THE 14TH EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

Communication Sciences – Globalization of Cultural Diversity

The Integrative Process of the European Union from the Perspective of Intra-Community Secessionist Movements

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Abstract: The prospect of a fully integrated European Union and, equally, symmetrically developed from an economic point of view, is an ideal desiderate that will go through a long and totally uncertain course. If the accession of the states and the establishment of the European Union as a supranational state materialized in one way or another, the process of integration of these states is altogether different. This cultural and economic diversity must go through a broad interconnection and interdisciplinary process, a process that will take place according to the natural or artificial managers involved in this integrative construction. The natural factors are constituted from the empathy of nations to such a process and the artificial factors are characterized by community instruments developed for implementation throughout the European community. In this paper, we intend to give a point of view on the complexity of the European integration process of the Member States and also to address this process from the point of view of the secessionist movements, that have lately become very visible, from our perspective with very serious consequences on the stability and development of the Community framework. Even if the vast majority of secessionist formations are of a small size, their distribution throughout the European space makes this phenomenon a substantial one in the EU integration and development process.

Keywords: secessionist movements; European Union; European Community; Intra Community

Introduction

The idea of separatism or autonomy is not something new on the world stage, these forms of claim or desire of existing as a form of social organization is an even natural element, we could say, from the perspective of the socio-cultural unity of the communities. Therefore, it is not their existence that worries us, but their development and purpose which are important to be analyzed and understood.

At this point, in the European Union, relying on the idea that Britain will become an extra-EU state, we have a few extremely powerful national states and other national states that are in the process of developing or becoming emerging economies. Considering this point, we notice that in the definition of the above-mentioned artificial criteria, the most important actors are the extremely powerful national states, namely Germany, France, Italy, Spain, which in their turn, have historical problems with the secessionist factions. From the point of view of representativeness in the European Parliament, we can also bring to discussion Poland, Romania and the Czech Republic, which also have substantial representation in parliament and thus contribute to the decision-making process in the field of union policies in all its aspects. From both perspectives, strong economies and those with parliamentary

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representativeness on the basis of the population, we appreciate that the movements of regions that want autonomy are or can become an impediment in the process of European integration and development. In essence, these regions of those states claim an autonomy that would lead to the formation of new states, basically these regions will substitute completely the state they belong to.

The actions of Catalonia, region of Spain, up to now and even the continuation of efforts to declare itself an autonomous region within the Spanish state, is an eloquent example of secessionist action which, despite the arguments for a substantial contribution to the country's GDP and the lack of allocation of European Union funds to the region by the Spanish state does not have a solid correspondent in reality. The fact that the Spanish Government is trying to defuse the situation and allocates considerable funds to this region is not a measure to meet the objectives of the region, which gives rise to a completely different reality of achieving autonomy actions.

The Romanian journalist Bogdan Chirieac says: "For the last hundred years, Spain has seen Civil War, Franco's dictatorship and the Basque terrorism. Spain is a powerful state with a strong nation that has written a significant part of the world history. Considering how determined Madrid is, the secessionist movement in Catalonia has no chances. I have seen the attitude of the Prime Minister Rajoy, of the Parliament and His Majesty Felipe VI. Madrid seems to be willing to enter a long-term battle, as it happened with the Basque Country, rather than give up Catalonia. It is hard to anticipate whether in response Catalonia will develop a secessionist armed movement, after the former model of the terrorist groups in Spain and Northern Ireland. Anyway, the unrests can last for years, maybe decades, until the hot heads calm down." [1]

At the level of the European Union, regions that develop movements for autonomy are spread throughout the continent, both in countries with a democratic tradition and in those in which the democratic exercise is in the process of being formed. Thus, as mentioned above, we can speak about the communities in Bornholm and the Faroe Islands (Denmark), Italy in Lombardy with 10 million inhabitants, 17% of the total, Venice (4.9 million, 8%), Sicily 8,25%), South Tyrol (511,000, 0,9%), Germany in Bavaria (12,9 million, 15,6%).

A description of these actions and an analysis of the importance of the European unity within the Union will be followed by our observation on the secessionist movement in Europe and on the effects these movements can have.

Content

The European Union's approach in the integration process aimed at interconnecting national states on all structural levels and started from values and principles that should naturally have played a liaison role in the integration process. However, the reality of this process is obviously much more complex and a number of variables have not been sufficiently analyzed or, better said, have been totally disregarded. It is precisely these variables that will make the European Union demonstrate that it follows the path of this desideratum called the European Community or not.

We can currently see an alarming increase in secessionist movements that argue their actions by the right to self-determination, which is not argued in real terms at all. A description of these movements can be described as follows:

Catalonia

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[1] https://trenulnostru.ro.

The autonomous region of Spain has behind these movements a powerful conflict that has lasted for a long time, at this moment being at its peak. The moment of the economic crisis in 2008 increased the economic differences between the northern and southern regions of the country, thus activating the will of economic independence among a population of Catalans, whose region is one of the richest. The Spanish Constitutional Court also rejected the recognition of Catalan as the main language of regional administration and the so-called Catalan nationality was not recognized in political and governmental terms.

By placing the independents at the head of the region, led by Carles Puigdemont in 2015, a legal encounter was propagated with the Spanish Government on self-determination. The fact that, at this point, the measures taken by the Spanish authorities have somehow stabilized the situation does not mean that these issues have been resolved. Without a consistent and constant policy from the Spanish state, this move will continue to exist.

Scotland

After the Scottish National Party won a clear victory in 2011, the issue of Scotland's independence reappeared. In this direction, a referendum was held and it ended with a rejection of 55%. Scotland has been part of the United Kingdom since the Union Act of 1707 and had two referenda on the creation of its own Parliament in 1979 and 1997. With Brexit breakout and the failure of the Prime Minister, Theresa May, before the British Parliament, the last of March 12th, 2019, a new Scottish independence movement started spreading.

Corsica

In 2015, the Corsican nationalism reached a new stage, namely the winning of regional elections by the independents, a repeated aspect, just as in Catalonia's case. This great political achievement and the deployment of weapons by the Corsican National Liberation Front in June 2014 made the game more dangerous. Corsica wants its autonomy and thus, through this approach, it demonstrates the adaptability and diplomacy of the regional independence movements that are typically specific to state bodies.

Northern Italy

In 1991, the League of the North appeared, an organization that promoted Italian sovereignty with the aim of forming an autonomous region in northern Italy. Under these conditions, Padania would have brought together several territories around a Pad River meadow. At this time, several officials in the organization are supporting the idea of an economic alliance between several rich northern regions. Thus, we can observe the presence of the same fundamental elements of construction and coagulation of an autonomous space, but without absolutely necessary mechanisms of integration into the socio-economic state space.

The Szekler Land

In Romania, through the agitation produced by the Hungarian Democratic Alliance Party in Romania, an area in the centre of Transylvania claims its autonomy under the same argument of self-determination. In this situation we also have a strong involvement from Hungary, which ostensibly and regularly feeds every secessionist approach in the area. The position of the Romanian state is firm and unequivocal in accepting such a compomise.

The Féroé Islands

The Féroé is an archipelago of 50.000 inhabitants, which gained autonomy from Denmark in 1948. This region is under the control of Denmark, but the region is not considered to be a Member State of the Union. However, the region is part of the free movement agreement in the European space and Denmark is responsible for foreign affairs.

In the Balkan space, the pro-autonomous movements are found especially on the territory of the former Yugoslav state, which is also the most unpredictable and difficult to control. One of the most sensitive regions is Kosovo, but the Albanian or Macedonian claims should not be neglected. We can also talk about Moravia region of the Czech Republic and Silesia in Poland, based on the same argument, the principle of self-determination. The most representative case is that of Ukraine, which has lost Crimea and at this moment the Donbas and Mariopol regions are in the same critical situation.

All these regions, from different EU Member States or candidate countries for the European Union, reflect common features of the secessionist movement as well as similar policies in controlling these movements. In this sense, the common voice of the European Commission, through Presidents Jean-Claude Junker, says: "If we allow Catalonia to separate - and this is not our job - then others will do the same. I do not want this", Juncker said in a speech at the University of Luxembourg, Reuters reports.

Juncker said he was "very worried" about the separatist tendencies in Europe and encouraged the Spanish central government head, Mariano Rajoy, to guarantee that the situation was to be under controlled. [1]

The conclusion we can naturally draw is that, apart from a consolidated democracy, in which the individual rights are guaranteed, real and functional, autonomies of any nature lead to secession. In this situation, collective rights are proclaimed as the only solution and they are not and cannot be the guarantor of individual rights either. On the contrary, collective rights can cover and even replace individual rights, which are the essence of any democratic society.

We can also notice that the republics are less adapted to a regime of autonomies, because they have as their primary objective the ensurance of individual rights. It is the register of these rights that establishes the level of democracy, their observance being understood. Kingdoms, at least the European ones, are state formulas that accept territorial autonomies because they are based on the sovereignty of the crown, not on the sovereignty of the citizens. We see that Spain and the United Kingdom include different forms of territorial autonomy, but the level of democracy ensures that individual rights are guaranteed to such an extent that autonomies are only forms of decentralized administration. Catalonia case seems to be enlightening - the independence claimed by a political group, even in the name of a republican ideal, has proved to be unrealistic precisely as citizens' individual rights are provided in a satisfactory manner by the democratic system in operation.

We can see that the way from autonomy to secession is opened when democracy in that state is in distress. The lack of individual rights naturally require the claim of collective rights as a form of protection for the groups of citizens. That is why, consolidating democracy, ensuring individual rights for all citizens, without any discrimination, whether positive or negative, is the only solution to ensure the stability of the state in order to protect the society from adventurous political or extremist actions. [2]

The most interesting aspect of the integrative process that the European Union promotes and implements is found in the Member States' funding policy through the various programs made available, programs

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[1] http://www.ziare.com/europa/spania.
[2] https://www.punctulcritic.ro/eugen-uricaru.

that are generally intended to be instruments designed to reduce social and economic disparities between the Member States or regions of Member States. Thus, we consider the financing mechanism insufficiently analyzed in terms of impact risks in the area of regional or national interest, which, not few times recently, has proved to coagulate or provoke certain separatist trends that are more meant to sustain an economic selfishness than to achieve the goals for which it was created. Obviously, against the background of a certain economic status of the regions, from our perspective it is erroneously demonstrated that in this open cooperation there are also hidden interests, even strategically thought, we could say. An economic and regional funding policy must be thought and analyzed much more deeply or should be designed to such an extent that the supply effects of subsequent secessionist tendencies cannot be taken into account.

The European Union's new concept of territorial cooperation, transposed into law by EU Regulation 1302/2013, describes and puts at hand a legal instrument which can be considered more than interesting. The fundamental aspect in our area of interest is that some secessionist interests can be materialized through a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation, meaning that by using substantial financial resources and the legal instrument of coordination, one can create a delayed trigger mechanism which may endanger the socio-political or socio-economic stability of certain states or macro-regions.

Point 4 introduces Article 3a of the Regulation which states that: 2. *A European Grouingp of Territorial Cooperation may be made up of members located in the territory of a single Member State and one or more third countries neighbouring that Member State, including its outermost regions, in case the respective Member State considers that such an Economic Cross-border Cooperation Grouping is in line with the scope of its territorial cooperation in the context of cross-border or transnational cooperation or its bilateral relations with the third countries concerned. [1]*

From our perspective, in the assiduous wish of the union to hurry the integrative process somehow, it is about to make some errors of analysis and implementation with unpredictable long-term effects. The overall objective of a territorial cooperation grouping is to facilitate and promote cross-border, transnational and inter-regional cooperation with a view to strengthening the economic, social and territorial cohesion policy of the European Union. The analysis should be considered upon the way of constitution, but also upon the members of such a grouping, as they are transposed into the legislation.

A cooperative grouping may consist of partners from at least two Member States (or one Member State and one or more third countries) belonging to one or more of the following categories:

• Member States or authorities at national level;

• regional authorities;

• local authorities;

• public enterprises or bodies governed by public law;

• enterprises entrusted with the provision of services of general economic interest;

• national, regional or local authorities, bodies or enterprises from third countries (subject to specific conditions);

• associations composed of bodies belonging to one or more of these categories.

The European Territorial Cooperation Groupings have legal personality and are governed by a convention unanimously concluded by their members. They act on behalf of their members, which adopt

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[1] http://www.renascc.eu/documente.

statutes by means of special conventions, setting out the organization and activities of the groupings. As a minimum requirement, a grouping must have two bodies: an assembly of its members' representatives and a board of directors, representing the group and acting on its behalf.

Conclusions

The complex integrative process through which the European Union passes has to be understood and sustained in its depth. This complex national and sectoral interconnection mechanism is often subject to pressures and variables that cannot be properly predicted or managed from the beginning. The cohesion and integration policy of the Member States is defined as a set of measures and actions aimed at ensuring the international balance but also the security of the European construction. Movements regarding the autonomy of regions or macro-regions should be taken into account as seriously as possible since the reality of this integration process demonstrates social behavioural characteristics that can become a source of instability or, moreover, a type of element triggering the start of movements promoting secession towards the national state.

The European Union must adopt clear macro-territorial and macroeconomic security mechanisms without prejudice to the security of the national member state. In our point of view, promoting some well-founded territorial integrity policies is the key to union's unity.

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Political Parties Attitude, Voter
Trust and EU Integration (Albanian Case)

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Abstract: This article focuses on the study of relations among political parties, their actions directed to fulfilling the EU integration political criteria and voters' trust. Under Albanian conditions, it is supposed that voters' trust is not an important/influencing factor for the Albanian political parties towards their attitude to the EU integration. The analysis is generally based on primary data of ESS, CHES, Balkan Public Barometer and empiric Albanian surveys. Albanian political parties result to be politically polarized, possess strong leaders, have conflicts among them (even resulting in parliament boycotts), etc. The voters' trust in political parties per se is in low level. The factors taken into consideration tend mostly to explain the thesis confirmation. Consequently, the voter trust into political parties' fallout to be a determinant for the political party's action and attitude, toward the European Integration. Although it is a factor of slowing down the level of belief of the Albanian citizens that Albania will enter the EU soon, resulting not so positive for this country to integrate in a bigger politically and economically government.

Keywords: Political Parties; Voter Trust; EU Integration

1. Introduction

"Political parties are a collective platform for the expression of individuals' fundamental rights to association and expression and have been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights as integral players in the democratic process. Further, they are the most widely utilized means for political participation and exercise of related rights. Parties are foundational to a pluralist political society and play an active role in ensuring an informed and participative electorate. Additionally, parties often serve as a bridge between the executive and legislative branches of government and can serve to effectively prioritize the legislative agenda within a system of government." (OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission, 2010, p. 8). The voter has considerable weight, especially in election period. Therefore, "the will of the voters is of considerable importance to the parties" (Hofmeister & Grabow et.al, 2017, p. 10). In this context the political parties need to prioritize their politics, focused on the voter's issues solving, and consequently raise their trust. On the other hand, this party – voter relation established by the voter following the parties dispute and political deliberations. The more the voter trust in their influence in the decision – making process, the more political parties would be focused in this perspective, as a base criterion of political parties (to win the election and govern the country). "Therefore, constant contact with numerous social groups and associations is needed". (Hofmeister & Grabow et. al, 2017, p. 40). This relational and constant contact with the voter is doubtful in the Albanian context. Party identification is one of the explanations of voter's trust in political parties. Although it

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should be mentioned that during this last decade, mainly in the developed countries, the tendency of ideological voter is in decline. (Russell et. al., 2003) This in Albania is an opportunity for disconnection of these two actors, therefore the political parties, increases the prospect to action more freely from the bond with the voter. This tendency goes mostly in the direction of more pragmatic activity (of their own interests), instead of the voter's interest. "These challenges may be especially important for developing nations. Without the stabilizing presence of party identifiers, party systems may suffer from persisting instability. Moreover, a more fluid public, decoupled from habitual party cues, can also open the door to exploitation and demagoguery by political elites. A less – educated public and a less – robust civil society may be less resistant to such appeals. The invention of partisanship was a solution to the problem of limited voter sophistication; when voters are nonpartisans and less sophisticated, this represents a challenge for responsible electoral democracy. When these changing patterns of partisanship and electoral behavior are a boon or a curse for electoral democracy depends on how citizens and political parties respond to these changes." (Dalton, 2016). In Albania this constant link with the voters, looks like is not connected with the Political parties' efforts in European Integration. It looks like the inside political activity and outside (European Integration) are detached. Even though it could be mentioned one interconnection factor: political parties pragmatist interest. This analysis is mainly focused in the main political parties of Albania. As these parties are the most influent in the political arena of Albania and in the European integration issues. The fullest view of political parties' deliberations and action towards the public is seen, when the actual party is in government. Most notably when they are in government and reveal and their politics to the public.

The paper research question is *"Is voters' trust an important/influencing factor for the Albanian political parties in their attitude toward the EU integration criterion fulfilling"*. The supposed answer is that these three indicators do not follow the same trend. The political parties taken into analyses are principally the parliamentary ones; primary, the three main political parties, Socialist Party (PS), Democratic Party (PD) and Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI) and secondly, the other parliamentary small political parties (coalition parties). Generally primary data is used in testing the paper thesis, such as ESS, CHES candidate survey (2014), Balkan Public Barometer, etc. and also primary survey data. In this context, statistical analyses are made in order to confirm this proposed thesis. Secondary data is generally used for the qualitative section of the analyses, particularly in the context of political parties' attitudes and actions (European Commission Reports, Freedom House, researchers analyses, etc.)

2. Political Parties' Attitudes

Albania is part of the post – communist countries. Therefore, as all other actors, it faces also difficulties in converging the political parties and the voter's interest into the same direction. Actually, since taking the candidate status (Jun 2014) it has been working towards to for almost five years. In this context, Albanian citizen affirm that EU membership is mostly a good thing. It results with a raising tendency from 81% (good thing) in 2016 to 83% in 2018 (Balkan Public Barometer 2016 – 2018). Furthermore, in another question of this survey mapping, the Albanians show a perception to postpone the EU accession. Albanian public in the shortly after the candidate status (51% in 2015), whereas in 2018 they show a perception to postpone the accession in 2025 (37%). Even though Albania has made progressive transformation toward the EU process, it still remains a potential candidate. Albania faces a strong political leadership, authoritarian tendency in the political drivers, politicized political parties, problematic level of corruption (national and local), strong disputes between the ruling majority and opposition, etc. Here is also important to mention the actual level of democracy in Albania (Freedom

House, 2019) of 4.11/7. Hence, it is 2.89 points far from being on the most democratic groups of countries. Technically Albania has to fulfill the EU Copenhagen Criterions in order to enter the EU. The European Commission Reports, strongly highlights the political context (EC, 2018). Such as political parties smooth out, stronger connection to the public and the voter, etc. All this directive goes in one main direction of the democracy level increase and consolidation.

In order to design the political parties' attitudes in the voter and EU Integration linkage, firstly, we have to see the political party and its leadership in its public attitude. Three of the CHES candidate survey (2014) are taken into consideration (Graph 1): *Relative salience of European integration in the party's public stance in 2014; Position of the party leadership in 2014 on fulfilling the good governance requirements of EU membership (administrative transparency, accountability, civil service reform and judicial reform); Overall orientation of the party leadership towards membership of the European Union in 2014.*

Results for the first indicator of political party's public stance salience support for the EU integration, the three main parties of Albania have the highest results on supporting its importance: PD 93.3%, PS, 93.4% and LSI 93.4%. The other smaller parties (coalitions parties) have fewer high levels of support PBDNJ 73.40%, PDIU 66.70%, PKDSH 57.10%, PR 80.00%. In overall, these political parties support the EU integration in their public stance. At this level of analyses, we can say that political parties could be influenced from the voter trust in their public stance. Hence, there is a probability the voter trust could be an important factor in their activities and behavior outside the public stance. Results for the second indicator, the party leadership position on fulfilling the good governance requirements of EU membership (*administrative transparency, accountability, civil service reform and judicial reform),* are mainly in increasing positive level. PS and LSI are in the same levels compared to the first indicator. The only one that is in decreasing level compared to the above indicator is PD, at the level of 80% from 93.3%. Instead the other smaller (coalition) parties show raising level of favoring in positive direction of the party leadership. The second factor results also confirm the outcomes of the first one. In regard to the third indicator reference the overall orientation of the party leadership towards membership of the European Union, we can confirm that results for the three main political parties of Albania. The other smaller parties show also high level of the leadership orientation toward the UE Integration: PBDNJ 73.40%, PDIU 100.00%, PKDSH, 72.80%, PR 84.70%.

Accordingly, as it is expected, Albanian main political parties tend in their public salience to support the importance of EU integration. Apart from the parties that tend to human rights and national politics such as PBDNJ, PR, the most important one such PS have the tendency to 100% pro EU integration from their leader. In the Albanian case, 20% of the moderate difference between PS and PD (the actual opposition) could be explained with time polarization between position – opposition, a year after the general election.

In the first sight, we can affirm that the main political parties and their leadership of Albania have the same tendency of supporting the EU integration, as the Albania citizens, confirming the above data of the citizens survey (Balkans Public Barometer). Although below we are going into deeper analyses to confirm or reject these preliminary outcomes.

ALBANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES ATTITUDE LINE TOWARD THE EU INTEGRATION

LSI PBDNJ PD PDIU PKDSH PR PS

	EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IS OF NO IMPORTANCE	EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IS OF IMPORTANCE.	OPPOSES	IN FAVOR	OPPOSES	IN FAVOR
LSI	6.70%	93.40%	6.70%	93.40%	6.70%	93.40%
PBDNJ	6.70%	73.40%	7.10%	92.90%	13.40%	73.40%
PD	0.00%	93.30%	20.00%	80.00%	20.00%	80.00%
PDIU	20.00%	66.70%	7.70%	84.60%	0.00%	100.00%
PKDSH	14.20%	57.10%	9.10%	81.90%	9.10%	72.80%
PR	13.40%	80.00%	15.40%	69.30%	15.40%	84.70%
PS	6.70%	93.40%	6.70%	93.30%	6.70%	93.30%

Graph 1. Albanian political parties' behavior toward the EU Integration

Source: CHES candidate survey, 2014

Note: how to read graph 1. To each of the three questions correspond two responses. Starting from the left: the first question of *Relative salience of European integration in the party's public stance in 2014*, correspond the first two answers (European integration is of no importance and is of importance), and so on with the other two questions.

Going into a deeper analysis, we obtain contradicting results on political parties and their public attitude. We will analyze below the actual political activity, focusing on their real action in the political arena of Albania. We will see that the main Albanian political parties (position and opposition) are mostly focused in their actions/attitudes resulting from the political actions, to be more pragmatist (self – interests) orientated, then voter orientated and less voter trust oriented.

Initially, the most important indicator is the authoritarian control of the political arena and action of the position leader. This control is extended in the executive and other institutions (Kajsiu, 2018). This tendency is seen not only in the today government but also in the previous governance as well. Furthermore, the same tendency is seen inside the main political parties' structure and management. The leadership is oriented toward fulfilling their pragmatist interest of the political position on the Albanian political arena. For example, PD ten years before voted animally for the vetting resolution. After that, the same one blocked the parliament works by boycotting delaying thus the juridical vetting of the Albanian institutions. It returns the parliament only with the agreement with the PS leader for a technical government (several ministries directed from the PD) and also the electronic voting agreement between the PS and PD. This last one is not applied yet, because of its failure in two pilots experiments in Fier an Tirana. Thus, missing the voter interest and issues which is fundamentally the base criteria of the political party concept. As a matter of fact, in 2019, the opposition (PD, LSI and other smaller parties) is in boycott of the parliament again blocking many of the activities of the parliament focused on the voter's interest. Consequently, political parties, instead of focusing on the voter's issues and problems solving are focused on solving their own political issues. Moreover, "electoral processes in Albania have traditionally suffered from politicized institutions, procedural irregularities, violent clashes between contending candidates, and allegations of vote-buying the opposition PD refused to nominate its representatives in the Central Elections Commission (CEC) and register its candidates well past the deadlines established by the electoral code" (Freedom House, 2018). Another factor confirming this point of view is the connection to the government of organized crime groups (European Commission, 2018). On the other hand, a large number of Albanian asylums seeking in the main European Countries

(as also the large number of emigrations from Albania) show low level of trust into Albanian political parties as in other Albanian institutions.

Following the above, there are also two other arguments, linked to the week connection of the voter trust and the political parties' attitudes. The first is the media dependency from political parties. The main issue of this dependency is the problematics of media financing, mentioned also from the EU Progress Report on Albania (Zguri, 2017, p. 51). Secondly stands the civil society, which is mostly not institutionalized. In a context of on – line, magazines, television, etc., being depended from the main political parties (mostly), the voter has the doubt in the information they receive. On the other hand, the deficiency of institutionalized civil society (mostly occasional) does not influence positively to the voters in the way of the possibility for the political parties to solve/discus their issue. Additionally, "civil society depends financially mostly on foreigner donors." The financial sustainability of civil society organizations remains a challenge due to fiscal and legal frameworks" (EC, 2018, p. 11). "The majority of people remain skeptical about the impact of CSOs' work and activities. According to the IDM Audit of Political Engagement (April 2016), only 22.4 percent of Albanian citizens think that engagement with CSOs can contribute to changing a particular situation they are not satisfied with". (USAID, 2017, p. 21). In this situation, of missing an inclusive policy dialog, the voters trust is doubtful of being a factor of influence the political party's action, and either to the EU Integration posture.

Consequently, Albanian voters face political parties' pragmatic actions, focusing in fulfilling their own interest and not the EU Criterion of Integration. In this context, below sustentive empirical results are presented focusing on the voters' trust in political parties. We should take into consideration that the two main types of voting behavior are the ideological (partisanship) and pragmatist. Hence, the partisan voter is supposed to be more connected to the political parties and have higher level of believe in the party they support. Apart, there are also other factors influencing the voters trust into political parties. Graph 2 shows the tendency of Democracy, electoral process, Corruption and Voter turnout in sixteen years (2001 – 2017). From 2011, voter turnout in election have almost the same tendency with the freedom of the electoral process. Therefore, the more democratic the electoral process, the more the voter goes to vote in the election day.

Also notice a likely similar tendency of the voter turnout indicator with that of the corruption level from 2001 to 2013. The 12-year tendency of these two indicators lets us think that there is a high possibility that the voter shall penalize the political parties if the level of political corruption raises, thus having a positive connection of these tow variables. Whereas the democracy level has more smooth line change tendency, probably because it mapped more than the only two indicators of corruption and electoral process shown here.

Thus, in this level of description analyses, we can assert that the voter is linked with the political parties' actions. On the other hand, above we discussed of the pragmatist political parties' actions and not so much directed from the voter's trust in them.

**Graph 2. 2001 – 2017 Democracy, Electoral process, Corruption, Voter Turnout**

Source: Freedom House for the Indicators of Democracy level, Electoral Process and Corruption

Central Election Commission for the Voter turnout 2000 – 2017

Note: *For the Freedom House data, the Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The voter turnout variable is calculated the actual value / 10 (to fit in the graph, in the way to compare the tendency of these four factors)*

3. Trust in Political Parties

After discussing the political party's actor, the successive analysis below presented is focused on the other actor related to the EU Integration, the Albanian electorate and its trust to the political parties. Initially, from a descriptive analyses point of view, in Graph 3, it is shown the tendency of the political party trust's question in the period of 2014 – 2018 (European Commission, Public Opinion Survey question, 2019). In the relevant period, it results that the level of party trust from 2017 to 2018 is decreasing from 36% to 30%, and increasing level of tendency of not to trust the political parties in the same time period from 62% to 68%. The high level of unreliability (almost 2/3) and the low level of trust (almost 1/3) poses a concern to trust of the voter and the political parties' activities toward the voter interest issues. The citizens show very low level of not answering this question. Therefore, we implicate that the voter is determined in its decision of mainly not trusting the political parties. The average of 30% of the political party's trust, is probably mainly correlated to the ideological marge of electorate in Albania. Although in the analyzes below a deeper analysis on the ideological voter trust into political parties is applied, in the meaning to better explain these data.

Graph 3. Political Parties Trust

Source: European commission, Public Opinion Survey 2014 – 2018

Getting deeper into the purposes of this paper, we will be examining direct linking variables to the voter trust. After the above possible connection of the voter trust on political parties, below we will try to find if there are factors that does have a possible influence on political parties and EU integration action. Secondly, we possibly will (varying from the results) discuss whether these correlated factors do mostly relate to the pragmatic or to the ideological voter behavior. In this context, if the voter believes in the political party in an ideological context, this relation is theoretically and practically a stronger relationship between the voter and the political party's actions. In new democracies this bond is more apparent than in developed ones. (Dalton & Weldon, 2007). Consequently, the voter supports the party in long term period. Therefore, the political parties' action toward the EU Integration process would be more conditioned from the electorates trust. The opposite happens if we talk about the pragmatist behavior, connecting the voter to the political party in support of shorter-term politics or even individualistic interests. Moreover, from politicians and scholars of the electorate's voting behavior there is a tendency to admit an ambiguity in the sustainability of supporting a party or another by the voter. Political actors themselves, leaders, etc., have an influence on the variability of the electorate's support. The behavior of Albanian electorate is doubtful and not free from political and public pressures (Çınar, last seen 28.01.2018).

Additionally, a statistical test is applied to empirical data in three points of times (years 2012, 2013 and 2015). Hence, it could be confident in talking about a possible tendency of voter behavior trust in the specific direction of supporting political parties. The test is a crosstabulation one, with "the trust in political parties" as a constant variable and 21 variables (factors) of micro and macro level, related to the static variable. These tests go further inside in the exploration of the electorate that support a party. The aim is getting some more convincingly scientific results for party trust and support from the electorate. In this regard, we complement these tests results by adding another significant scientific test of "the party that the voter supports more". Factors correlated are: *Life satisfaction; Happiness; Acknowledgment with the program of political parties; Makes the political wing distinction, PD electorate; Socialist Party electorate; LSI electorate; Freedom of control over their lives; Judgment in general from the viewpoint of non - punishment in case of inconsistency - program – activity and specific for the three main parties PS, PD and LSI in Judgment by the electorate for punishment in case of inconsistency - program – activity; demographic factors such as age, gender, etc.*

The results show that it cannot state whether only micro or only macro factors impact the voter perception in influencing their trust or non – trust to the political parties. The only two variables that does correlate in a to a somehow sufficient extent are *Happiness* (0.437) and *Makes the political wing distinction* (0.415). Thus, it can be affirmed at this point that the electorate does not divide one of these dichotomist group factors. We can also state that the correlated factors change from year to year inducting that we probably have an unstable electorate. Thus, it can be presupposed that with these data analyses (supported from other continuing analyses below) of supporting the main political parties, the voter is better evaluated as a non – stable one. According to their belief to the political parties they could also be influenced from short time factors (electoral factors, etc.). Thus, political parties trust, is not confirmed to be an inflecting factor for the political parties' attitudes and action, and therefore not inflecting also their attitude toward the EU Integration process.

Besides, there is also a statistical surprise on the demographic factor's results. None of them correlates to the constant variable of "political party's trust". Thus, in these years we can declare that neither the profession, gender, incoming, education, the civil status, age or work status, does influence the voter to belief or not in a political party or to all political parties. These variable does mostly correspond to the type of ideological association of the voter to political parties (as they mostly are variables of their social or psychological group, or other long-term factors). In such logic, is more adaptable to affirm that the voter mostly shows a pragmatic type of behavior. Additionally, the voter could have not a crystalized voting behavior in itself, but rather there could be a behavior formed form outside, such as from political actors, or other outside factors. Meaning that a pragmatic voter, also brings to e pragmatic political party (affirming the results above of the pollical parties' section). This design displays a non-stable behavior, that in general happens in the transitional democratic countries.

Table 1. Factors related to political party trust 2012, 2013, 2015

Factor cross - tabulated	Cramer's '12	Sig. '12	Cramer's V '13	Sig. '13	Cramer's V '15	Sig. '15
Life satisfaction	0.159	0.106	0.164	0.000		
Happiness	*0.437*	*0.000*	0.160	0.001	0.303	0.000
Acknowledgment with the program of political parties	0.196	0.000	0.171	0.000	-	-
Makes the political wing distinction	*0.415*	*0.000*	0.169	0.000	0.257	0.000
PD electorate	0.184	0.034	0.140	0.222	0.202	0.092
PS electorate	0.195	0.008	0.163	0.000	0.183	0.008
LSI electorate	0.158	0.340	0.138	0.047	0.199	0.012
Freedom of control over their lives	0.135	0.630	-	-	-	-
Judgment in general from the viewpoint of non - punishment in case of inconsistency - program – activity	0.183	0.001	0.136	0.032	0.249	0.000
Judgment by the electorate of the PS for punishment in case of inconsistency - program – activity	0.308	0.000	0.145	0.231	0.244	0.000
Judgment by the electorate of the PD for punishment in case of inconsistency - program – activity	0.201	0.000	0.127	0.116	0.273	0.000
Judgment by the electorate of the LSI for punishment in case	-	-	0.124	0.160	-	-

of inconsistency - program - activity						
Demographic factors						
Satisfaction from finances	0.171	0.040	0.140	0.030	-	-
Gender	0.158	0.256	0.080	0.760	-	-
Age	0.320	0.000	0.110	0.630	-	-
Education	0.163	0.999	0.160	0.270	-	-
Civil status	0.124	0.999	0.100	0.810	-	-
Profession	0.251	0.183	0.420	1.000	-	-
The level of income	0.210	0.001	0.160	0.330	-	-
Occupation	0.264	0.000	0.110	0.570	-	-

4. The Ideologic Behavior Factor Influence the Political Parties in Entering the EU

Finally, as the ideological behavior of the voter is one of the most probably influential factors on the political parties' behavior, it is worth to further analyze this kind of relation, from the paper thesis point of view. The correlation test result in Table 2 (ESS data, 2012), between the trust in political parties and level of closeness the voters party support, confirm the so far outcomes. Only 22% of the test results correlated, meaning that at this level the voter that is close to the party have the tendency to trust in it. If we examine more specifically the three main political parties of Albania, we will find that although there is a somehow level of trust in the ideological voter, political parties mostly don't take this factor into consideration for their political action, as also the European Union Integration.

Table 2. Connection of trust and closeness to political parties

Trust in political parties	**Test**	**Albania 2012**
How close to party	Correlation	-0.22**
	Significance	0.000

** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$

In this perspective, in Table 3 is exposed the "Level of belief in the parties (Socialist Party, democratic Party and Socialist Movement for Integration)" variable cross tabulated to "seriousness of these three parties" variable, in the period 2007-2008. The question for the seriousness of the political parties have five levels of measure "yes very serious, serious, somewhat serious, not serious and not at all serious". It is considered only the first to "yes very serious, serious" for the purpose of this research paper. The reason is to show that if the voters trust in the political party, how much do they rely or state the reliability of each of the parties in the years 2007 and 2008 (only these two years we were able to get this kind of measurement, because of the type of the questionnaire and question raised it it).

The result confirmed that for the two main political parties in Albanian Socialist Party and Democratic Party, the voters whom believe in that party also have confidence in that party. The highest level of the data in the cells do affirms this argument. It is also confirmed the decrease of the level of the voter believing in the political party. A decrease of almost 10% for the Democratic Party and 1.13% for the Socialist Party. Consequently, is also confirmed the results analyzed above that the SP electorate is a more stable one. High level of belief results into cross sectioned variables with the one of the SMI and the SP. The levels are higher of the belief in SP related to the SMI, 8.8% in 2007 and 10.2% in 2008, resulting in a slight increase of 1.4% (different from the two-main traditional political parties), and a lower increase for the SMI of +1%. We must mention also that the two main political parties of Albania, have surely higher degrees of voter trust and seriousness in that party.

Therefore, the most probable factor to influence the actions of the political parties, could be the ideological voter, even though they show low level of impact. Adding here also the other results of high level of pragmatic behavior of both actors, and also the factor that the voter even though the party does not fulfill it platform and political promises, they will not punish their parties – will keep voting it (mostly of the Socialist Party), object of a high chance of non-behavior of the political parties linked to the voter trust their attitude toward the EU integration.

Table 3. Level of trust in PS, PD, LSI and Seriousness of party crosstabulation 2007-08

Factor	Year	PS	PD	LSI
Seriousness of Democratic Party	2005	-	-	-
	2007	2.3%	25.4%	0.8%
	2008	5.7%	14.9%	2.6%
Seriousness of Socialist Party	2005	-	-	-
	2007	17.2%	4.0%	2.6%
	2008	16.7%	4.9%	1.9%
Socialist Movement for Integration	2005	-	-	-
	2007	8.8%	4.1%	5.3%
	2008	10.2%	4.7%	6.3%

Note: The alternative shown is "Yes" (completely yes + mainly yes)

5. Conclusions

As a conclusion, the voter trust into political parties results not to be a determinant for the Political party's action and attitude toward the European Integration. Although it is a factor of slowing down the level of belief of the Albanian citizens that Albania will enter the EU soon, resulting not so positive for this country to integrate in a bigger politically and economically government. This could be one explanation of non-action so much towards the EU integration of the Albanian political parties.

Today's political parties in Albania have highlighted the clientele trends and the patronage system. The results show that the voter does not constitute a very strong influencing actor in their line of action. Institutions and other political party interests can contribute to their political activities, especially in terms of European integration. Here the greatest role can be played by the international factor linked to the pragmatic interests of political parties. In fact, for the development and democratic integration of Albania into the EU, this order needs to change in the direction of focusing on reforming, involving and fulfilling the requirements and issues of the Albanian electorate.

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THE 14TH EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

The Meanings of Romanian Patriotism
in Three Texts from the Beginning of the 20th Century

Fănel Teodorașcu[1]

Abstract: In this paper, we intend to follow how the *patriotism* was explained to Romanians during the period preceding Romania's entry into the First World War. We consider our approach important and because on 1st of December 2018 the Romanians celebrated for the one hundredth time the Day of the Great Union. In our research, three texts, each of them belonging to another author, will be followed. The first text represents an orthodox Christian point of view on *patriotism*, the second text comes from the sphere of politics, and the last text on which we will stop embodies the military vision of the matter dealt with here. In addition to these three texts, we will also use articles that have been published in magazines such as: *Revista Generală a Învăţământului* (The General Magazine of Education), *Revista Istorică Română* (the Romanian Historical Review), *Revista Grănicerilor* (the Guardian Magazine), *Revista Istorică Română* (the Historic Magazine), *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* (the Romanian Orthodox Church,) Furnica, etc.

Keywords: patriotism; nationalism; history of press; education; communism

1. Some Explanations

In Romania, the political events that took place in recent years determined the national public space to talk seriously about *patriotism* again. After the fall of the *Communist regime*, which took place in *December 1989*, there was less talk of "patriotism", which was associated, especially by young people, with the policy of the Romanian Communist Party (P.C.R.). Today, there is talk[2] of patriotism again. Attempts to define/redefine *patriotism* are made by specialists from different fields of activity. Not just in the speeches of politicians, university professors, sociologists, psychologists, etc. one can find references to how *patriotism* is understood, but also in some commercial advertisements (even if in the latter case the idea of patriotism is not clearly expressed, but only suggested). In this paper we do not intend to clarify the meaning of *patriotism*. There are already many works that have undertaken this goal. Our intentions are much more modest.

Over the years, "many meanings of patriotism" have been given, but most of these meanings were, if we were to believe the author of an article published in 1944, "false". (Miclea, 1944, p. 2) In our research, we wanted to see how the *patriotism* was explained to Romanians during the period preceding Romania's entry into the First World War, at the end of which political events took place that led to the Great Union which took place on 1st of December 1918. We consider our approach as important and

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[2] See (Marin, November 30, 2016). At https://pressone.ro/ce-este-si-ce-nu-este-patriotismul/The article was quoted on December 10 2018, at 05.01 p.m.

because in the year 2018 there have been hundreds of years since the aforementioned event. Three texts were chosen in this respect, each of them belonging to another author. The first (Teodorescu, 1912, pp. 482-499) of the texts chosen by us represents a Christian Orthodox point of view on *patriotism*, the second text (Iorga, 1914, pp. 3-12) comes from the sphere of politics, and the last text (Arifeanu, 1921, pp. 16-19) on which we will stop embodies the military vision of the matter dealt with here. The authors of these three texts are Ilie Teodorescu, N. Iorga and Virgil Arifeanu, respectively.

2. Some Definitions of Patriotism

In order to make an inventory of patriotism works, even of Romanian ones, it would take many years of thorough research. For this reason, we will only stop at some of the texts that refer to the Romanian patriotism. So, in an article published in *Vulturul* (the Eagle) in 1906, it appears that from all the feelings known by the man, the most powerful is "patriotic feeling." It is also shown here that "the holiest and most exalting" love is "the love of the homeland". According to the author of the article quoted, every human being "with pure heart and clear mind" loves "the country and the nation" and for this reason the greatest happiness he knows is to die for the homeland. (Patriciu, 1906, p. 1.) In 1933, in an article published in Oradea in *Cele Trei Crisuri*, Gh. Popescu spoke about the elements that distinguish the *patriotism* of *nationalism*: "In opposition to nationalism, patriotism has its deep roots in the land of the country. Patriotism involves the love of the earth that we and our ancestors were born on. The native land must be the garment that man must serve until death. The limit of this land is fixed by nature itself, by the property of people of the same nation, of the same origin, language, habits, the same feelings that connect a large family through strong bonds with similar purposes. In a country where boundaries are not naturally attached to the above considerations, patriotism turns into nationalism and nationalism in a mysticism." (Popescu, 1933, p. 135) In 1919, the article" Patriotism and Patriotism "was published in the humor magazine *Furnica*. In this article, the author talks about the inferiority complex that Romanians have in relation to the French when it comes to *patriotism*: "That's as old as time: the neighbor's hen makes bigger eggs. […] Not. In the field of patriotism, be it French, the big guys, but we also do not let ourselves down. But this is the Romanian: he looks over the fence and seems warmer on the plot rather than in his own garden. (Yo, 1919, p. 6) "In 1921, in an article published in the *Revista Grănicerilor* (the Guardian Magazine), C. Cepleanu showed that "country love is something born in the Romanian soul". (Cepleanu, 1921, p. 4) Thus, Romanians are naturally patriots. They love the place where their mothers gave birth more than others do. (Cepleanu, 1921, p. 3) Finally, in a paper published in 1988 in the *Revista de Istorie* (History Magazine*)*, Nicolae Ceausescu, the one who was "the president of socialist Romania", is indicated as an example of a "great patriot". (Oprițescu, 1988, p. 750(6)) In the quoted paper it is also shown that "the masses led by the PCR, plenary engaged in a profound revolutionary work of building a new society, have given new meanings, qualitatively superior to patriotism. (Oprițescu, 1988, p. 750 (6); p. 749 (5)). "We will specify in this part of our paper that, in 1943, a very interesting article about the *patriotism manual* published in Iaşi in 1829 was published in the *Revista Istorica Romana* (Romanian Historical Review*)*. But we will not stop on this article now, but we will mention it in the Bibliography.

3. a) Patriots Marry and have Children

In 1911, in Târgovişte, the steward Ilie Teodorescu held a conference called "Patriotic Sentiment" at a congress of the "Association for the Propagation and Spreading of the Homeland". We reached the text of the conference through the *Biserica Ortodoxă Română (*Romanian Orthodox Church magazine*)*, in

which it was published in August 1912. So, before showing "patriotic feeling" (Teodorescu, 1912, pp. 482-499), Ilie Teodorescu talks about what is not a "patriotic feeling." In the opinion of the quoted author, "patriotic feeling" has been "over the centuries" of "many and different changes". This is explained by the fact that, according to the author, in some people the "patriotic feeling" takes the form of "chauvinism" or the form of "cosmopolitanism". Also, in this part of the text, Ilie Teodorescu establishes the "foundations of the homeland idea" and does so in the manner used above, showing what is not the *idea of a homeland*. More specifically, *the homeland* is not a "narrow idea" that the progress of human society will make disappear. Despite those who popularize false doctrines about *patriotism* and *the homeland*, Ilie Teodorescu shows that nothing can *break down* the noble patriotic feeling that is in the Romanians. The same author, however, points out that it is necessary for the patriots to take action against false doctrines. Patriots are advised, however, "not to exaggerate anything in supporting and preaching the idea of patriotic feeling." This recommendation originated in the fact that "the patriot with many claims" does not help *patriotism*, but "ruins" it. The same source shows that patriots whose patriotic acts are exaggerated make the "patriotic feeling change and become *chauvinism*." Patriots *with many claims* "push the love of native land to madness". In the opinion of such patriots, *love for the native land* is not clean unless it is "built upon hatred" and if it is "not sustained by hostile attacks against anything foreign." According to Ilie Teodorescu, the *patriotic feeling* must be based on ideas spread by *Christian religion*. In this respect, the author quoted recalls the "Sermon on the Mount". *Christianity*, Ilie Teodorescu says, will never bless *chauvinism*, and the reason is that *beautiful patriotism* is "open" and "magnificent." For "pure and holy patriotism" worse than *chauvinism* is only *cosmopolitanism*. The latter is considered by the author of the text we pursue as "a mask" under which, in fact, "selfishness" is hidden. *Cosmopolitanism* is, in most cases, "a ferment of social dissolution."

After talking about the *flawed* variants of *patriotism*, Ilie Teodorescu moves his attention to "the true patriotic feeling." So, for the true patriot "homeland is the first necessity." This situation is explained by the fact that the homeland "is the condition of individual development, it is the protection of social life, the vessel that prevents the waste of precious liquid; it is for the world, under its current conditions, the solid embankment, but indispensable, against anarchy. The *true patriot's* life "does not begin exclusively at his birth and does not end at his death." It started with "our parents and our ancestors" and continues with our sons and grandchildren. In order to be able to grow, respecting the "law of nature given to us by God," the *patriot* must adhere "to the land of the homeland, to its tradition and history." Having exposed the basic principles of *patriotism*, the author begins to talk about the *patriotism of Romanians*. So, the brotherly feeling of the Romanians is in danger of being thrown under the pressure of *insults* and *unwarranted criticism*. Those whom Ilie Teodorescu points the finger at in this regard are members of political parties and journalists.

In Romania, *public life* is "noisy," and *the face of social life* is "unattractive". Despite these shortcomings, says the same author, Romania has something to be proud of: the *Romanian army*, the *Romanian universities*, the *Romanian Academy*, the *Romanian artists and writers*, the *Romanian priests*, the *Romanian family* and the *Romanian people*. Romanians must, however, have the "strong faith in God" and remain *Orthodox Christians* in addition to those shown above. According to Ilie Teodorescu, Romania, if "it will not be an Orthodox Christian," "loses any more significant action". Ilie Teodorescu asks the Romanians not to be "patriots of persuasion, but of action". The patriotism of action requires that Romanians work together "harmoniously so that *Romania has citizens, have good laws and, finally, have brotherly peace*."

The first *action* that *patriotism of action involves is marriage*: "The wedding has its own laws and it is the duty of the man to obey it. As for celibacy, I find, according to the teachings of the Apostle Paul,

that it is sublime or miserable. (Teodorescu, 1912, p. 492). "In particular, celibacy is" sublime "when it is the result of" a compelling debt "and is miserable when it is the result of needs "of human nature". Marriage is important, says Ilie Teodorescu, because God created men "with the help of man." The absence of *domestic life* results in the *depopulation of the country*, and a country without children is a country without soldiers willing to defend their country at all costs. For a Romanian to be considered a *patriot of action*, it is not enough for him to marry and to give sons to the country. He has to give his sons *a solid education*: "Education is the first and most important power of movement of a nation. Let us give Romania the bright, generous, devoted, patriotic sons and, if we want them to be truly useful and worthy, to drink them with the living and wonderful water of the Orthodox Christian faith. (Teodorescu, 1912, pp. 493-494) "The second action of the *patriotism of action* relates to the need for "good laws" of Romania, in order to be well governed. Romania is governed by the people, through its representatives in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. For this reason, Ilie Teodorescu shows, the patriot has the "duty" to *tell his opinion*, to *speak*. The great power of the people is the *vote*, which must not be left to the care of those who do not understand its true role. By voting, the patriots contribute to "endowing the homeland with good laws". Finally, the third action of *patriotism of action* is related to *preserving the brotherly peace*: "Fraternity is the cement to which human beings are bound to build a nation. As the cohesion of sand grains form the rock, as love builds the family, so brotherhood grows and develops the nation. From this, one can see how bad is evil and how stupid is the foolishness of those who, under the pretext of adjusting a law or changing a regime, tend to raise storms and scratches. (Teodorescu, 1912, p. 496) "In support of his claims of brotherhood, Ilie Teodorescu brings the words of the Savior: "You have heard that it was said to the former: «Do not kill»; and whoever will kill, will be worthy of judgment. But I say to you: Whoever gets angry with his brother shall be worthy of judgment [...] "(Matthew 5, pp. 21-22). Romanians, although they are brothers, are "enemies of one another". For this reason, Ilie Teodorescu asks the *true patriots* to "keep against the lost, deceived, unconscious and weak a war of light and fraternity and not attack." The Romanian *who truly loves his homeland* must stop his "selfish impulses "and work firstly, *for the country*. The Patriot says he is "a drop of water in the ocean of his people". *The heart, the life and the forces* of the patriot belong to his homeland.

b) National Solidarity Creates True Patriotism

In a work dedicated to N. Iorga, Pamfil Şeicaru tells how in the autumn of 1917, when he was returning from the front, he went home to the great historian, in Iaşi, "to expose him the state of mind of those in the trenches." (Teodoraşcu, 2014, p. 165) Following the talks with Şeicaru, Iorga would have said: "I don't watch who holds the flag of the country, I see the flag of the country, I defend the flag of the country." (Şeicaru, 2002, p. 169) In this key must be understood, we say, the patriotism of N. Iorga.

On September 8, 1914, N. Iorga held in Galaţi a conference on *true patriotism* (Iorga, 1914, pp. 3-12). Though he did not appreciate "raillery," N. Iorga testified in our text that he had the habit of using *irony* when he spoke of "ridiculous and corrupt exaggerations," which he considered both "vain" and "unhealthy." Thus, N. Iorga will use *irony* in the text we follow, but not the "brutal raillery". The explanation is that, according to the author, in the national political past there were times when the "reprehensible pedagogy of mockery" prevented the harmonious development of Romania.

In the months following the outbreak of the "Great War," *Romanian statemen* (Teodoraşcu, 2015, pp. 23-24) could not decide on the side with which Romania would enter the battle (Bacalbaşa, 1936, pp. 179-195). There were many who said that Romania had to give up neutral attitude as quickly as possible to enter the "war" (Bacalbaşa, 1936, p. 184). The thoughts of the Romanians were taken by war (Bacalbaşa, 1936, p. 183). For this reason, N. Iorga showed in his conference that "patriotic

demonstrations" are natural and often have *a real value*. However, the quoted author believed that *patriotic demonstrations* are useful to the country only if those participating are prepared to turn their *patriotic slogans* into *patriotic deeds*. For example, *patriots* who ask for their country to enter a war must be the first to ask for enlistment to fight in that war. According to N. Iorga, a patriot is not allowed to joke about *the name and the colors* of his country. For this reason, any word spoken in the name of the country must be "a holy duty for the greatest sacrifices".

In order for Romanians not to confuse *true patriotism* with *less true patriotism*, Iorga defines the first. In fact, Iorga will define what can be defined as a patriotic *feeling*: the *purpose* it pursues and the *means* it uses. According to N. Iorga, the patriots are divided into two categories. First of all, it is the category of those who begin to feel patriotism when a great danger lies "on the borders of their country". They are embraced, in "bad times," by the sincere desire to "fight for the defense of national territory". Besides this category of patriots, there is also the category of patriots who always have patriotic feelings. The patriot in the second category differs from the patriot in the first category "through his work".

Work, says N. Iorga, is part of man's *nature*. For this reason, only "the sick, the fool and the vicious" are entitled to be lazy. But work is also two ways. Starting from an Asian legend, N. Iorga shows that work can be "white" or "black". *White labor* is *holy*, and *black labor* is *cursed*. For training patriots, the first of the two types of work are very important, but it is not enough. The "holy" work creates "good people", "people of faith," but not "true patriots". *True patriotism* comes from "the great, continuous patriotic act of full, absolute national solidarity." This type of *patriotism* develops a "militant power" of a nation: "The moral powers that are meant to merge at any moment in the active moral unity of the nation are multiplied and strengthened by every blow of grabbing axe, by each turn of the wheels, through each line written and by every thought that flies." According to N. Iorga," these moral powers "represent the" sure factors of victory ".

c) Patriotism is measured when the Country is in Difficult Times

In this part of our research, we will use the book entitled *Cartea Românului. Manual de educaţie naţională pentru cetăţeni şi ostaşi* (Arifeanu, 1921, pp. 16-19) signed by Virgil Arifeanu. The volume we used was published in 1921, but it should be said that much of this work (127 pages out of a total of 183 pages) was taken from the brochure *Pentru Armată şi Neamul Românes* (For Romanian Army and People), which was published in 1913. We also show here and that some of the ideas about patriotism used by Virgil Arifeanu are quoted by Major Octav Boian in "Virtuţile ostăşeşti (Soldiers' virtues)". Therefore, according to Virgil Arifeanu, *patriotism*, also known as *the love of the homeland*, "is the love that each Romanian must have for Wallachia and for the Romanian nation." In fact, *the love of the homeland is*, as the quoted paper shows, which every man must have for his own country. *The patriotic feeling* is the *noblest and most powerful* of the feelings that man has or ought to have. This *feeling*, the quoted author points out, makes the one who has it "to sacrifice his fortune and even his life for the good and defense of his homeland, subduing all his private interests."

In the quoted paper, *patriotism*, from which "that moral force, that strength of character" rises, through which people manage to assault their enemies, "is the strain of all secular virtues." In peace time, *the feeling of patriotism* seems to be "numb in our hearts," and its glow is only visible in certain situations: when we talk about "the glorious past or suffering of the nation," "when the interests of the Motherland are at stake" or "when news from outside rush our pride and ambition." "In the difficult days of the country", the feeling of *patriotism* "bursts like a flood and shines like a sun in all hearts and in all the strata of society." (Boian, 1921, p. 16)

Only in the difficult moments the *Romanian patriotism* can be measured. In the days of *despondency*, all Romanians "stand up for the defense of the ancestral field". These days one can see what patriotism is: *devotion to the homeland*. Patriotism is the "strain of virtues" and "it supports itself" *discipline, devotion, courage, military honor, and military duty*. Without *patriotism*, the quoted text reads, there can be no heroic deeds. The power of a country, shown in the same source, is in the power of love that its soldiers carry.

4. Conclusion

According to Dimitrie Bolintineanu, *patriotism* does not consist only in the patriot's love for his country, but also in his desire to put "general interests" before "personal interests". (Bolintineanu, p. 72) The same writer also points out that "the feeling against patriotism" is "cosmopolitanism", this being explained by the fact that "nationality" is at the *core of patriotism*. (Bolintineanu, p. 73) According to Mihai Eminescu, instead, *patriotism* is love for *the country's past*, not love for the land of the country, because there can be no "country love" if there is no "cult of the past". (Bolintineanu, p. 73) In a study (Bolintineanu, p. 73) published in the beginning of 1939, Constantin Atanasiu, in the *Revista Generala a Invatamantului* (General Education Review), showed that *patriotism* is one of the ideas that "*are the basis of individual and collective soul power*". These *ideas*, including *patriotism*, need to be *revised* when the "people battle" conditions change in a significant way. The importance of *patriotism*, the same author shows, does not have to be doubted, because it represents one of the *two ideas*[1] that represent the "foundation of soul power" and which "can be considered levers of moral resistance of a nation".[2] According to some authors, RCP members are those who have managed to give patriotism a new, superior quality to the one known at the time of the establishment of the communist regime in Romania. In a recent work (2017), commenting on a definition of King Michael's[3] patriotism, Cristinel Munteanu said that "we are the children of the homeland, but we ourselves ought to love it not only as a mother, but also as a daughter".

There are many journalists who have written about *patriotism*. There are also many people who have spoken of the *patriotic feeling*. Priests and intellectuals have also been among those who have tried to explain *the meanings of patriotism*. We have seen in our work that, according to some authors, true patriotism is the feeling that causes the patriot to marry, to have children, to respect his right to vote, to work for his country, etc. Other authors, on the other hand, consider that patriotism is truly visible only when the country is in great danger. According to the latter, patriotism can be measured only when the country is in difficult times. It is hard to say which of the definitions of *patriotism* we are pursuing in this paper is the most comprehensive. In fact, even N. Iorga, one of the authors of the texts on which we stopped in our research, said that no one is allowed to define a feeling. A feeling is, said the same author, whether respected or crushed.

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[1] The second ideea that Constantin Atanasiu reffers is the *Ideal*.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 49.
[3] King Michael defined *patriotism* as follows: „Being a patriot means to love your country as it is, but, at the same time, to do all you cant o make it better".

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THE 14TH EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

Enlargement of the European Union
in the Western Balkans and Russia's Geopolitics in the Region

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Abstract: The European construction at the level of establishing an economic, political, social and cultural unity between its constituent states and those which are to complete it,represent the ultimate vision of a united and solid Europe, designed to generate welfare and security for all its members. Our approach attempts to reveal the functionality and substance of the Union's enlargement objectives in the area, generically called the Western Balkans. These goals, which have recently been translated into a strategy, will be achieved in 2025 for Serbia and Montenegro and for the other countries in a more distant future. Obviously, the European Union is not the only geopolitical player in the area and, certainly, the proposed objectives are directly or indirectly linked to Russia's regional geopolitical strategy. Thus, we show that in this enlargement process we are already in the collision phase of the two macrostates, the European Union and Russia, state entities which have so far prepared strategies of influence and have also undertaken approaches of strategic anchoring in the Balkan region. The present paper focuses on the geopolitics of the two powers, which is already in progress and produces effects in the Balkan bloc. Given that the Balkan bloc is more a strategic security area than an economic pulse, the centering of the two forces will materialize according to the interests of security and socio-political stability. It is to bementioned that the European Union will usually bet on the strengths of the six Balkan bloc states and Russia on their weaknesses, even more, on the Union's cumbersome response mechanism. If Serbia and Montenegro have a horizon in 2025, Northern Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo will remain in this dispute for a longer period of time.

Keywords: European Union; Russia; the Balkan bloc; strategy; Serbia; Montenegro; Albania; North Macedonia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo

Introduction

At this point, the world scene is clearly configured in terms of the power exercised and constituted by the great powers, the struggle going only to consolidate these elements and possibly to seize new areas of influence that would only have a defensive role. Therefore, we know that the West maintains the same mechanism of external action and the East and Asian powers count on a strategic and operational flexibility that has often proved to be more effective in strategic geopolitics.

In this global and especially regional context, the European Union wants to be an inter-state macro-entity that dictates and develops a socio-political concept that has the role of coagulating nations and stimulating a form of cohabitation based on sustainable criteria from the perspective of the individual to the social and cultural macrogrup.

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The Union's constitution and enlargement process is well known in terms of its evolution over the years and obviously, the results of this process make this mechanism continue and produce effects that have a defining role in the achievement of the European goal, namely that of being the area of security and well-being for all its citizens. But exactly on the same basic criteria there is a collision with other regional and world players. More specifically, the European intercultural, social and economic conglomerate runs counter to the other social, cultural and economic patterns of the other superpowers, namely the United States of America, Russia and China.

Talking about the prospect of a new wave of EU accession, which looks at the countries in the Western Balkans, we appreciate that Russia's influence is and will continue to more and more manifest itself. Analyzing in general terms the six countries in the Balkan bloc, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, we observe a religiously heterogeneous population and substantial gaps in the gross domestic product of these countries. Besides, the geographic position of these states determines a particular prioritization of geopolitical interests in the area, both for the European Union and for Russia.

Considering these background elements, we can appreciate that the strategic approach of Russia and the European Union for attaining its own objectives will have different characteristics and tactics that are surely to generate extremely important long-term effects. In order to define and analyze the evolution of the goals of the two European powers, we must understand from the beginning that Russia has chosen, through its leader Vladimir Putin, to agree to the theory promoted by Aleksandr Gelievich Dughin, namely that Russia must exist as an empireand this empire must be defended primarily by natural borders formed by states or large areas of territory. This approach, coupled with the new generation war, set up by General Valeri Gherasimov, the chief of the Military Russian Staff, only reveals the challenge that the European Union must face in its enlargement process. It should also be noted that this new wave of enlargement will be built on the admission of these new states in block and the admission bloc will consist of at least two states.

In our analysis we will highlight the importance of the formation of these accession tandems and the vulnerability of the strategy adopted by the European Union in the process. To the same extent, we will transpose the reporting of these vulnerabilities to Russia's tactics to maintain influence in this area.

Content

In February 2018, the European Union, through the European Commission, published a strategy aimed at guaranteeing,in front of the Balkan countries, the continuation of the enlargement process and the admission of new states into the Union. This is very important for the simple reason that this document speaks of an acceleration of certain negotiation chapters and of the effective building of the accession bloc.

The accession bloc consists of Montenegro and Serbia, Albania and Northern Macedonia and with a more remote perspective, Bosnia and Herzegovina with Kosovo. In this configuration which could be called a strategic one, Russia seems to be able to play its game and promote its interests much easier, but reality is breaking apart in something else.

The strategy confirms the European perspective of the region as a geostrategic investment in a stable, strong and united Europe, based on common values, identifies the priorities and areas of cooperation and addresses the difficulties faced by the region, emphasizing the need for fundamental reforms and the building of some good neighbourly relations. The objective of the strategy is to provide a new impulse for reforms in the region to address the major challenges faced by the countries concerned. Novelty consists of a new strong message of encouragement for the necessary reforms to those countries

and guidance on the steps they need to take to move forward as soon as possible on the way to EU membership.

For Serbia and Montenegro, for which accession negotiations are already in progress, the strategy sets out the indicative milestones that need to be completed to finish the accession process in the perspective of 2025 adherence. In addition, through the six emblematic initiatives in key areas, the strategy significantly reinforces the EU's commitment to Western Balkan partners.

These six emblematic initiatives are specific actions that the EU will adopt in the coming years to support Western Balkan transformation efforts in areas of mutual interest. The following directions are concerned: strengthening the rule of law, enhancing security and migration commitment, supporting socio-economic development, increasing connectivity in transport and energy, launching a Digital Agenda for the Western Balkans, supporting reconciliation and good neighbourly relations. The main actions and their timetable are set out in the "Action Plan to Support the Western Balkans Transformation", annexed to the enlargement strategy.[1]

But these steps are very complex and uncertain in reality, as well as some statements made by European leaders expressing their reserved views. Thus, in a joint press conference with the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker and the European Council President, Donald Tusk, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Boyko Borisov, could not hide his dissatisfaction with the outcome of the meeting. Addressing the Western journalists, he spoke about the importance of joining the Western Balkan states to the EU and drew attention to the involvement of other forces, such as Russia, in this region. Borisov said he did not understand the Europeans' fear of these countries, which together have a population of 17.7 million citizens.

The French President, Emmanuel Macron, told the reporters that over the past 15 years, each time the enlargement has been talked about, a "weakening of Europe" has been achieved. "I do not think we are doing any favour either to the candidate countries or to us by maintaining a mechanism that somehow has no rules", Macron said. The French leader emphasized that the EU needs a "real reform" before a new enlargement.[2]

A news periodical states that, during the stage of Albania's tour through the countries aspiring to join the European Union, Jean-Clude Juncker told the press: "Contrary to what we read everywhere, the Commission and I did not say that Serbia and Montenegro would necessarily be members of the EU in 2025. The 2025 term is open to all candidate countries and if a candidate country meets all the accession criteria up to date or sooner, we will act so that its efforts are recognized by the EU."[3]

Against the background of what the European official said, the perspective of the Montenegrin official, described in a publication stating that "Montenegro's newly elected president, Milo Djukanovic, made publicly known that he intended to improve the relation with the Russian Federation, a relation that has become increasingly cold as Montenegro's NATO integration process has advanced and become a reality, despite Moscow's opposition. The Montenegrin Foreign Minister, Srdjan Darmanovic, praised the initiative of the Montenegrin president and, despite his notoriety for harsh comments on Russia's influence in the Western Balkans and Montenegrin politics, Darmanovic emphasized the need to improve the relations between Montenegro and the Russian Federation."[4]

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[1]http://www.cdep.ro/afaceri_europene/afeur/2018
[2]https://www.euractiv.ro
[3]https://www.digi24.ro
[4]https://monitorulapararii.ro/balcanii-de-vest

Taking into account the profoundness of things, we observe Russia's functional strategy, which has positioned its influence in the former Yugoslavian countries, especially Serbia. Under these conditions, Albania-Northern Macedonia tandem will become an easily manipulated target by Russia, as neither at this time the old dispute between Albania and Macedonia has been fully resolved, even if officially this is over. The Slav origin of the population in the region plays a crucial role in the exertion of certain influences by Russia, especially since, through its good relations with Bulgaria, a country that considers Macedonia as a Bulgarian territory, Russia will seek to strengthen its strategic position in the area.

What Russia already created in the Western Balkans is very difficult to dismantle by the European Union and Russia has strategically positioned itself playing the book called Kosovo. The smarter Russia's strategy in the Balkans is, for the simple reason that the economic investments in Serbia are very low compared to the amounts allocated by the European Union to this country.

The relations between Serbia and Kosovo are extremely tense, especially since last year a Serbian train was sent to Kosovo, which said in many languages, "Kosovo is Serbian". Putin's involvement by Serbia's president, Aleksandar Vucic, on this issue shows that Russia is an important player in the geopolitical maneuvers of the region. Serbia is Moscow's most important pawn, which has gained this low-cost influence. Serbia refused to impose sanctions on Russia, as Montenegro, for example, did. The Serbian mercenaries fought in Donetsk to destabilize Ukraine.

Russian companies have invested in Serbia five times less than the European ones, says Serbia Monitor. European business investments for the past decade amount to 15 billion euros, equivalent to 73% of total investments made in Serbia. In the first half of last year the weight was 85%. Traditionally, the EU was Serbia's largest and most important trading partner, with more than 60% of its imports and exports. In addition, between 2000 and 2015, the EU countries granted Serbia 2.7 billion euros of non-reimbursable funds, hoping that in the future this country would make enough progress to enter the Union.[1]

Russia has increased its commitment to the region, trying to delay the Western Balkans' access to the European Union and block the course of those countries that want integration into the North Atlantic Alliance. In addition, Moscow uses every opportunity, including intelligence structures, and sometimes the Russian Orthodox Church, to promote its interests and to support anti-Western sentiment, especially among Serbs and to undermine the Western influence throughout the region.

In this context, it is worth emphasizing the perceptions developed by the Orthodox Slavs in the Western Balkans regarding Russia and the European Union. Belgrade's Security Policy Centre poll shows that Serbs perceive Russia as a major political (70%) and military (79%) political power and, on the other hand, according to another poll, the 2017 Balkan Barometer, only 26% of Serbs believe that joining the European Union is a good thing. At the same time, the data collected by the Ministry of European Integration in Serbia between June and December 2017 show that support for the Serbian membership of the European Union often varies between 48% and 52%.

The new attitude and vision of the Russian leaders shows us very clearly that Russia exploits all the opportunities offered by one of its strong points, namely its quality as an important supplier of energy resources on the world markets, thus strengthening its position in the field of regional and global security. Thus, an important tool for strengthening influence in the Western Balkans is Russia's energy strategy, which includes increasing its share of energy resources, often at the expense of Western suppliers of such resources, building pipeline networks across all geographical directions, influencing

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[1]https://www.zf.ro/business-international

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the market by increasing the prices of energy resources and, implicitly, generating and enhancing the dependence of as many countries in the region as possible, including by coordinating its activities with other energy producers.[1]

Analytically looking at these de facto situations, we can assume that the Union's enlargement policy is rather a policy tactic at the Union's border than a clear enlargement process and the purpose of this policy is to correctly and substantially assess possible internal security slips within the Union on the basis of disputes of cultural or religious origin. This strategy adopted by the European Union is a socio-political exercise to which the aspiring countries will have to participate and their participation will definitely define the future community building. Thus, at this moment, the European Union proves its geostrategic maturity in the area and becomes cautious in its expanding endeavors.

The consolidation factor becomes paramount in all community sectors, and intercultural diffusion represent the key to success in all macro-community processes that converge towards a safe area and capable of responding to any planetary power in the field of military and economic security. Ensuring the flexible and secure mechanisms that it is now experiencing in the Western Balkans, the European Union becomes a skilled and flexible player at its southern border and this experiment will be decisive in its strategy towards Turkey, a country that has been negotiating with the Union for a very long time. The fact that a strategy offers a perspective for the Balkan countries, the European Union does not promise anything, and it also introduces a new concept, namely adherence in block. This type of accession, at least in the case of Macedonia and Albania, says exactly what the European security community wants to be.

While Russia is diplomatically repositioned vis-à-vis most western states, the size of the Kremlin's influence in the Western Balkans and the mechanisms used by Russian leaders show that Moscow is failing to take concrete action to maintain considerable influence in this region.

However, even thoughfrom a geopolitical point of view the Western Balkans occupy an important place in Moscow's area of interest, from a geo-economic point of view, Russia does not have the means to replace the West. The European Union is still the most important trading partner of the Western Balkans, accounting for over 76% of the trade in the region, with Brussels being the main supplier and key source of foreign direct investment in most of the countries in the region, even though there are many reforms and conditions to meet the aspirations of the six states and the integration of the region into the structures of the European Union. But this does not prevent the Russian authorities from disrupting the process of stabilizing the region and contributing to maintaining the status of Western Balkan security-conscious entity.

In the Western Balkans,Moscow is trying the same strategies and tactics tested and operationallyusedin Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the Baltic states, exploiting in a professional manner the main vulnerabilities of the Western Balkans. The growing religious agitation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian-Kosovo dispute over the status of the former Serbian province point to the main objective of the Russian authorities, which is and will remain the blocking of any process of solving these problemmes and inducing and developing distrust in motivations, capabilities and goals of the European and Euro-Atlantic structures to further enhance the major division of civil society across the Western Balkans.[2]

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[1]https://monitorulapararii.ro/
[2]https://monitorulapararii.ro

Conclusions

The enlargement process of the European Union is one of another strategic concept, which from our perspective has acquired the strength and maturity of countering Russia's geopolitical and geostrategic security strategy. Even though the Western Balkan states are not soon an integral part of the European Union, they play a key role in the regional security and the regional economic development.The democratic exercise imposed by the European community on the Balkan states strengthens a deep reform path that the Union is considering in this region. Moreover, the new energy independence solutions the Union has in view, clearly outlines the capacity of the European community to become a stable and independent macro-state.

Russia is aware of the fact that it cannot brutallyintervene in this area and, to a large extent, it does not want it, as Russia's goal is to reject the Euro-Atlantic force structures.

From this dual perspective, Russia's interest in the area and the European Union's strategy in this region, we conclude that the Union's enlargement process is only a strategic and long-lasting approach and the security of the area will exclusively depend on the foreign policy of the two great powers, the European Union and Russia.

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