestos. Consequently, the article focuses on the documents of The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), The Finns Party, (Perussuomalaiset, PS), Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz), The Estonian Centre Party (Eesti Keskerakond, EK),

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<sup>1</sup> Securitization theory looks at the shifting of a common political issue into the realm of exceptional security issues through speech acts performed by political elites (Wæver 2004, 1–2).

The Coalition of the Radical Left – Progressive Alliance (Sinaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás – Proodeftikí Simachía, Syriza), and Podemos.

**The Austrian Freedom Party** (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs; FPÖ) has been described as a right-wing populist party since the 1990s (Knight, 1992, Riedlsperger, 1998). The first populist party to succeed in forming a governing coalition in 1999–2005, FPÖ also became part of the governing coalition in 2017, but lost support in 2019 as a result of the so-called *Ibiza scandal*<sup>1</sup>. Despite this setback FPÖ is still a valid player in Austrian politics, especially as a potential coalition partner.

**The Finns Party** managed to become part of the ruling coalition between 2015 and 2017, some twenty years after it was established. With a right-wing populist ideology, the party stood out through its anti-immigration discourse (PS 2015). Following internal fragmentation, the party joined the opposition in 2017. Although the governing experiment was not a success, the PS remained the third most popular party in Finland, with polls showing 24% support among voters at the end of 2019 which makes it a strong candidate for further governing coalitions looking to obtain parliamentary majorities (Boros et al., 2020, p. 47).

**Fidesz – the Hungarian Civic Alliance**, has been in power since 2010 and is probably one of the most successful right-wing populist parties. Initially a liberal centre-left party, Fidesz steered its discourse and ideology to the populist right after the 2002 elections defeat (Andor, 2000, 69). Today, Orbán's regime is generally seen as authoritarian and illiberal (Buzogány, 2017). In recent years, the discourse of the party and its leader has become more conservative, critical of the European Union and migration. Starting 2018, Fidesz is in the fourth government term, winning on a discourse targeting immigrants and foreign powers interference.

Although the most well-known populist party in Estonia is the Conservative People's Party of Estonia (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond, EKRE), **The Center Party** (Eesti Keskerakond, EK) has its own history of populist tendencies (Jakobson et al., 2012, p. 59). One of the largest political parties in Estonia, EK began taking part in governments since 1995 and continued with interruptions until 2007. The party returned to coalition governments in both 2016 and 2019. However, the decision to govern with EKRE, despite the official rejection of such a partnership before the elections, has led to a decline in the party's popularity (Boros et al., 2020, p. 43). Criticism came amid conflict over values. EK declares itself liberal and is very popular with Russian minority voters while EKRE is explicitly against the latter. This led to EK to change coalition partners and lead alongside the Reform Party.

**Syriza** is the only populist left-wing party to have won elections and become a coalition leader between 2015–2019. Formed in 2004, Syriza managed to win the sympathy and votes of the Greeks in a relatively short time, capitalizing on the losses of the older PASOK party and street protests against austerity measures (Tsakatika 2016). Electoral promises that contributed to the party's success were largely found in the Thessaloniki Program, aimed at economic and political restructuring (Syriza 2014). Self-declared a radical party, Syriza tempered its discourse once it came to power. The acceptance of a new package of austerity measures imposed by the famous Troika (EC, ECB, IMF), led to the loss of the 2019 elections, despite gaining about 32% of the vote (Boros et al., 2020, p. 61).

The second left-wing populist party on the list, **Podemos** entered the ruling coalition only after the 2019 elections when it won over 14% of the popular vote in the Unidas Podemos coalition formula (Taggart & Pirro, 2021, 23). Podemos' success came only 5 years after the founding of the party, which started

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<sup>1</sup> In 2019, a 2017 video surfaced in which party leaders Heinz-Christian Strache and Johann Gudenus were willing to facilitate government contracts in exchange for positive publicity by a local businesswoman of Russian origins.

the Indignados Movement against austerity measures. The party platform includes anti-austerity and economic inequality reduction policies, as well as feminist elements or proposals to redefine sovereignty (Podemos, 2015).

The corpus for this content analysis is formed of eclectic and diachronic official party documents (Appendix 1). The only English-language party document available on FPÖ's website is the party programme adopted in 2011. In the case of PS it consists of 2015 and 2018 English-language written materials: the 2018 PS principle programme and the party platform from 2015. Fidesz documents include the official website party presentation updated in 2020, as well as their 2007 party manifesto. The EK document is the party platform available on their website. Syriza documents include the official website party presentation and the Thesaloniki programme from 2014. For Podemos the only available English texts are the party presentation and their 2014 principle programme.

Informed by the idea that discourse can be "anything written or said or communicated using signs" (Fillingham, 1993, p. 100) and refers to "talk and texts as parts of social practice" (Potter, 1996, p. 105), this study examines discourse fragments including references to security, issued by the selected parties.

Acknowledging these are merely part of the wider security discourse that each of the parties has developed over time, the decision to only select English-language texts is based on the following assumption. Since security is one key issue in International Relations it is worth looking at how populists who have the power to interact at regional and international level use security references in documents which are more easily accessible to international audiences.

Objections to choosing official texts such as the fact they are not actually read by voters and audiences are well motivated, but the purpose of the present endeavour is to only investigate the formal discursive position of these parties and not the actual impact of their discourse on voters or international relations.

This investigation mixes quantitative and qualitative text analysis, which has already been shown to have some advantages when it comes to the study of populism (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011). For the quantitative analysis Voyant Tools automated analysis has been used, in order to establish and illustrate the relative frequency of key main words *security* and *crisis*, and of additional key words *protect* and *defend*. The qualitative exploration is designed to identify collocations with the key words, with the objective of identifying which security sectors are more likely to be targeted by populist discourse.

## **5. Findings**

Despite being written in different contexts, both the quantitative and qualitative findings show that right-wing populist documents include the term *security* and related collocations more often than the left-wing populist texts. Available documents are also longer in the case of FPO, Fidesz, and PS, as well as for the centrist EK. Syriza and Podemos English-language documents are shorter, but they both seem to use more the key word *crisis* instead of *security*.

### Security versus crisis language

Corpus quantitative data analysis reveals the term *security* is considerably more frequent in the English-language documents of the Freedom Party of Austria, the Finns Party, Fidesz, and the Estonian Centre Party. By contrast, Syriza documents only mention *security* five times, while Podemos texts do not mention *security* at all (Figure 1)<sup>1</sup>.




Figure 1. Security Relative Frequency

The same trend is noticeable for the relative frequency of verbs *defend* and *protect* (and their variants) which is higher for the same four parties compared to leftist Podemos and Syriza (Figure 2)<sup>2</sup>.




Figure 2. Protect and Defend Relative Frequency

The frequent incidences of *security*, and verbs *defend* and *protect* seem to indicate a stronger emphasis on security topics, in line with (right-wing) populists use of “fear” and “insecurity” discourse to gain political capital (Wodak, 2015).

The trend is opposite when focusing on the word *crisis* (or *crises*), which is relatively more frequent in Podemos and Syriza documents compared to the other selected parties (Figure 3)<sup>3</sup>. One notable

<sup>1</sup> Stéfan Sinclair and Geoffrey Rockwell, „Trends”, *Voyant Tools*, accessed March 20, 2022, [https://voyant-tools.org/?query=security\\*&corpus=3f8a87c7a525212f5334c8cb75b39167&view=Trends](https://voyant-tools.org/?query=security*&corpus=3f8a87c7a525212f5334c8cb75b39167&view=Trends).

<sup>2</sup> Stéfan Sinclair and Geoffrey Rockwell, „Trends”, *Voyant Tools*, accessed March 20, 2022, [https://voyant-tools.org/?query=protect\\*&query=defend\\*&corpus=3f8a87c7a525212f5334c8cb75b39167&view=Trends](https://voyant-tools.org/?query=protect*&query=defend*&corpus=3f8a87c7a525212f5334c8cb75b39167&view=Trends)

<sup>3</sup> Stéfan Sinclair and Geoffrey Rockwell, „Trends”, *Voyant Tools*, accessed March 20, 2022, [https://voyant-tools.org/?query=cris\\*&corpus=3f8a87c7a525212f5334c8cb75b39167&view=Trends](https://voyant-tools.org/?query=cris*&corpus=3f8a87c7a525212f5334c8cb75b39167&view=Trends).

exception is the Finns Party where the word *crisis* occurs no less than fifteen times. However, PS documents are also lengthier.




Figure 3. Crisis(Es) Relative Frequency

This suggests that while right-wing populists favour a security language, left-wing populists opt for a crisis language in their official discourse. It is important to note, though, that both Podemos and Syriza rose to power in a time of economic and political crises in their respective countries and, as such, the frequency of *crisis* might be influenced by context.

## 6. Beyond Word Frequency – What Do Collocations Reveal?

Looking at what types of collocations with the key words the parties use, provides an overview of what sectors of security they tend to include in their discourse. This could be an indicator of which of these sectors could become subject to a securitization move on their part as governing elites (successful or not).

### *Right Wing Populists – More Military Security*

FPÖ's manifesto includes mostly security collocations which allude to the military, political and societal sectors, while the economic and environmental sectors are only hinted at through the mention of "security of supply". Issued in 2011, it is interesting to observe that the context of the economic and sovereign debt crises seems to have had little to no influence on the text.

Their discourse on security appears to follow a traditional view of the concept. Examples related to military security include "security and independence of Austria", "maintain internal and external security", or "common foreign and security policy". Some security collocations referring to the societal sector are "security and freedom of its citizens", "the security of a family" (FPÖ, 2011). Interestingly they also offer a lengthy definition for security itself:

*We view security as a basic need and vital requirement for the positive development of mankind. Safeguarding our security requires the ability to defend ourselves. Hence, we are committed to the best possible training and equipping of the bodies of our police force and the army. (FPÖ, 2011)*

Quite obviously, FPÖ presents security in a traditional, military sense by mentioning traditional internal and external defence forces. Security is a "need" but also a "vital requirement" and must be defended from potential threats by police and army. As opposed to the various collocations with security, the FPÖ text only makes a general reference to "crisis situations and refugees".

Verbs “protect” and “defend” can be indicative of referent objects, namely whose security is the FPÖ focused on. The manifesto reveals the party wants to protect: citizens, persecuted asylum seekers, freedom of religion, children welfare, freedom of citizens, native language, society, as well as their “view of mankind and society” (FPÖ, 2011). These referent objects are usually found in the societal security sector. Additionally, the text mentions protecting or defending the homeland, the national territory, the country, which are referent objects in the military security sector. There are also single references to protecting: natural environment, natural livelihood, or private property which are related to the economic and environmental security sectors. Being single mentions might indicate a lesser emphasis on these areas.

PS’ programme was published during a growing migrant crisis and following the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, whose influences are visible in the text. However, PS’ documents have many similarities with FPÖ, namely a clear tendency to reference military security more through collocations such as: “security risk”, “defence and security of the homeland”, “internal security”, “Finland's security”, “security guarantees”, “common security and defence policy”, “EU security framework”, “Nordic security”, “Finland's foreign and security policy” (PS, 2015).

Like FPÖ, the PS uses one *crisis* collocation, namely “Ukraine crisis”, referring to the 2014 conflict (PS 2015). Of all the surveyed parties, PS is the only one to include the cyber-security dimension and argue for the protection of “computer networks” (PS, 2015). Some references to economic and societal security can be found in collocations such as: “security and welfare of the ordinary Finnish citizens” or “security of the labour market” (PS, 2015). PS advocates protection against “job dismissal” and against “the erosion of local self-determination”, but also for the protection of children, military abroad, language, minority languages, and linguistic diversity which cover all but one security sector, the environmental.

Out of the right-wing populist parties, Fidesz is the only one whose English-language manifesto tends to include more economic security collocations, while also maintaining a lot of collocation related to military security. The collocations related to the economic sector are: “social security”, “welfare and security”, “the security of existing jobs”, “the safety and security of supply”, “security of energy supply”. Collocations related to the military sector include: “Security of the Nation”, “common European security policies”, “country’s long-term security”, “Hungary’s security risks”, “global security environment”, “security policy programme”, “security and defence policy”, “armed forces and security services” (Fidesz, 2007).

The oldest manifesto on the list, Fidesz’ text must also be related to the 2007 context. The text was published only 3 years after Hungary joined the EU during a time when the party was in opposition. Furthermore, this was a time when Hungarian economy and politics were riddled with corruption scandals, which might be why there are more references to the economic security sector.

Their party presentation, however, was updated in 2020 and it reflects new discourse strands such as the 2015 migration crisis or the 2008 economic crisis. Exploring this more recent text reveals a visible shift to societal security which is sometimes linked to the military. Fidesz wants to defend: “the Hungarian and Schengen borders in the wake of the 2015 migration crisis” “our borders”, “the Hungarian way of life”, “the rights of our fellow Hungarians and speak up when they are discriminated” (Fidesz 2020). Contrastingly, the 2007 party manifesto made more references to protecting: economic interests, society, territory, human rights, democracy, citizens, families, national minorities - focusing on more varied aspects of societal, political and military sectors.



*Centre Populists – The Catch-All Security Discourse?*

EK is the only centrist political party with a left-leaning tendency included here. It is perhaps not surprising that their English-language party platform (EK, n.d.) includes collocations alluding to most security sectors: “foreign and security policies of Estonia”, “internal security of the state.”, “effective foreign and security policy of the European Union”, “Estonian national security and state defence”, “European security strategy”, “security risks”, (military); “social security status of its population”, “the security of the population”, “safe and secure society.” (societal); “ecological security” (environmental). Even so, the military security sector seems to be ‘represented’ more, just like the the case of the right-wing parties.

Crisis collocations are more frequent than in right-wing populist documents. They focus on the political, the socio-economic, and the military: “crisis of democracy”, “crisis management missions”, “international crisis management operations”, “rural life crisis”, “crisis in medical aid and the departure of trained professionals abroad”. (EK, n.d.)

In terms of potential security referent objects, collocations with verbs *protect* and *defend* show a strong political and economic sectors emphasis. EK wants to protect or defend: “constitutional rights”, “citizens outside the boarders”, “enterprises”, “consumers”, “human rights”, “democracy”, “democratic values”, “freedom of speech”. The societal sector is suggested through mentions of the protection or defence of: “minorities”, “values”, or “specific historic, natural and cultural characteristics”. The environmental sector is also referenced through the protection of “the natural environment and public health” or that of “network of natural reserves” (EK, n.d.). These findings seem to support the idea that as a centrist party, EK leans toward a catch-all discourse, as they include both security and crisis collocations covering all security sectors.

*Left-wing populists - less security more crisis*

While in Podemos’ documents there is no reference to security, Syriza does mention “social security funds” and leading “with security the country to recovery” (Syriza 2014). When it comes to crisis collocations Podemos mostly focuses on the political sector talking of the “crisis of the regime”, “institutional crisis”, “political crisis”, “organic crisis”, “crisis of expectation”, “crisis of the PSOE”, “crisis that goes beyond the loss of legitimacy of its political elite”, and a single mention of the “economic crisis”. There are no mentions to *protecting* anything but the party argues that it wants to “defend” itself from political criticism (Podemos 2014). These references should be correlated with the fact that the program was drafted during a political crisis in Spain. Podemos’ lack of references to security in its principle program is not surprising, as principle programs are shorter and more general. Having only this document in English may indicate that their focus was on sending a different message. The Spanish-language party program tells a different story, but is not subject to the present inquiry.

Syriza employs collocations “humanitarian crisis” and “exit from the crisis” (Syriza 2014) referring to the economic crisis the country was going through. Accordingly, the referent objects who need protection are “most vulnerable social strata” and “employment rights”. While they aim to offer the parties’ view this official English documents are bound to be influenced by the time and context they were written in. None is more obvious than the Thessaloniki Programme, which was very issue-specific, proposing a plan for the country’s recovery from the sovereign debt crisis. As such, it did not include views on other areas and limits current findings.

## 7. Conclusions

Using quantitative and qualitative content analysis of six European populist parties which managed to enter governments between 2015 and 2020, this short study has revealed that right-wing populist parties FPÖ, PS and Fidesz use the term *security* and *security collocation* more frequently, and left-wing populist parties Podemos and Syriza lean towards using *crisis* and *crisis collocations* more, while centrist EK uses both. Given the small number of parties and the limitations of only using English-language documents, it would be valuable to extend the investigation to more or all European populist parties which have accessed ruling power to see whether this is in fact a general tendency. Nevertheless, the very absence of English-language documents for the other populist parties in power during this period may be significant in itself, suggesting a less internationally oriented discourse on their part.

This research has also shown that right-wing populists seem to adopt a more traditional official discourse on security with collocations fitting more the military sector, but also including references to referent objects from the societal and economic sectors. Left-wing populist documents have been either too general (Podemos) or too specific (Syriza) to allow for solid observations about which security sectors they tend to include in their narratives, but appear to be more focused on the political and economic sectors. Investigating Estonia's Centre Party (EK) platform has proven more fertile, showing a more catch-all security discourse as it included collocations related to all five security sectors. The main challenge in interpreting these data is that the discourse fragments are diachronic and context depended. Further qualitative studies should include a more in-depth analysis of how context influences official party discourse. More comprehensive work could include national language party documents, as well as party and party leaders' public statements, which could more confidently establish both the *crisis versus security* focus and which security sectors they prioritize discursively.

Bearing all limitations in mind, this article illustrated some clear differences when it comes to 'security talk' between populist parties depending on their right, left or centrist orientation. In this way, it opens a discussion about whether left-wing populists are prone to favour a crisis discourse while right-wing ones prefer a security discourse.

## 8. Acknowledgement

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## Appendix 1

### Corpus documents

Estonian Centre Party. n.d. "Party Platform". <https://www.keskerakond.ee/en/ourparty-main/ppplatform-inf.html>

Fidesz. 2007. "A stronger Hungary. The manifesto of Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance".

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