



THE 13<sup>TH</sup> EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
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REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

**International Relations in the Contemporary World.  
Geopolitics and Diplomacy**

**The Changing Nature of Diplomacy: Rising Powers' Humanitarian  
Diplomacy Practices**

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**Abstract:** In this study, the ways of how the sample rising powers conduct their humanitarian diplomacy are analyzed since there is heterogeneity such in the other fields of foreign policy implementations. Rising powers' foreign policies and their soft power tools are a debatable issue in general. However, this study goes into much detail within the scope of humanitarian diplomacy and humanitarian aid as a part of it. The case study includes the sample countries which are Turkey, Brazil and China. The official reports, official foreign policies and their implementations are considered in the analysis. Turkey's perception on humanitarian issues is based on the idea of humanity and international responsibility with its historical and cultural history. Brazil's focus on humanitarian issues is mostly related to both its foreign policies and multilateralism tendencies. China has deep philosophical thoughts and some long-term goals. Even the policies of case countries seem in this way in principle and humanitarian issues are universally accepted issues, when the implementations are analyzed, there are some differences that inhibit us to reach a general conclusion and prove the heterogeneity in the practices. Thus, this study is an important contribution for such privatized diplomacy theme regarding the sample rising powers.

**Keywords:** humanitarian aid; foreign policy; emerging powers; responsibility; humanitarian report

## **1. Introduction**

The general definition of power is to ability to influence and effect the behaviours' of other to get what you want. The attitude and way of getting what you want defines whether it is soft power or hard power. The military and economic sanctions, inducements, threats, coercions are all part of hard power and their effects' can be seen in the short run. However, soft power is a kind of indirect way to effect the others' decisions. A nation's ability to persuade and attract to the others with its attractiveness of culture, political ideas and policies is called as soft powers. (Nye, 2004, p. 2) Rising powers in international relations are getting much more share in international politics than ever before. The way that they conduct their foreign policies is a debatable issue in international politics since the growing attention to soft power tools rather than the hard power tools.

Changing power relations and increasing number of the actors that are included in these relations have also changed the way implementing foreign policies in different ways. Diplomacy can be regarded as

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the most important way of implementing the foreign policies. On the one hand, the number of the actors included in the diplomacy increased and on the other hand, the increasing tools of power have changed the power structure. (Cooper, Heine & Thakur, 2013, p. 50) In the cases of conflict, chaos, war, natural disasters, diplomacy needs to be conducted. However, based on the scope of damage and efforts by the governments, states and organizations may not be able to solve the problems or tend not to give time or use resources for a political situation. (Egeland, 2013) And over time, diplomacy has started to be a privatized field that one can see many different kinds of diplomacies and one them is public diplomacy which means to influence the citizens of other countries' behaviours in a parallel way of their foreign policies by emphasizing the upsides and strenghts of the country. However, despite all the differences in power relations and interdependence relations, there is a common understanding that irrespective to any kind of differences, all needy people who are sick, suffering or starving should be helped in anyway. The UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are the leading international organizations of conducting humanitarian affairs. However, humanitarian affairs are not limited with only these organizations. The main term explained in this study is humanitarian diplomacy which means "a strategy for influencing the parties to armed conflicts and others - States, non-State actors and members of civil society. Its purpose is purely humanitarian and it is carried out through a network of sustained relationships - bilateral and multilateral, official and inform a strategy for influencing the parties to armed conflicts and others - States, non-State actors and members of civil society. Its purpose is purely humanitarian and it is carried out through a network of sustained relationships - bilateral and multilateral, official and informal" according to ICRC's definition. Regarding the content and scope of humanitarian diplomacy, it is a responsibility rather than a choice (IFRC). There are some basic principles of humanitarian diplomacy which are humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. These guiding principles are set out by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (International Review of the Red Cross). Rising powers in international politics have also the principle of non-intervention to the needy country. At this point, the general principles and the application of rising powers are in accord with each other. Hence, the humanitarian diplomacy samples are mostly conducted on natural disasters and needy situations rather than the conflicts context. In this hence, humanitarian aid is the most concrete step that one's humanitarian diplomacy. So, how do these sample three countries deliver their humanitarian aid is the main theme of this study. The focus is their practises of humanitarian aid. The reason why this study is so privatized is that humanitarian aid practises are addressed in the frame of its being a tool of humanitarian diplomacy and hence being a tool of rising powers' soft power initiatives. These three countries' humanitarian aid policies and practices will be explained and then in the conclusion part, the similarities and differences will be asserted.

## **2. Sample Countries**

As an important tool of soft power, humanitarian diplomacy is an instrument of rising powers' foreign policies as well as the traditional powers'. However, the way of their exercises on humanitarian diplomacy vary because of their differences as a rising power. They have their own characteristics and they are not under the same roof about some specific issues. The niche diplomacy scopes vary for each rising power, however it is possible to say that actions should be in harmony with foreign policy, overall capacity and role conceptions. (Öniş & Kutlay, 2015, p. 9) Even the basic logic of humanitarian diplomacy is based on the similar philosophies, the way of conducting it as not the same. In this complicated power relations, Africa is the region where it can be seen the clash of these relations or the most beneficial cooperation. In this study, the implementations of three of rising

powers which are Turkey, Brazil and China is analyzed. Because of their growing effect in especially in Africa and inside their regions and their similar stances in the world politics, these countries are chosen to analyze. Their rate on the global ranking of soft power are also very close to each other. (USC Center on Public Diplomacy, 2017) The motivations of conducting humanitarian diplomacy vary for each sample country and it is not possible to evaluate the motivations solely and exclusively. There may be other factors influencing the choices.

### **2.1. Turkey**

Development aid, especially humanitarian aid and humanitarian issues are formally a prominent part of Turkish foreign policy for years. The official authorities do not abstain from indicating this. In 2013, the Foreign Minister Mr. Davutoğlu declared that the humanitarian diplomacy is more than humanitarian aid, it is “human-oriented diplomacy”. (Baird, 2015, p. 1; Davutoğlu, 2013) As a country which feels responsibility for the needy people in all over the World, Turkey also gets advantages of positive reflections of this approach in international field. (Özkan, 2010, p. 538) The Turkish model of humanitarian diplomacy is based on finding a balance between conscience and interests and its multi-track face means its inclusion of official, business and civic channels. (Akpınar, 2013, p. 735) The official policy of Turkey in this field is to help the needy people wherever they are. Turkey gives humanitarian aid to conflict regions, however the purpose of the aid is rehabilitate the situation rather than intervening to the conflict. Turkey conducts humanitarian diplomacy practices with some official institutions and too many NGOs. The expense that Turkey has spent for Syrian refugees made Turkey second largest humanitarian aid donor in the world. In 2016 the 99 % of humanitarian assistance delivered by Turkey goes directly to refugees. (Development Initiatives, 2017, p. 44) By Turkey’s adopting Africa Plan in 1998, the diplomatic and trade relations between them have increased year by year (Özkan & Orakçı, Viewpoint: Turkey as a “political” actor in Africa – an assessment of Turkish involvement in Somalia, 2015, p. 344). The promoted relations came into practice with Somalia case and the Turkish government cared about the hunger and instability problems of Somalia. Turkey collected donations and closely cooperate with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Somalia case. (UN, 2011) Somalia initiative has started in 2011 and it was with the pure humanitarianism targets. And it was the most prominent evidence of Turkey’s engagement with the Africa (Özkan, Does “Rising Power” Mean “Rising Donor”? Turkey’s Development Aid in Africa, 2013). Turkey’s cooperation in the region is not limited with the UN. It is trying to engage with Al- Shaabab and NGO workers in the region. Because the most needy people are in Al-Shaabab controlled areas, assistance should reach safely and not be misused. (Murphy & Woods, 2014, p. 7) This case forces Turkey’s hand to cooperate with them even it may be dangerous for the humanitarian workers in the region. The top humanitarian assistance receivers are Syrian refugees, Palestine, Somalia, Iraq and Myanmar by the beginning of 2017. (TİKA, 2017) Non-governmental institutions together with the government institutions, INGOs and sometimes the local authorities are the part of Turkey’s humanitarian diplomacy in the Africa. Turkey’s aid given structure has evolved for years in a way of increasing mobility of NGOs, direct involvement of political and official figures and re-organization of aid institutions. The structure and coordination of institutions are enhancing with moving beyond its limits in both practice and procedure. It is possible to say about this transformation process that it mostly depends on three basis changes and policies which are: 1) political consolidation and stability, 2) multi-dimensional vision of foreign politics and pro-active foreign policy stand, 3) economic success. (Haşimi, 2014, pp. 129-133) TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) is the leading institution for the coordination of development assistances. However, respecting the humanitarian assistances, AFAD (the Disaster and Emergency Management Authority) is the most effective institution. Besides these two institutions, it is necessary to mention about the Turkish Red Crescent,

the Ministry of Health in this regard. Besides the field projects and given aid, Turkey hosted the first Humanitarian Summit in İstanbul in 2016 and this shows the power of Turkey in defining the principles and the ways of humanitarian aid practices. The humanitarian aid given to the Syrian refugees includes the cost of living expenses and health cost of the people who currently lives in Turkey.

## **2.2. Brazil**

Brazil sees humanitarian diplomacy and hence humanitarian aid as an opportunity for his rising power and influence in the continent. So, Brazil is more concentrated on the continent. More politics oriented approach of Brazil also has aim to be a global power in the future. The term global governance has key importance for Brazil's foreign policy that is mainly based on soft power tools. From business firms which have interests in mining industry to different kinds of diplomatic actors, Brazil has widened its sphere of influence. On the one hand Brazil is implementing their policies in line with the idea of multilateralism which is a kind of tradition in Brazil's foreign policy, on the other hand Brazil has deep ties with the "Third World". When these two main tradition comes together, Brazil's objective of actively engaging in international organizations, such as a permanent seat at the UNSC, might be harder to achieve. Besides, Brazil is a part of Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative as a non-Western country. (Gilley, 2015, p. 49) However, even it seems necessary to use all necessary measures including military intervention, Brazil show a reluctance in this way and can call for the ceasefire such as in Libya example in 2011. (Lindert & Troost, 2014, pp. 16-18) However, the capacity of Brazil's becoming global power is limited such in the region. Over time in line with Brazilian foreign policy concept, the non-indifference approach got more important. (Arantes, 2014, p. 42) General characteristics of Brazil humanitarian diplomacy finds itself in the trilateral cooperation. About ¾ of Brazilian aid goes with multilateral channels. Brazil also attaches high importance to humanitarian aid. When the Haiti earthquake was hit, Brazil has supplied humanitarian aid by international organizations mostly by the United Nations. At the UN donor conference after Haiti, Brazil was the only non-western donor who co-chaired to the conference. It was an opportunity for Brazil to show its leading role on the continent. (Binder, Meier & Steets, 2010, p. 11) As well as China, Brazil is also an active participatory to the ISDR. The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery-GFDRR under the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations- FAO and World Food Program are the multilateral organizations Brazil is cooperating. Except the emergency situations on humanitarian diplomacy, Brazil also supports the program aid especially in the agriculture and food fields such as "Zero Hunger Program". (Binder, Meier & Steets, 2010) Brazil sustains an activist foreign policy in Africa and especially combating for AIDS and malaria, he closely cooperate with the US. (Guilhon-Albuquerque, 2014, p. 118) In the institutional structure of Brazil's humanitarian aid lies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the decision making body. And further, Brazil closely cooperates with FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) and WFP. (World Food Programme) (Binder, Meier & Steets, 2010, p. 12)

## **2.3. China**

The way of China to cooperate in Africa is getting a reciprocal form unlike the traditional donors and by giving what Africa needs most, China is having both political allies and economic partners there. (Wild, 2015, p. 95) China's existence in the Africa has too many reasons such as trade and investments, infrastructure, mining etc. (Guilhon-Albuquerque, 2014) In the Chin and Frolic's study, it is indicated that China does not tend to be included in cooperation with other countries or multilateral organizations. (Chin & Frolic, 2007) Even if China has not much "real" tendency towards joint working, it sees cooperation as an important factor in the humanitarian issues. He also closely

cooperate with the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction- ISDR and Association of Southeast Asian Nations- ASEAN). The approach of China to development aid is mostly based on the principle of non-interference. The humanitarian diplomacy approach is also based on this principle, hence China gives humanitarian aid mostly in intergovernmental way which means bilateral type in practice. However, in conjunction with the Wechuan Earthquake (2008) and tsunami in the Indian Ocean (2004), the idea of cooperating closer with the international organizations has gained more importance. Besides the idea of responsibility and the need to respond humanitarian emergencies, Chinese Confucian philosophy recommends that a person who has humanity and goodness in herself also cannot be irrespective to humanitarian values (Xiaodong, 2001). Even the idea lying behind the humanitarian aid practices of China seem reasonable, however there are some arguments regarding the embedded idea of China's looking out for its own economic interests. (Binder, Meier & Steets, 2010, p. 13) (Lengauer, 2011, pp. 52-53) With this idea, a question of debate has arisen regarding the initial motivation of China in humanitarian aid. However, in the case of emergency reliefs, it is almost not questioned. China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) is a non-profit organization and most relief aid activities are coordinated and implemented by this organization such as tsunami in South and Southeast Asia in 2004, Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, the 2007 cyclone in Bangladesh, 2008 cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. (D'Hooghe, 2015, p. 180) Apart from this, the characteristics of Chinese humanitarian diplomacy is a kind of different than the others in a way of its win-win approach. While supplying aid, their way of doing this is more diplomatic way, because engaging with the countries and founding diplomatic ties mean much more diplomacy rather than giving aid as a "gift". China's stand seems more likely not to give aid in this sense. The dilemma about the Chinese humanitarian aid is that, China has taken steps with the idea of responsibility to protect against to humanitarian intervention, when it comes to Africa, it still has the power of humanitarian intervention. Another explanatory idea about the real intention of humanitarian aid is that China mainly uses humanitarian intervention as a part of its diplomacy, hence humanitarian aid seems like a part of its economy. (Wild, 2015, pp. 95-97)

### **3. Conclusion**

Despite having the principle of non- interference, the rising powers, especially Brazil and China have no data on global humanitarian reports. The prominent problem is transparency. However, Turkey voluntarily reports its humanitarian assistance to OECD and the data for Turkey is much more accessible. (Development Initiatives, 2017, p. 45) Brazil usually contributes by being included in trilateral cooperation which is "*human-related*". Because it stresses human rights rather than the other "*humanitarian*" issues. Then, it is possible to say that the initial step is the relevance of the needy situation with "human rights". And Brazil bases this approach on responsibility to protect motto. (Itamaraty, 2015) However, the urgency of the needy situation is a valid motivation for Turkey to get contact with the needy people. Regardless of the distance and the other differences, Turkey is ready to give humanitarian aid to be included in the resolution processes. For China, an undeniable fact is that China has multi-faced motivations rather than solely humanitarian concerns.

Geographical proximity makes call all three countries' attentions to the region. Turkey, Brazil and China cannot be indifferent to the humanitarian problems of their own regions and this makes them such a leading regional power and hence, their power in international relations are increasing. Despite the universally urgent needy situation characteristics of humanitarian aid, if they have to choose a priority, some selection criteria become prominent. While the enhancement of the region the most prominent criteria for Brazil and China, Turkey also considers the historical, cultural and religious

ties. China prefers the countries and situations in which she can settle further diplomatic relations and take the advantage of win-win approach. Brazil is more politically driven approaches. However, all these approaches do not change the result that these countries help the people who are in needy situation wherever they are. All three countries consider the principle of non-interference and this is the most explicit characteristics of these countries' humanitarian aid practices.

Regarding the motivations, practices and formal policies of the countries', it is obvious that there is no homogeneity among these countries. As well as the heterogenetic, structure in the other fields, humanitarian diplomacy and hence humanitarian aid is the other diplomacy tool which proves the heterogeneity. Even all the claims are open to debate; the similarities and the differences are as mentioned above in the frame of the real aims and functions of humanitarian aid.

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**Some Aspects of Partnership between State, Business and Education in  
Training of Specialists**

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**Abstract:** The aim and the objective of the work is to research the problems of effectiveness of educational processes through the use of partnerships between state, business and education; the research is based on the model “Triple Helix” by Ickovic and on the situational-production model proposed by the author which describes the relationship between participants (state, business and education) of the partnership; the final conclusions were made on the basis of: the conducted case studies in the partnership field (economic and socio-economic aspects were considered), the mathematical model of complex systems modeling, the models of knowledge representation and the questioning of participants of partnerships; the development of system of specialists’ training for business (by example transport companies) will enable the network structure of educational, crewing and consulting firms to provide educational services, to ensure availability of training for the general population; the interaction of the training’ system and raising the level of managerial staff of state and non-state structures; the proposed approach to develop a system of training for business enterprises on the basis of the partnership between state, business and education is used in the appropriate author's computer system of support for the adoption of managerial decisions on personnel training for transport enterprises.

**Keywords:** partnership between state; business and education; training of specialists; situational-production model of the training system

**JEL Classification:** E23; I25; I28; L32; L38

## **Introduction**

The partnership between state, business and education is a system of institutional relations between the public and private sectors. The effectiveness of using partnerships involves identification of benefits and minimization of costs for its participants, taking into account risks and responsibilities.

Therefore, there is an urgent problem of determining the priorities of business development and development of enterprises that provide educational services.

## **Related Work**

The problems of partnership between state, education and business were considered in the works of M. Blauga, T. Veblen, R. Daniel, G. Ickovic, J. Keynes, G. Mencken, D. North, V. Oyken, M. Porter, L.I.

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Abalkin, A.B. Bazhenov. The questions of training are considered by G. Becket, P. Drucker, J. Mincer, T. Norbert.

### **Problem Statement**

Problems of partnership between the state, business and education in the training of our time have yet to be solved. All this led to the urgency of the problems associated with the organizational, economic and social aspects of training in terms of European integration and world globalization.

### **Concept and Terms**

The partnership between the state, business and education in training of specialists is based on the distribution of benefits, rewards, risks and responsibilities using business training, mixed financing and improving the quality of education..

### **Solution Approach**

The effective functioning of training system is based on the usage of situational-productive model that takes into account the dynamics of market demand for educational services and qualified personnel, budget and value of paid learning, etc.

The situational-production model of the training system, on the basis of which the training programs are formed, takes into account the following:

- levels of development of business and education enterprises;
- level of training of students (basic, professional, etc.);
- types of business activities;
- types and amount of educational services provided.

The system of personnel training on the basis of the partnership between state, business and education provides an opportunity to substantiate the directions of the state policy regarding the development of human resources of business enterprises and education.

The current state of the training system shows that small and medium-sized enterprises often do not participate in training programs, and their personnel policy exists only formally or is absent at all. In order to eliminate such a situation in the specialists' training system, it is necessary for the forms and methods of state, business and education partnership to depend on market relations.

The implementation of the partnership between state, business and education is one of the conditions for the harmonization of relations between the state and business.

The participants of the state, business and education partnership are the state, employers, consumers of educational services, training companies, investors and crewing companies.

The tendency of extensive development of this sphere remains in Ukraine, despite the interest of the state in business. Unfortunately, this trend is supported by the current training system's state.

Formation of partnership relations between business enterprises and the state imposes professional and qualification competences to the personnel, which are formed by employers and are the basis of business development and training system for the business.

The partnership between state, business and education takes into account the characteristics of business enterprises (in particular, transport companies), the characteristics of training enterprises, staff assessment, evaluation of specialists' competence, evaluation on the position in the labor market and the market of educational services.

The definition of competences and the creation of specialists' training system for business enterprises that is oriented to them is possible by using the partnership between state, business and education in the training of personnel.

The training requires a lot of expenses, which is a heavy burden for small and medium-sized enterprises. Therefore, the partnership between state, business and education will be able to stimulate the development of institutional forms, necessary training programs and relevant reforms.

The functions of conducting educational, educational and consulting business, and the provision of educational services should be put on the system of training, and the functions of controlling of the quality, modernity of educational services and the formation of requirements for personnel should be put on business. The state should supervise the activity of training enterprises.

The development of a training system for transport companies will enable the creation of network structure of educational, crewing and consulting firms that will provide educational services; to ensure the availability of training for the general population; the interaction between the system of training and the raising of the level of managerial staff of state and non-state structures.

The partnership between state, business and education requires businesses enterprises to understand the need for links with the training and retraining system. The choice of specific forms of partnership between the state, business and education in the training system for business enterprises depends on many factors, in particular:

- the level of enterprise development;
- the range of training programs;
- the financial situation of both business enterprises and training enterprises;
- the range of educational services provided.

The most widespread form of partnership between the state, business and education is contractual.

The independent organization of such programs is constrained by the low degree of accessibility to financial resources and the disunity of business enterprises. This calls for state support, for example, by partially financing of the training process.

With the help of state programs and personnel training enterprises, business enterprises are involved in the innovation restructuring of the national economy, and business will receive additional opportunities for increasing competitiveness, which depends on the raise of professional qualifications of its employees.

A priority line of work to meet the demand of business enterprises in qualified personnel is the development of a system of social partnership and relations between institutions of training, employers' unions, executive authorities and local self-government.

The complex of works on the assessment of the situation in the labor market, identification of the educational needs of the population and the possibilities of training enterprises that provide educational services, can be presented as follows:

- *the first level* – the system of relations between the subjects of the labor market for the development and coordination of volumes and levels of personnel training;
- *the second level* – a specialists' training system and employers. The system functions in order to determine the scope and direction of training of skilled personnel for business enterprises.

Training programs for business enterprises are classified by:

- the degree of development of the training company;
- the level of students' basic background;
- the type and level of innovative activity of the training company;
- the type and level of innovative activity of the business enterprise;
- the information technologies that are used in the process of business enterprise management;
- the information technologies that are used in the process of management of personnel training enterprises;
- the level of educational technology;
- the requirements of the labor market or specific business enterprises;
- the requirements of the educational services market.

The partnership between state, business and education in the personnel training for business enterprises can be implemented through the creation of a special Coordination Center.

In particular, he will be provided with the following features:

- monitoring and analysis of the directions of the training system development;
- coordination and promotion of partnership in the training system;
- informational support of the training system;
- formation of training programs;
- development of standards for professional training;
- preparation and conducting of training companies' rating assessment;
- defining of the methods for evaluation of the levels of professional qualification competences of business enterprises;
- provision of consulting services to business enterprises and training systems;
- marketing of educational services in the training system.

The development of the training system for business enterprises on the basis of the partnership between state, business and education is impossible without creating the organizational and economic structure of the system that is based on the professional qualification competencies.

## Conclusions

The proposed approach to develop a system of training for business enterprises on the basis of the partnership between state, business and education is used in the appropriate system of support for the adoption of managerial decisions on personnel training for transport enterprises.

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THE 13<sup>TH</sup> EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
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REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

## State-society Relations and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Lucian Balanuta<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** It has been argued that president Donald Trump's decision to recognise Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel lead to a complete freezing of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Judging by the internal dynamics of both actors, the prospects of an agreement, established on mutual agreed land swaps, have long been diminished. The theory of neoclassical realism, based on the frame structure by Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey Taliaferro and Steven Lobell, provides the mechanism for conceptualizing the factors influencing decisions on this subject. In such a complex regional environment, the external stimuli, translated through an intervening variable, has a causal effect on the dynamics of reconciliation. Thus, the range of domestic-level arrangements can interweave responses to systemic and sub-systemic pressure and have a significant impact on the strategic behavior of a decision factor. This study analyses the determinants of state-society relations, both in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, underlining the way they had conditioned domestic leaders' foreign policy options before and after Trump's decision. The paper aims to indicate which of these interactions have causal potential in order to include them inside an explanatory scheme that highlights the current freezing status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

**Keywords:** Middle East; Israeli-Palestinian conflict; internal dynamics

### 1. Theoretical Frame Setup

Since the conclusion of the Oslo Accords (1993) and so far, the talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority have gradually evolved into a deadlock in the matter of conciliation. Often overshadowed by the current wars in the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian case falls into a status of division that finds increasingly difficult the political perspectives of compromise and peace

The decision of US president, Donald Trump, to recognise Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel, though it was not considered "taking a position on any final status issues" (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2017), underlined, at most, the current status-quo where both sides have already given up the diplomatic opening for a gradual evolution in territorial concessions. The geographical area delimited by the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River is still disputed in order to satisfy national aspirations. The lack of dialogue between the two actors amplifies the divisions as time passes, "direct talks have not been organized since the failure of John Kerry's efforts in April 2014". (Black, 2016, p. 459)

Territorial control is seen as a connection with the aspirations of the two actors for stability. Hence the appreciation of the land, that theoreticians like Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse (2008) assert that "due to their association with the integrity of states, territories are cited much more than the economic or strategic value they have." (p. 240)

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In the model of neoclassical realism, causal components, such as the independent variable of relative power in the international system and the intermediate variable of constraints at the domestic level provide a true representation of foreign policy options. In the present study, however, the argumentation is formulated, in particular, on the basis of the internal motivations of foreign policy behavior, in the logic according to which “states are billiards, but each ball is made of a material different, affecting the speed, rotation and ricochet on the international plane”. (Zakaria, 1998, p. 14)

Applied to the Israeli-Palestinian level of analysis, although a better understanding of the causes on current peace efforts is possible, in particular, starting from the top of systemic and sub-systemic (regional) developments, the level of internal analysis is important for the purpose of understanding the arrangements and the current context that have direct implications on the diadic relationship. In the end this will lead to limited options on a possible peace process. In the same vein, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a constant issue within the two actors’ political landscape and an “establishment of an existential threat that is sufficiently important to have substantial political effects”. (Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde, 2011, p. 46).

This analysis identifies state-society relations, one of the main categories of the intervening variable instrument for a neoclassical realist and adapts the model to the Israeli-Palestinian landscape, in order to operationalize the manner in which this prism filters the signals from systemic and sub-systemic levels and to underline the nature of constraints on the ability of leaders to undertake strategic adjustments.

Moreover, it identifies the set of causes that unfold over a specific foreign policy behavior, establishing a link with the abandonment of a peace process as it had been configured once, under the parameters of the Oslo Accords.

The following arguments are based on the model proposed by Ripsman, Tagliaferro and Lobell, where domestic variables complete the causal chain of foreign policy adjustments and are seen as pathways to political significance.

## **2. State-Society Relations**

The interest of the academic world towards the Middle East is resumed, in particular, by the theoretical challenges that this geographical space has in terms of explaining phenomena. Numerous times, an appeal to the past is revealed to decipher the current and future elements. In a context of historical disorder, the Middle East is dominated by transnational and international military interventions, seemingly irreconcilable identity confrontations, humanitarian crisis, and escalations of Islamic fundamentalism, whereas the Israeli-Palestinian conflict dimension is becoming more and more difficult to include inside a peace frame. In this regional dynamis, the state is not the only foreign policy actor.

According to Ripsman, Tagliaferro and Lobell, a neoclassical realist views the state, mainly, from the perspective of formulating a foreign policy decision, after the internal filter captures the systemic incentives in order to emphasis the role of decision-makers in terms of security strategy. The three researchers are criticizing the lack of inclusion of cases where there is no feature of the so-called well-defined territory of a state according to Max Webber’s view (1992) and highlights this matter by using a formula where the monopoly over the legitimacy of coercive force is disputed. Although under an umbrella of fragmentation and leadership split, the Palestinian entity can be summed up at least referring to one group of persons charged with such duties in the field of foreign policy. The theory of

neoclassical realism built by Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell provides the tools necessary to resolve this dilemma by avoiding the state's reliance on the exercise of sovereignty and by an evolution that is not limited to the domination of the state as the only reference object or actor of international relations. It is not the only theory that starts from this premise. Also, despite the erosion of legitimacy and institutional problems, according to Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, practice shows that states are not nowadays primarily pursuing the national model and a number of entities with claims to statehood play increased roles at a primary level, which is why there is the motivation to accept them as autonomous units.

Both Israeli and Palestinian societies have a long history of mutual hostilities and lack of trust when it comes to the negotiation space. This asymmetrical relationship translates into limited possibilities of identifying a path for bilateral talks to address the belligerent beliefs.

When focusing on state-society relations, the driving factor is related to the power of national leaders to extract and mobilize resources in order to pursue a specific foreign affairs agenda. Public support for the state plays a role of guarantor of internal political survival as a mediation source between state institutions and society. The state bases its legitimacy through the interaction with the citizens, and the prosperity of society can also be translated into an extended state's interest in formulating internal and external policies. Dynamics of coalition politics in the state, nature of civil-military relations capture faithful representations of internal affairs that impact preferred foreign policy goals as Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell underline.

In order to advance a peace process, leaders and governments seek legitimacy and political support and the process itself is shaped by a link that reflects the relationships between the conflicting societies. Legitimacy is decisive for leaders engaged in a peace process, both in the initial stages and in the eventuality of signed agreement.

In this particular case, whereas the Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, is dependent on the political configuration of the ruling coalition, on the other side, Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Palestinian Authority, lacks institutional autonomy in pursuing a foreign affairs agenda, mainly due to the failures of the reconciliation agreements with fierce rivals, Hamas, in his attempt to act as a single voice when seeking negotiations with the Israeli counterpart. Thus, the ability to resist domestic challenges, the constraints of coalition partners on one side and lack of control of armed wings and terrorist organisations, on the other side, poses significant obstacles to a peace initiative between the two actors.

### **3. Dynamics of Coalition Politics in Israel**

Referring to the dynamics of parliamentary arrangements in a particular state, Ripsman, Tagliaferro and Lobell argue that a leader who is drawn from that specific political coalition is subject to constraints that can often lead to the inability of enacting policies that diverge from the general preferences of the coalition. Governmental coalitions in Israel are inherently unstable and incapable of surviving grand strategies of peace projects. The electoral threshold for entry into the Knesset is 3.25 percent of the votes, resulting in a system that allows the political representation of a significant number of segments. Thus, from a hypothetical perspective, the possibility of concessions during a peace process is subject to be ensured by the support of the political coalition with a causal mechanism in which small parties exercise a disproportionate influence.

The current ruling coalition, updated in 2016 under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, includes all right-wing, nationalist and ultra-orthodox parties (Likud, HaBayit HaYehudi, Kulanu, Shas, Jewish Torah and Yisrael Beiteinu). This dynamic is often reinforced by the fact that Benjamin Netanyahu's political survival is in a relationship of dependence on this configuration, which often constrains him to adopt an agenda based on a nationalist and religious ideology. An example of dependency in this regard is played by the ultra-Orthodox formation HaBayit HaYehudi, led by the current Education Minister and member of the Israeli security cabinet, Naftali Bennet. The minimum number of mandates required to strengthen a parliamentary majority is 61, the current majority has 67 seats, while the HaBayit HaYehudi party has 8 seats in the Knesset, enough for a possible withdrawal that automatically leads to the loss of the majority, what Giovanni Sartori (2005) defines as "a party may be small, but it can be strong and with a great deal of negotiation potential in a coalition."

The agenda of the Israeli prime minister and his ruling coalition is, therefore, determined by the survival of the State of Israel in a war-dominated climate and actions to counter Iran in the region and to limit its expansion through Syria, following the ongoing civil war and the change in the balance of power in the Middle East.

The Palestinian file is among the top-level issues that determine the position of a party in Israel, and as a party turns to the right of the political scene and then the emphasis is on a consolidated component, rather than resolving this conflict, because "right-wing parties oppose land abandonment to the Palestinians as a means of ending the conflict."<sup>1</sup> (Schwartz, 2015, p. 3)

An analysis published by Ahren in the Times of Israel (2015, March 17) before the Israeli general election, emphasizes that there is a wide range of views on solving the Palestinian problem. Parties such as the Zionist Union, Joint (Arab) List, Yesh Atid, Kulanu and Meretz, left-wing, center-left are relying on the two state solution, either through direct negotiations or under regional or international patronage, whether or not maintaining Israeli colonies in the future configuration, while right-wing, nationalist and ultra-orthodox political formations - Likud, Shas, HaBayit HaYehudi, Yisrael Beytenu, United Torah Judaism and Yahad are more skeptical, viewing the way the conflict could be settled from a two-state solution perspective with borders redefinition led by Israel, to denouncing any bilateral negotiations or even the full annexation of the West Bank.

Former US Secretary of State, John Kerry, in his 2014 final remarks report, denounced the government's view as flagrantly contradictory to the idea of a peace process, indicating the existence of a risk for the future conciliation prospects, generated especially by the adoption of the right-wing agenda of the movement that supports the construction of Israeli colonies:

"we have to be clear about what is happening in the West Bank. The Israeli prime minister publicly supports a two- state solution. But his current coalition is the most right-wing in Israel history with an agenda driven by the most extreme elements. The result is that policies of this government, which the prime minister himself just described, as more committed to settlements than any in Israel's history are leading in the opposite direction." (U.S. Department of State, 2016, December 28)

One day before the elections, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in an attempt to reduce difference in polls announced that a Palestinian state will not be created during his future mandate, marking his first public statement of desconsidering any territorial concessions with the Palestinian side.

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<sup>1</sup> Eytan Schwartz, Elections in Israel. Is Change Possible?, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, martie 2015, <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/11245-20150317.pdf>, consultat ultima dată la 3 martie 2018;



Over the 3 years since the general election in Israel (2015) was held, there has been no coordination and coherence in obtaining public support through legislative proposals or conducting direct negotiations with the Palestinian side. On the contrary, a series of legislative acts, mainly initiatives of nationalist and ultra-Orthodox parties, complementary to public statements, inflicted additional causes for the freezing status of the peace process.

HaBayit HaYehudi initiated a law stipulating the impossibility of splitting Jerusalem without a vote of the Israeli Knesset consisting at least two-thirds in favor of such a move, a bill which was later adopted. At the same time, the law includes stipulations that would allow future changes to Jerusalem's municipal borders, including the placement of Palestinian neighborhoods within separate municipal authorities. Thus, one of the most sensitive points of the Israeli-Palestinian case, the division of Jerusalem, disputed capital by both sides, is placed under the umbrella of a veto actor, the Israeli parliament, which can only allow concessions on this subject in the event of a qualified majority of parliamentarians to support such an initiative. Hamas's reaction to the law in question was to declare the United States out of any peace process, and the Oslo Agreements dead, whereas Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority, considered it was a declaration of war.

During Netanyahu's rule, the State of Israel did not have a clear position on freezing or eliminating colonies built in the West Bank, but instead strengthened its control over territories by extending settlements. Such an approach contributes to the impossibility of creating a viable Palestinian state as shown in numerous reports of the United Nations Human Rights Council and mainly between 1<sup>st</sup> of November 2017 – 31 of December 2017.

“The Israeli settlement enterprise continued unabated in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, with significant new developments. Settlement expansion accelerated, doubling the settlement housing advancement in Area C and East Jerusalem when compared with the previous reporting period, despite a slowdown in the commencement of new construction. The Government of Israel declared that establishing settlements in the West Bank was a natural right of Israeli citizens.” (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2018, March 6)

If prim minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to be constrained by the nationalist and ultra-orthodox elements of his governing coalition, then it can be said that these assignments, for reasons of maintaining power, might translate into limitations on peace options with the Palestinians, in his capacity as prime minister and foreign minister. In the theory of neoclassical realism, this type of behavior falls within a limited capacity to extract resources for an external policy oriented towards, in our case, the definition of a viable peace process, and adds additional constraints that close return options when going through the stages initiated with the Agreements at Oslo.

#### **4. Nature of Civil-Military Relations in the Palestinian Territories**

Over time, the splitting of the Palestinian political arena has significantly limited the Israeli actor's confidence in the possibility of formulating and implementing a conflict resolution. Over ten years of internal conflict also involved the creation of two parallel administrations and two security apparatuses. Thus, foreign policy decisions of the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, must invariably take account of internal constraints and as Randall Schweller (2006) suggests - vulnerable leaders, in such a context must “take into account the internal costs attached to policy options.”

The absence of unitary leadership structures led to repeated wars in the Gaza Strip, as well as to the recurrence of Palestinian terrorism, manifested by attacks on Israeli militaries and civilians in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

The current developments are concentrated on a peace process inside another one, which consists of efforts to reconcile the two dominant parties – Fatah and Hamas. One of the main obstacles in the quest for a Palestinian unitary agenda is the impossibility of controlling the armed wings in the Gaza Strip. The motivation of civil control lies in the possibility to subordinate the security of national interests, to defend the society and not to define it.

Instead, the Palestinian Territories are dominated by political parties that rely on the contribution of a military wing, the so-called non-statutory security forces.

Of these, the most important power cap is the Brigade of Izz al-Din al-Qassam, initially built as a paramilitary force, and later in a military unit, after Hamas agreed to form the government in Gaza in 2007 and accepted a technocrat's executive with Fatah in 2014. The importance of Hamas' military wing as an obstacle to peace resides in the fact that every conciliation agreement between the ruling party in Gaza and Fatah always skipped the provision of a civil control.

Even apart from the negotiations with Fatah, although there is a distinction between Hamas's political and military activities, it is not possible to establish a clear control mechanism for the military wing, as all elements of the Islamist movement contribute to the resistance activities, according to the Charter (2017, Mai 1) which stipulates that “armed resistance is considered as the strategic choice to protect the principles and rights of the Palestinian people.” Indeed, the very nature of the relationship within a single organism indicates a dynamic of balancing, as an analysis of The Washington Institute Whiteabout indicates that “the movement must manage pressure for military action from within, and the outcomes of these pressures can influence the dynamics of power within the group.” (White, 2011, January 4).

The national unity government that was formed in 2014 encountered resistance from Hamas's armed wing that did not accept assignments on the change of status quo in internal dynamics. The demilitarization of the Gaza Strip was the main condition set by the government led by Benjamin Netanyahu to resume peace negotiations in the format enshrined in the Oslo Accords. The 2014 agreement focused on the administrative side, but the issue of using violence was not included in the final configuration of the negotiations. Moreover, the continuation of terrorist attacks, Israeli abductions and the promotion of violence led to a war with Israel in the Gaza Strip and the erosion of the 2014 agreement. The kidnapping of the three teenagers in the West Bank by the Hamas military wing, recognized by Saleh-Arouri according to Crawford (2014, August 21), one of the co-founders of the armed movement (who in the meantime became deputy at the political office of the organization) at a conference of the World Association of Muslim Researchers, helped escalate the tensions that led to Operation Protective Edge, a war that opposed the Hamas military wing and the Israeli IDF army.

The latest reconciliation and formation agreements of a Fatah-Hamas national unity government have not found a common denominator regarding the control or disarmament of the military wing Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a subject that is disqualified from the conditions assumed through the Oslo frame, where the two actors undertook to “act immediately and effectively in accordance with this agreement against acts or threats of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis.” (Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement, 1995).

Still, during the current reconciliation process which was agreed upon in October 2017, Hamas refused to disarm. President Donald Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's eternal capital

highlighted, once again, the split between the two organizations. Whereas Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh encouraged a violent mobilization, president Abbas condemned the decision, but did not change its peaceful approach and security coordination with Israel.

According to Harel (2018, April 1), after the failed assassination attempt against PA Prime Minister, Rami Hamdallah, an action took place Gaza before an official meeting, it was clear that the reconciliation process was over, and that Hamas is not a serious partner when it comes to renounce violence.

The lack of real control over Hamas's military wing denotes a perpetual conflict and a strategy centered on terrorist violence in particular, which can be placed outside the Declaration of Principles signed between the Israeli Government and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993 and can contribute to a continuous social fragmentation and government vulnerability.

## **5. Conclusions**

The public statements and decisions of the current Israeli ruling coalition and the Palestinian leadership are also following the backdrop of historical mistrust in the two states solution. The latest Israeli-Palestinian joint poll in December 2017 found that only 46% of Israelis and the Palestinians now support the two-state solution, a historical fall below the 50% threshold, indicating a retreat from the framework that the international community has sought to implement over the last quarter of a century (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2018, January 25).

In the dynamics of state-society relations one can see a consistent support for the way Israeli society relates to the conflict with the Palestinians, resulting in a high degree of harmony with foreign policy decisions on this subject, in a mechanism that Randal Schweller puts it in the ideal scheme where the consensus at the level of the elites is complemented by social cohesion. Instead, on the same basis of Randal Schweller's schemas, the declining legitimacy of the Palestinian leaders in both territories (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) indicates a form of vulnerable government to which a fragmented society adds, and thus, in the absence of real mobilization of resources for a peace process with the State of Israel, a strategy of unbalancing is most probable to pursue.

Absorbing the external stimuli through nationalist and ultra-Orthodox elements of the governing coalition in the State of Israel, it is highly possible that this could lead to serious constraints for prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu's willingness to advance talks with the Palestinian side on reconciliation. This detachment from solving the Palestinian dossier has a number of explanations that emanate from reasons of internal balance of power. The ruling coalition's bill approval on sensitive matters isolate the field of options to a dialogue with the Palestinians and removes, from the negotiating space, a series of important milestones left alongside the Oslo Accords, such as negotiating the status of Jerusalem.

In the case of the Palestinians, however, the vast autonomy of the military wings inside the Gaza Strip and the consecutive failures in seizing a Fatah-Hamas agreement that could lead at least to some sort of control of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades makes the administrative segment of the settlement insufficient for restarting a dialogue with the Israeli counterparts.

Thus, one of the most important categories of the neoclassical realism intervening variable – the state-society relations – emphasizes a series of behaviors of high empirical value that leads to a lack of perspective for an Israeli-Palestinian peace process on the basis of past agreements initiated once with the Oslo Accords.

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THE 13<sup>TH</sup> EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
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REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

## The Roots of French and German Anti-Americanism

Valentin Filip<sup>1</sup>

**Abstract:** After the Cold War and more specifically at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century we are witnessing a resurgence of Anti-Americanism in the West. This paper explores the origins of Anti-American ideas and discourse, arguing that they go beyond just a simple reaction to various U.S. decisions and actions on the world stage. Drawing upon constructivist theories and approaches in the study of international relations that put a premium on the role of heuristics and ideas in international politics, it attempts to uncover the cultural substratum that lies underneath current criticism oriented against the U.S., focusing on two significant actors of the Euro-Atlantic community: Germany and France. The main findings of this historical approach highlight the existence of a negative cultural predisposition when considering U.S. behavior and mere existence in the world. As such, Anti-Americanism generates cognitive biases which are greatly inflated due to the technological tools available in the information era. Moreover, this predisposition may be unintentionally or willingly activated, given the increasing impact of public opinion on the preferences of democratic states in the realm of international relations. Hence, the study may be of use not just for research dedicated to history and international relations, but also for academic and decision-making circles interested into information warfare.

**Keywords:** Anti-Americanism; History of Ideas; Constructivism; Cultural International Relations Theory

### 1. Introduction

The European Union and the United States are arguably the most important powers that shape the world: militarily, economically, culturally and politically; albeit a lack of fully integrated policies and processes on the European side, especially in the defense and security areas. Most notably, they constitute the main core from where democracy emanated and spread around the world, as well as the creators and guarantors of the current international system, both from a legal and institutional perspective. The Euro-American or transatlantic relations largely define world politics, yet if the bonds that tie these actors together start to crack, which is a thesis that has been advanced by many, especially since the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, then it may be that the West and consequently the world as we know it may come to an end and democratization/westernization, lacking the nucleus that gave it so much energy, may fade away little by little. Building on Karl Deutsch definition, a security community is built on “people bound by common values, trust, mutual sympathies and a we-feeling”. (Kopstein, 2009, p. 367) As such, the very existence of the transatlantic security community depends on reciprocated feelings and beliefs on one another of its constituent actors.

Building on seminal works such as those of Graham Allison (1971), Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1974), Robert Jervis (1976), and Richard Ned Lebow (2008), this research rejects the complete understanding of world politics and decision-making in international relations based exclusively on a rational choice model. It explores instead the cultural milieu of interstate interactions,

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starting from the premise that culturally-based and oriented ideas, identity politics and therefore subjective/irrational motives shape the mindsets of top decision-makers and thus the course of international relations. Given the complexity of decision- and policy-making, approaching the study of foreign/security policies and international relations requires a deeper understanding of cultural views, beliefs and cognitive biases that drive and animate the targeted societies and their publics, not just because their leaders arise from and represent them, but also because they are accountable to them, especially in democracies. All the more so because, in the information era, there is a wide and effective array of tools designed to influence public opinion, which may be also used by hostile entities. “Fake news” is truly a buzzword nowadays.

This paper studies a specific dimension of the transatlantic relationship, focusing on the evolution of Anti-American ideas in two Western European countries, France and Germany, in order to identify the origins and supporters of this phenomenon. The argument is that Anti-Americanism lies in the realms of culture, society and politics. It is a product of history in the sense that the first Anti-American perceptions were echoed throughout the years till present day. Moreover, they were transformed, refined by new circumstances. In other words, Anti-Americanism adapted, as a living being, to the cultural, social, political and economic realities. Consequently, it was disguised under numerous forms, but never departed from its original core. In order to better understand it, strategists, policy-makers as well as scholars need to deepen their grasp of the history of Anti-American ideas. The present, which has been quizzically dubbed as the beginning of the “Anti-American century” (Krastev, 2004), cannot be understood but in the context of the past.

The following chapter deals with the main debates on Anti-Americanism, attempting to shed light on such a controversial and contested concept. The next two parts are divided on a chronological basis: before and after World War I, ending with World War 2. The reason for this choice stands in the role played by the U.S. as a state: first becoming independent and then arriving to the European stage. The scope of study is limited to 1945, due to its founding premise: that Anti-Americanism is not exclusively fueled by the role of the U.S. as a superpower influencing world politics. Both chapters dealing with a specific period try to identify the partisans of Anti-Americanism in France and Germany and the key ideas that they supported. The conclusion includes a summary of findings and attempts to lay the foundation for future work.

## **2. On Anti-Americanism(s)**

A lot of effort was dedicated to the topic in the academic sphere. However, there is no generally agreed upon definition of the term, thus making debates on the topic particularly difficult. In a very influential volume, Paul Hollander described Anti-Americanism as a “predisposition to hostility toward the United States and American society”, identifying it as both “a relentless critical impulse”, “an aversion”, “contempt” and “dislike” to everything that may be dubbed American (1992, p. 339). In the same line of thinking, Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane defined it as “a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general”. (2006, pp. 27-28) A similar interpretation was also given by Heiko Beyer and Ulf Liebe, viewing it “a psychological tendency to devalue actors and phenomena perceived as American” (2014, p. 91), and Andrei Markovits, considering it “a generalized and comprehensive normative dislike of America and things American”. (2007, p. 17) Ivan Krastev called it “a systemic opposition to America as a whole” (2004, p. 7), while Marie-France Toinet viewed it as “systematic opposition, a sort of allergic reaction to America as a whole”. (1990, p. 219)

The above selected considerations reveal a propensity to treat Anti-Americanism as some sort of culturally-driven prejudice. That said, not all criticism of America/American belongs to this “-ism”: objective reasoning and political preferences are not. More explicitly, opposing a specific U.S. policy because of its causes or consequences is not Anti-Americanism, but opposing it just because it emanates from Washington, D.C., and not from, say, Paris or Berlin, that is Anti-Americanism indeed. Some scholars addressed this difficult separation only to observe the complexity of the attempt. The merger of “what America does with what America is [...] will forever be jumbled and impossible to disentangle”. (Markovits, 2004, p. 3) Another way to put it is to differentiate between opinion, which is about judging U.S. behavior, and bias, which is about cherry-picking reports about the U.S. (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006, p. 26)

By contrast, another option to approach Anti-Americanism is “to move away from arguments over parsing definitions of essentially contested concepts and recognize that their meaning inheres in the way that they are used over time”. (Friedman, 2012, p. 7) This departure from a pure definitional debate, but nonetheless intrinsically valuable for this endeavor, promotes the value of “understanding the historical development and powerful continuity” of the concept. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, Introduction) Alternatively, in a complete paradigm shift but to the same purpose of avoiding the impossible distinction between legitimate criticism and prejudice, a different attempt to conceptualize Anti-Americanism is to analyze Anti-American discourse and its situated use, as well as the scientific discourse on Anti-Americanism, in order to represent the concept “as a family of performative speech acts, bound by similarity rather than universally common features”. (Knappertsbusch, 2013, 105)

For the sake of conceptual clarification, research on Anti-Americanism aimed also at the identification of its various forms. One of the best known taxonomies proposed six different types but highlights their intermingling in reality (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006, pp. 28-37): (1) Liberal, “feeding on perceptions of hypocrisy” that America does not live up to its own ideals; (2) Social, focusing on “value conflicts that reflect relevant differences” with respect to social aspects (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006, p. 29); (3) Sovereign-nationalist, dealing with conflicting views of political/state power in contemporary world politics; (4) Radical, promoting the idea that America *per se* is evil. It can be both secular/ideological (Marxism-Leninism) and religious (Islamic Fundamentalism); (5) Elitist, originating in countries/societies with a long tradition of condescendingly considering America; (6) Legacy, existing in countries/societies which experienced (a perceived) U.S. imperialism.

Along the same lines, another classification identified five pure “types” of Anti-Americanism: (1) political-economic, seen as a reaction to U.S. foreign policy affecting the interests of different international actors; (2) historical, rooted in the negative feelings stirred by past, continuous American actions in world politics; (3) religious, as an expression of various condemnations of American immorality; (4) cultural, as a reaction to the abrupt intrusion of American culture into other local cultures; (5) psychological, stemmed from the ambivalence of the “American Dream”: attractive but not always attainable. (Naim, 2009)

Different typologies arise from a claim-oriented approach, stressing the charges used to accuse U.S. behaviour. Such empirical efforts are context specific but nonetheless indicative of the various offshoots of Anti-Americanism that cross traditional boundaries (political, economic, social etc.). One of the first attempts, later refined and elaborated according to historical conditions, noted six main themes preferred by the perpetrators of Anti-Americanism: (1) America is fascist, shifting towards an authoritarian repressive regime; (2) America is genocidal, owing to its commitment to annihilate opposition of any kind (cultural, ethnic etc.); (3) the Bomber Left is a moral force, legitimising violent action against America's refusal to change; (4) the American worker is a “honky”, revelling in racist,

imperialist, anti-intellectual views; (5) America's political system is a fraud, hindering true democracy and threatening political freedom; (6) America is in decline and surpassed by its rivals, inherent weaknesses causing its own demise (Beichman, 1971). Another approach, more centered on “how” are promoted rather than “what” are the main Anti-American ideas, finds five central pillars: (1) stereotypization, referring to generalization of clichés; (2) denigration, labelling as moral and cultural inferior; (3) omnipotence, fearing the power and control of the U.S. over the world; (4) conspiracy, uncovering so-called treacherous attempts to rule over the mind and matter of all; (5) obsession, exhibiting constant and excessive concern with the U.S. (Markovits, 2007, p. 12)

The polyvalence of American society was advanced as an explanation for the heterogeneity of the concept, as well as its manifestation: “American symbols [...] embody a variety of values with different meanings to different people and indeed to the same individual”. (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2006, p. 34) Research on the topic is complicated by the difficulty of measuring it. Despite the utility of sociological surveys, such as the Global Attitudes Project of the Pew Research Center, the Transatlantic trends of the German Marshall Fund, or even experimental, tailored polls, in mapping Anti-Americanism, tracing its evolution and even correlating it with U.S. specific intentions and actions in international relations, they can hardly and rarely help when studying Anti-Americanism as a prejudice. However, statistical representations should and could be integrated into a broader examination of the concept from a cultural and historical perspective.

### **3. Early Signs: Cultural and Political Construction of Identities**

Even though sporadically expressed during America’s nascent stage, even before emerging as a country, the debate concerning the perception of America in Europe fully emerged in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, once the “enlightened” Europeans started to look across the Atlantic to a savage and primitive America. It was an era when the “degeneration thesis” (Markovits, 2004, p. 7) or “degeneracy theory” (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 1) claimed European superiority over American backwardness. As far as 1749, the French naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, came up with an interesting theory, based on Montesquieu's work and embraced as well by Voltaire, concerning the impact of climate on animals and humans. His argument was that in America every living being was degenerate, morally and physically inferior to their Eurasian counterparts. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 1) In 1768, Cornelius de Pauw, a Dutch philosopher at the court of Frederick the Great, published a book, “Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains” (Diner, 1996, pp. 3-4), in which he noted the monstrosity of America. De Pauw even wrote a second book, in 1776, in which he found that the Americans lacked the capability to progress due to their stupidity, laziness, ignorance and physical weakness. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 1) Similarly, a French Encyclopedist, Guillaume Thomas François, abbé de Raynal, expanded these views on nature and morality to the realm of culture: “America has not yet produced a good poet, an able mathematician, one man of genius in a single art or a single science.” (Ceaser, 2003, p. 7) Even Immanuel Kant found, in 1775, that Americans are “a not yet properly formed (or half degenerated) sub-race [...] too weak for hard work, too indifferent to pursue anything carefully, incapable of all culture, in fact lower even than the Negro”. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch.1)

But an America which was growing demographically and economically faster than Europe and which was represented by famous philosophers and inventors, such as Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, was hardly primitive and degenerate. Moreover, after the restoration in France, America became the home of the Enlightenment, founded on rational deliberation. The



degeneracy thesis had to find new grounds and they were offered by Romanticism, the cultural reaction to Enlightenment. Natural savagery was no more dubbed as the source of decadence, but its opposite: reason. The new, civilized America with its emphasis on rationality and science, freedom and equality was perceived by the Romantics as deficient in terms of culture, history and identity. Romanticism thus became the foundry of Anti-Americanism (Diner, 1996, p. 31), its cultural engine. Later Anti-Americanism, till the present day, was inspired by the Romantics and echoed their ideas.

As a result, mixed feelings continued to fuel the Anti-American discourse in France: America was characterized by both untrustworthiness, provincialism, individualism and hypocrisy. (Meunier, 2005, p. 127) The same paradoxical combination of arguments was present in Germany, where von Schlegel considered American fauna as “most unseemly in form and most degenerate in nature” and Arthur Schopenhauer wrote about the country’s ignorance, vulgarity and ignorance (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, p. ch. 1), while at the same time Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel condemned the absence of culture and history in America and considered this a sign of inferiority. (Diner, 1996, p. 9) German Romanticists criticized the materialist and rationalist ideas praised in America. The source of European culture, in a Romantic view, was the Middle-Ages period. On the other hand, America was a product of modernity; its history did not go as far as the Middle-Ages. It goes without saying that the New World was then perceived as “unnatural”, it was “a haven for avarice, the Babel of absolutely limitless utilitarianism and a reprehensible absence of culture.”(Diner, 1996, p. 33) Moreover, since America was a pure society, a society without a state (as perceived in the European tradition), Hegel considered it a “happy country without a history” where the state existed as “merely something external for the protection of property” (Coker, 1998, p. 7). This idea of a “soulless” society lacking history and identity was to be borrowed by post-war Anti-American discourse, such as the Gaullist one. (Kuisel, 1996, pp. 145-146)

Since Romanticism placed a great emphasis on natural condition of society and history, it also viewed the industrial, capitalist and democratic America perverting the true nature of the Native Americans, as they were seen because of the novels of James Fenimore Cooper and Karl May. Paradoxically, while savagery was criticized by the partisans of the Enlightenment, now civilization was depicted as the one oppressing the Native Americans and mutating the natural order advocated by the Romanticists.

The cultureless America was the main theme of a new wave of Romantic critique, in the mid-1800s. After staying a few months in America, the poet Nikolaus Lenau (a Hungarian born in Habsburg territory and quite popular in German speaking lands) spread the myth of a materialistic America, based on commercial, mercantile and technical spirit. (Diner, 1996, p. 34; Rubin & Rubin, 2004, p. ch. 1) In his view, America was defined by *Bodenlosigkeit* (rootlessness) and offered no *vaterland* for its inhabitants. (Ceaser, 2003, p. 9). Americans are thus victims of alienation, that know not “wine or nightingales.” (Diner, 1996, p. 35) His ideas were reflected in Friedrich Kürnberger’s novel “Der Amerika Müde”, also based on a phobia vis-à-vis America (Diner, 1996, p. 33), or in Hoffman von Fallersleben’s poem “Die Neue Welt”. (Diner, 1996, p. 37)

At the same time, the German poet Heinrich Heine, as well as the French diplomat Talleyrand years before, condemned the Americans for their lack of passion and materialism. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, p. ch. 2) Another German novelist, Heinrich Laube, attacked the same idea of equality which results in “no free science, no free art”. (Diner, 1996, p. 37) Another idea is thus attached to the image of America, that of mass politics and capitalism, of homogenization of the masses in the name of equality and money. America is then the “Other” of Europe. Mass politics and mass production, industrialization and consumerism also formed the key ideas of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche’s critique of America. Moreover, the German philosopher observes the spread of these ideas in Europe and compares them to a disease “already beginning ferociously to infect old Europe and is spreading a

spiritual emptiness over the continent”. (Ceaser, 2003, p. 12) Other important figures of the German intelligentsia, including the historian von Schlozer and the dramatist Gutzkow, revolved against the same materialist critique, noticing how, in a “commercial country”, “ideas are changed into money”. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 2)

America was not only the object of a cultural debate. It also entered the realm of politics. Anti-Americanism was not limited to Romanticists, it also included Conservatives who objected to the liberal ideas and values promoted in the U.S.. In 1823, Johann Georg Hülsemann, wrote a work whose main thesis was the American democracy as a peril to the monarchic, absolutist Europe founded at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Moreover, because of its aspirations to a sphere of influence (Monroe Doctrine), America was now not only an object of despise, but an enemy. (Diner, 1996, p. 32) America also caught the attention and critique of Joseph-Marie, Comte de Maistre, a French philosopher, promoter of Conservatism, who described the young republic across the Atlantic as “the most fragile thing in the world: one that could not bring together more symptoms of weakness and decay”. (Ceaser, 2003, p. 8)

The establishment of the American political system brought a relentless assault on the newest democracy from both European Left and Right. In France and Germany, the degeneration theme translated from nature and people to the political institutions, dubbed as “deformed, weak and fragile”. (Beyer & Liebe, 2014, p. 92) De Maistre, one of the founders of European Conservatism, even denied the existence of “man” and “humankind”, which formed the basis of the Declaration of Independence): “The is no such thing in this world as man, I have seen in my life French, Italians, and Russians [...] but as for man, I declare that I have never met one in my life; if he exists, it is entirely without my knowledge. [...] All that is new in [America’s] constitution, all that results from common deliberation is the most fragile thing in the world: one could not bring together more symptoms of weakness and decay”. (Ceaser, 2003, p. 8) Felix de Beaujour, a French writer and diplomat to the U.S., was convinced of the frailty of the U.S. Government, destined to fall into “despotism and disunion”, while the famous novelist, Stendhal, deplored “the tyranny of opinion” that characterized the American democracy (Rubin and Rubin, 2004:ch.2). Heinrich Heine wrote in 1830 on America as “a monstrous prison of freedom,” because it promoted principles such as equality of all men. (Diner, 1996, p. 38) Freedom becomes an illusion under the tyranny of the masses. Another French Ambassador to the U.S., Louis de Linières, denounced the “fraud” of allowing “common Americans to influence public affairs since they were incapable of reasoning”. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 2) The same argument was to be seen later to Charles Baudelaire, who described America as “gaslight barbarism, the alliance of technology with primitiveness”, ruled through the tyranny of public opinion which was “more cruel and inflexible than any monarch”. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 3)

Besides right-wing Conservatives, left-wingers were also proponents of Anti-American ideas. Although equality was a dear idea of the Left, America was criticized by saint-simonists and socialists, such as Moses Hess, because of its capitalist image, its focus on wealth and money. Moreover, Hess linked this attribute to the national character, specifically to the Jews. (Diner, 1996, p. 39) Even the Alexis de Tocqueville, generally considered a supporter of the U.S. democracy, complained about the lack of “independence of mind and freedom of discussion” attended by the tyranny of the majority in the U.S. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 2) The same ideas were to take a perverted twist and be (ab)used by the Marxists and Communists in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In 1906, Otto Ladendorf avowed in his “Historisches Schlagwörterbuch” the parallel between Americanization and Judaization/ “Verjudung” (Diner, 1996, p. 20) This was the beginning of the negative association between America and Jews which had a greater impact later on. A special focus

should be granted to Arthur de Gobineau, a French aristocrat who developed in the 1850s the Aryan theory. One of the founding father of racism, Gobineau also criticized America because he considered that democracy and its principle of equality was dangerous for the White Supremacy. In his view, in America a new race was created, due to the homogenization of various ethnies, but this race was characterized by “greatest mediocrity in all fields: mediocrity of physical strength, mediocrity of beauty, mediocrity of intellectual capacities – we could almost say nothingness.” (Ceaser, 2003:11) As with the Anti-Semitism mentioned earlier, these racist ideas were going to have a greater impact in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.

#### **4. The World Wars: Strengthening and Diversification**

The European debate regarding America, and implicitly French and German Anti-Americanism, grew stronger once the US started to meddle more in the continental affairs. To be more specific, a new stage in the evolution of American *clichés* emerged with World War I. The French, German and American nations’ trajectories started to intersect at a higher level. (Kuisel, 1996, p. 1) Consequently, their mutual perceptions multiplied. The American economic model was envied and imitated by both France and Germany, countries devastated during the Great War. However, this process of economic growing interdependence between U.S. and Europe was seen not only in terms of trade and finances. In addition, it was perceived as composed of social and cultural aspects which threatened German and French identities. The effect of technological progress, especially in the field of mass communication, added to an increasing American presence in Europe, by making “key aspects of American culture part of European life”. The fact that common Europeans were now “dancing the charleston, flocking to movie theaters, idolizing film stars, grooving on jazz” increased the Anti-American feelings of the European elites. (Markovits, 2004, p. 10) This was the rise of mediocrity and conformity deplored by Martin Heidegger, destroying “everything creative”. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 4) Due to increasing U.S. involvement in international politics, Anti-Americanism also developed an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist offshoot. (Beyer & Liebe, 2014, p. 92)

These social and cultural standards were detested by French intellectuals such as Georges Duhamel (author of “America the Menace” in the 1930s) and André Siegfried, who feared that American mass culture and conformism – Fordism – were threatening the French “civilisation” and individualism (Kuisel, 1996, p. 2). The 1930s American financial and economic crash was perceived as a proof that economic progress is illusory in the absence of a matching spirituality. Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu feared the “American conquest” and called for a “spiritual revolution.” Thierry Maulnier, member of the Académie Française, defined Americanization as a wave of “new barbarism”. (Kuisel, 1996, p. 13) In short, French intellectuals feared that the American consumerism, materialism and standardization were jeopardizing “la civilization française”, as much as the novelist Paul Morand concluded that it was “fashionable for the intelligentsia to detest America” (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 4)

This new “wave of anti-American rhetoric” was also due to “French disappointment in the U.S. over its postwar isolationism and perceived biased indifference to France in the matter of war debts and reparations”. (Meunier, 2005, p. 127) It was also the dismay of the French that “Americans had come out such clear global winners” and their “materialism and industrialism were seen as a real threat to the beauty and variety of Western culture”. (O’Connor, 2004, p. 80) Antoine de Saint-Exupery warned about the “spiritual emptiness that accompanied the material productivity of American industrial society. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 4) On the same lines, George Duhamel “conveyed the sense not

only that America's consumer and profit-oriented culture was unappealing in itself, but that it threatened to spread to France and affect its own traditions negatively". (Meunier, 2005, p. 127) While industrialization and technology made *homo faber*, civilization was needed to elevate him to *homo sapiens* (Kuisel, 1996, p. 127)

In Germany, the negative feeling towards given by the defeat was amplified by the same process of "Americanization." Adolf Halfeld's book, "Amerika und der Amerikanismus", was a virulent reaction to the American bourgeois liberalism. The connection between faith and business or the preacher-entrepreneur unity was a sign of hypocrisy in Halfeld's eyes. (Diner, 1996, pp. 56-57) Wilson and the Peace Agreement were another target of Anti-Americanism, which considered that Germany was betrayed in the aftermath of WW I (the "Dolchstoßlegende"). Radical leftists saw Germany's defeat as the beginning of the infiltration of liberal capitalism in the country, they even criticized moderate social-democrats who dared to praise Wilson's ideas: "Wilson is great and Kautsky is his prophet!" The Romantic theme regarding the American lack of culture was reiterated by German authors such as Egon Erwin Kisch and his "Paradies Amerika", as well as Bertold Brecht. (Diner, 1996, pp. 74-75) Wilson, with his "American character" and "alleged Jewishness", was actually dreaded by Western European intelligentsia.; (Beyer & Liebe, 2014, p. 92)

Germany's dependence on American finances, as well as the problem of the "reparations", laid the foundations of another dear idea of Anti-Americans: American imperialism. (Diner, 1996, p. 56) Communists, such as Paul Levi, saw Wilson as a perpetuator of the same American capitalism and imperialism aiming to "enslave" Germany. Even right-wingers and national liberals, such as Friedrich Naumann, considered the Great War a "major financial operation" intended to establish American supremacy around the world. Emil Daniels, in his 1922 book "Amerikanischer Imperialismus und Deutsche Vorkriegspolitik", talked about the same new world order imposed by America. (Diner, 1996, pp. 60-61) In short, the anti-imperialist theme produced a strange rally of both left-wing and right-wing forces under the flag of Anti-Americanism. It can be synthesized as reaction to "dollar imperialism", a term used first by two Americans, Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman (Diner, 1996, p. 64), and which refers to the US attempt for world domination through financial subjugation. The philosopher Richard Muller-Freienfels lamented about the "technicalization or mechanization of life", specific to "Americanism" or Americanization of the Western World. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 4)

The inter-war era clearly led to the merger of two ideas: Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism. American quest for domination was also a Jewish enterprise, given their influence in American politics and finances. In this view, Werner Sombart called America a "Judenstaat". (Diner, 1996, p. 62) Jews were held responsible for the rise of "rootless modernity and capitalism, with the worst outcome of these forces being America": the United States became "the last bastion of Jewish Power in the World". (O'Connor, 2004, p. 80) In France, Charles Maurras went as far as accusing American Jews for blocking an earlier entry of the U.S. into the Great War. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch.4) Again, as in the above mentioned issue regarding imperialism, aversion to Jews and Jewish capitalism reunited the two radical wings on the political scene: communists and nationalists, and later national-socialists. (Diner, 1996, pp. 66-67) Obviously, German fascists could not miss the opportunity of mixing "the hatred of America with the hatred of the Jews". (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch.4) Nazi ideologues built on all Anti-American ideas mentioned above. Giselher Wirsing condemned American imperialism and its "Jewish warmongers" and drew a racist comparison between the "American marines in South America" and the "French nigger regiments" in the occupation of the Ruhr area. (Diner, 1996, p. 68) Alfred Rosenberg concluded that the American cultureless is a result of women's rule. (Diner, 1996, p. 71) C.G. Jung deplored in racist terms the Negroid and Native American influences on the initially

Germanic culture and character of America. (Diner, 1996, pp. 71-72) Otto Bonhard, in his 1927 article "Jüdische Weltherrschaft" reaffirmed the connection between America and the Jews which resulted in a specific form of capitalist imperialism. Moreover, he claimed that the democratic form of the republic allowed a Jewish corruption of America. (Diner, 1996, pp. 72-73)

Two perceptions on American physical and moral traits widened the cliché of American impotence. The first was the disregard for the American military capabilities (Diner, 1996, p. 57) and the second was the perception of America as a "matriarchal society". Beyond the degeneration and materialistic theses, the excessive power wielded by American women was a common theme even for Nazi Anti-American propaganda. Alfred Rosenberg, a influent philosopher in Nazi circles, saw a clear relation between America's "low level of culture" and "women's rule in American". (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 4) Halfeld, already mentioned above, as well as Hermann Keyserling, enounced the idea of "feminization" of America. Equality of women and men was perceived even more as "rule of women". In addition, consumerism and utilitarianism deprived men of their aristocratic, noble and warrior nature. (Diner, 1996, pp. 70-71) American military ineptness is just a logical consequence, an idea that was also shared by Hitler, a firm believer in the cowardness and military incompetence of the Americans. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 4)

Adolf Hitler also expressed his contempt with regard to American decadence and accused it of being ruled by the Jews and bourgeois elites. (Diner, 1996, pp. 82-83) He considered it "a moneyed clique... under the fiction of a democracy". (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 4) In short, he considered America "the land of infinite incompetence". (Diner, 1996, p. 25) However, an interesting remark is worth mentioning with regard to Nazis perceptions on America. From a technological and economic perspective, they admired and imitated the American model. Moreover, they even imported the idea of mass politics, which was fundamental for an authoritarian regime which emphasized de-individualization. (Diner, 1996, p. 85) However, ideologically and politically, Nazis shared the same ideas with the rest of the Anti-Americanism partisans. They even built on ideas propagated from the left and right of the political scene. Another relevant factor in the ambivalent Nazi approach to America is their strategic interest of keeping America out of Europe and as much as neutral with regard to European affairs. This is the reason why the Nazi regime restrained itself from giving a public voice to its Anti-Americanism until circumstances permitted them to do so. (Diner, 1996, p. 83) Nevertheless, Goebbels considered that, if needed be, "nothing will be easier than to produce a bloody revolution in America", given that it is poisoned with social and racial tensions. (Rubin & Rubin, 2004, ch. 4)

In the interwar years and into the 1940s, another source of f Anti-Americanism on the French political scene was situated to the left, within the Marxists ideologues, intellectuals and the Communist ranks, with their arguments built on the same myth of American emphasis on wealth and money and took a hard stance with regard to other major debates such as the "coca-colonisation" in the aftermath of World War II. (Kuisel, 1996, p. 38)

## **5. Final Considerations**

Anti-Americanism as a prejudice is an ensemble of clichés and stereotypes. It was built on the past and it echoed the past in the sense that negative European perceptions on America were transmitted in time as a destructive legacy. These perceptions were adapted, in order to respond to various social, political, cultural or economic realities.

Its strength lies in the ability to cut across ideological or political differences, from Enlightenment to Romanticism, from right-wing conservatism to leftist socialism, from national-socialism to communism. The actors that promoted Anti-Americanism encompass then a huge span in the realm of ideas, as well as on the political scene. This chameleonic feature means nonetheless that Anti-Americanism is full of intrinsic contradictions.

Culture was an essential ingredient in the making of Anti-Americanism. Culture, and especially Romanticism, translated mostly into rediscovering and fabricating folklore and myths, building identities and glorifying the past, was the one major source for all later Anti-American ideas. Romantic ideas reverberated into several waves of Neo-romanticism. Politics constitute another source of Anti-Americanism. America was defined as the enemy by various political parties that were struggling to gain legitimacy and rally votes on the domestic scene. Although America was envied for its prosperity, economics also enhanced the rationale of Anti-Americanism. Economics were not considered a separate object of study, but a dual process with secondary implications. Prosperity “à la américaine” was envisaged as attainable only with the risk of a huge loss in cultural and social terms.

Its evolution may be traced as follows. Proto-Anti-Americanism started during the Enlightenment as an anti-degeneracy, anti-primitiveness movement. Then the Romantic ideas were added, such as anti-rationalism, anti-materialism, anti-decadence and anti-modernization. Racial theories came up with the new anti-Semitism feature. Later on, it became anti-capitalist, anti-consumerist and even anti-democratic. Finally, Anti-Americanism gained new attributes like anti-imperialism, anti-hegemonic and anti-globalization. In sum, we can talk not of one, but of many Anti-Americanisms. The only common feature that can be generalized to all these Anti-Americanisms is the European perception of America as a mirror of itself, as an *alter ego*, as both its past and its future.

Anti-Americanism persisted in the aftermath of the Cold-War and it consisted of two main perceptions, despite the feeble persistence of other minor ideas. First, America is nowadays perceived as the driving-engine of globalization. However, other Western countries are also sources of globalizing trends. Anti-globalization movements are not only Anti-American, but also Anti-Japanese, Anti-German or Anti-French. This cultural and economic stigma is now ‘shared’ among several countries. It is less Anti-American. Second and most important of all, America is perceived as hegemonic, in political, military and economic terms. This is probably the most prominent form of Anti-Americanism today and it is difficult to be countered because of (1) empirical arguments and (2) Washington’s attitude vis-à-vis its European allies, especially France and Germany. US policies are sometimes unilateral and disregarding European positions and only add strength to the Anti-American arguments.

Anti-Americanism will probably continue to be with us for a long time. Its roots are too complex to be overcome; its ability to adapt is remarkable. However, Anti-Americanism can and should be moderated; otherwise it may lead to a gap in the transatlantic relationship. Moreover, as stated in the introduction, in the event of such an unfortunate development, it could have repercussions all over the world. It should not be forgotten that Anti-Americanism, as well as the so-called “transatlantic gap”, is about perceptions which can be easily manipulated in the era of hybrid warfare. Atlanticism, as a vision of a shared future based on common values, may be breached, given the existence of the Anti-American weakness at its very ideational core. Franco-German disdain toward the U.S. is deep and transcends mere critique of American intentions and actions, all the more so if elites across the Atlantic fall into the “Anti-Anti-American trap”, which is aversion towards or rebuttal of even objective, legitimate European criticism on the counts of irreconcilable Anti-Americanism.

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THE 13<sup>TH</sup> EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
REALITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

## **Perspective on the Economic and Strategic Relations between the EU and USA Regarding the Stage of Iran Denuclearization Agreement**

**Angela-Mihaela Ene<sup>1</sup>**

**Abstract:** The approach of the theme regarding the Nuclear Agreement concluded in Vienna on the 14th of July 2015, between Iran and the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany in terms of economic and strategic relations between the US and the EU aims to characterize the real stake of the USA initiative, namely, to withdraw from this agreement. Looking in detail at the meetings between the USA President, Donald Trump and the French President, Emmanuel Macron on one hand and Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, on the other hand, we can understand that the real stake of these official meetings is represented by the new possible positions in the economic and strategic military arena of the three powers: USA, France and Germany. It is understandable that the subsequent change of terms of the nuclear agreement with Iran is only a reason to reconsolidate US economic interests to the detriment of the EU and especially of France and Germany, which also arises from the attitude of the two European leaders.

**Keywords:** Iran nuclear agreement; USA - EU economic relations; strategic interests

### **Introduction**

Described as a historical step in international security, Iran Nuclear Arrangement is now raising new issues regarding its continuation and maintenance in the current form, especially by USA President, Donald Trump. In addition to the de facto aim laid down in this agreement, namely that Iran should substantially reduce the enriched uranium deposits and laboratories in order to eliminate the risk of nuclear weapons production and maintain security in the area, there are also major economic interests, both of the EU and the USA.

Even though the negotiations before signing the agreement in July 2015 were made by all the signatories in a responsible manner, we can see that now, less than three years after the signing, the USA wants to withdraw and impose new economic sanctions through the voice of President Donald Trump.

The economic sanctions that the USA wants to implement are extremely harsh, we could say even radical, more exactly they want US companies and US partner companies to stop all trade relations with Iran, which is definitely rejected by the EU.

*The novelty that we are describing in this analysis, the one regarding the economic foreign policies between the US and EU, is the US attempt to reset the international rules on economic and foreign policy cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. Thus, as part of an international agreement, the US attempts unilaterally and without deliberating on the economic and*

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*strategic consequences of the other states involved, to use its dominant position in favor of its own economic interest*

With lifting the economic sanctions, after the agreement had come into force, Iran benefited from the “defrosting” of about 90-120 billion dollars, but these funds could be partially accessed because of the inability of the interbank infrastructure. According to the Central Bank of Iran, the country’s debt is about 5.5 billion USA dollars. As an improvement of the relations with the EU and the Far East, export credits and financial guarantees are becoming more and more accessible to Iran. Italy and Japan allocated 10 billion US dollars in this respect and South Korea 5 billion USA dollars.<sup>1</sup>

## **Content**

A very important location for the trade with the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Far East, situated at the heart of the trade corridor between Europe and Asia, Iran has the geostrategic and natural resources to maintain the increased interest of the great powers. The hydrocarbon reserves are mainly made up of oil (the world's fourth-largest) and natural gas (the world's second-largest) and these energy sources represent the currency of global economic security.

Considering the geographical location of Iran, with neighbors like Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, we can see the distribution of the influence of the two great powers, the USA and Russia. We could say at first sight that the distribution of influence is balanced, i.e. Russia's control of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Pakistan and of the USA on Afghanistan, Armenia and Iraq, but the EU intervenes in this area. The European Union depends very much on the supplies made by Russia and a cooperation on hydrocarbons, especially natural gas, with Iran, is a major point of interest for the Union's economic security.

For example, on 01.07. 2013, the USA issued the Congress Executive Order to ban the export to Iran of parts and components for the automotive industry on the grounds that this branch is considered a resource of the power institutions for the proliferation of activities in the nuclear program. Obviously, this measure has been an instrument in managing purely economic interests, not a viable measure in terms of risk prevention in Iran's nuclear program.

In the recent meetings between USA President, Donald Trump, Emanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, the EU is looking for urgent solutions to protect its investments and interests in its relation with Iran as a means of counteracting the relation between the EU and Russia. It is a back-up measure, but also an opportunity to strengthen the geostrategic influence that the Union wants in the global strategic-military and economic balance plan.

The USA response and reaction to the two European leaders' call for a nuclear agreement is questionable, especially as Israel, through a public presentation of the prime minister, has revealed evidence that seriously criticizes Iran's compliance with the terms of the agreement.

For months, the USA Department of State has been pressurizing the authorities of the European countries in order to make them give up trade relations in Iran. The pressure on the EU states is even bigger, as the law of the Congress setting out the sanctioning of American companies that will cooperate with the Iranian party, enjoys very high support.

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<sup>1</sup> Guidebook of Islamic Republic of Iran.

*“Our goal must be zero foreign investments”, said Tom Lantos, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council, proving how eager the Americans are to isolate Tehran from a commercial point of view.<sup>1</sup>*

The international and Romanian media are telling and exposing the increasingly tense position of the USA President, Donald Trump.

Deutsche Welle publishes an article from which we are selecting a paragraph: *“But the essence of the problem, former and current USA and European officials consider, is the very fundamental opposition of President Donald Trump to the agreement with Iran, a vision that is likely to be radicalized with John Bolton, a “hardliner”, holding the position of president’s National Security Adviser. In an editorial written three years ago, Bolton suggested that “in order to stop Iran’s bomb, Iran must be bombarded.”<sup>2</sup>*

Looking at these issues, we can see that the USA desires to isolate Iran at all costs and wants it as at this moment, by exploiting shale gas in its own country, the USA has stopped being an importer and has become an exporter. One of the main targeted markets is Europe, which comes out from USA support in the development of the project *Three Seas Initiative*, with its first warehouse and distribution point in Poland. The USA wants the Eastern European countries to become a gateway to the whole European market, which the EU does not want. The presence of France and Great Britain in the Persian Gulf clearly demonstrates the interests of the Union in energy security and this is precisely what Donald Trump wants to change.

“If this treaty fails or the USA withdraws from it, we will have nothing similar and we fear that the situation will significantly deteriorate, along with everything that is required”, the German foreign affairs minister told the press at the meeting of the foreign ministers from the Group of the 7 most industrialized states, which takes place in Toronto.<sup>3</sup>

The statements made at the agreement signing by the Foreign Minister of France and presented by the international press agencies at that time strengthen the conviction about the US’s intentions to maintain control over the global energy markets. Thus, we are presenting the opinion of the French official: the French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, said that the nuclear agreement between the big powers and Iran was solid enough for at least ten years and that Western states would closely monitor how Iran used the money coming from lifting sanctions. France’s position of “constructive firmness has allowed a sufficiently solid agreement, at least for a period of ten years”, Laurent Fabius declared for the French daily *Le Monde*. “In the spirit of this, we will monitor its implementation”, he added.

Asked whether he was worried that Iran would try to destabilize the region using the money coming from lifting the sanctions, Fabius replied: “It will be one of the tests and we will be extremely vigilant”. The foreign minister also said he did not think that French companies would be penalized by Iran because of what was perceived as a tough position of France during the negotiations in the Iranian nuclear file.<sup>4</sup> These statements are conclusive about France’s interests in the region and its presence in the Persian Gulf is extremely important in the EU’s energy security policy.

The USA threat to withdraw from Iran Agreement is fully used by Donald Trump Administration, as the tensions in the customs quota between the two entities have been and continue to be a cause for dispute. It is well known that in his statements, Donald Trump has threatened the European Union with the percentage increase in certain taxes, notably the 25% increase in steel import duties and 10% in EU

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.gandul.info/international/>.

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.dw.com/>.

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.dcnews.ro>.

<sup>4</sup> <http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/international>.

imports of aluminum. In response to these statements, European officials have said they can immediately take retaliatory measures to products exported by the USA.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that this agreement represents the pinnacle of a much more complex situation and it clearly describes the lack of tact and the clear intention of the USA to impose the rule on the world market, even at the cost of violating international law. Moreover, the USA foreign debt of nearly 20 000 billion dollars, according to the USA Treasury, may be a turning point and justifies to some extent this impulsive control of the world economy by the USA.

Being a risk that some international rules which govern trade relations between states will be violated, according to USA initiated actions, is not of particular importance to Donald Trump Administration, which presumes that the stake and horizontal effects occurring on the margin of the nuclear agreement with Iran are extremely important for the United States foreign trade policy.

At this point, we can consider that the USA is using any means of action to enhance and strengthen its presence, even to control, maritime trade routes and hydrocarbon supplying areas for their own benefit, invoking in a particular way the national security in relation to the provisions stipulated by the international legislation advocated by the World Trade Organization. The concertation of these actions also comes from the support given in the project The Third Sea Initiative, in which the USA wants to strengthen its position on the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Adriatic Sea.

Against the background of this nuclear agreement, an unprecedented trade war between the USA and the EU is predicted, with long-term, hard-to-repair consequences. An approach by both entities, in line with the provisions of international law and more flexible international trade rules, would certainly be for the benefit of all the states involved.

## **Conclusions**

The analysis carried out on the USA position regarding the withdrawal from the Nuclear Arrangement with Iran and the effects on international relations, especially the trade ones, with the European Union, reveals the lines that the USA wants to address in a relatively short time and through instruments that force the limits of the international regulations which have come into operation.

The main interests of the United States are the consolidation and control of major maritime trade routes, the identification and acquisition of new markets for the supply of liquefied petroleum gas and, last but not least, the re-enactment of international trade law. Through all these measures, the USA is trying to control foreign debt by constraining lending countries, thus managing the flow of external debt and imposing new terms for the future regarding the international economic cooperation. The immediate opening of Donald Trump Administration to sign a large-scale trade deal with the UK is an important milestone in the tension between the European Union and the United States of America.

Through an objective approach of these events, we conclude that it is imperative that international bodies should adopt a firm position and it is desirable to counteract any tendencies to escalate interstate relations and any unfounded actions and mentioned only through the medium of some statements referring to the national security.

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THE 13<sup>TH</sup> EDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
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**EU Economic Security from the Perspective of the Economic Association  
Agreements Signed by the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia  
with the EU**

**Angela-Mihaela Ene<sup>1</sup>**

**Abstract:** This approach aims to highlight the European Union's long-term economic security policy. Following the signing of the Economic Agreements between the EU and Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, as EU-associated countries, major economic and geostrategic interests of the European Union are revealed, in the sense of holding the economic and geostrategic supremacy, that is an enlarged economic and functional market, just by the rules imposed by Brussels, is a tool for controlling and counteracting the economic pressure exerted on the world market by the three great powers, the USA, China and Russia. Even if the USA finances the three associated states in the EU, amid the consolidation of the rule of law and a solid democracy, the expected outcome of the USA foreign policy is by far an insignificant one. We should consider China's growing interest, which has increased its purchases of vast agricultural lands and signing economic contracts with the Ukrainian state. Thus, we can notice a new struggle front between the economic axes created: the USA-EU and RUSSIA-CHINA, which at this moment, through the move made by Russia, the annexation of Crimea, takes another turn.

**Keywords:** economic association agreements; economic security policy; Republic of Moldova; Ukraine; Georgia

## **Introduction**

The establishment and consolidation of the European Union as a federal state is a long, but safe process. The EU's evolution over the years in this formation process has reached an advanced stage through the existence of a single market and a de facto and de jure interstate union, which has an impact on the population of EU member states.

Speaking at this moment about the existence of EU borders, we must take into account the very important particularities that emerge from the EU's eastern flank, with states from the former communist block, namely Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

The objectives we are considering in approaching EU economic policies, with regard to economic and geostrategic security, with the neighboring countries in the eastern flank, are limited to approaching them from the following perspectives:

*- The role and effectiveness of the EU macro-financial assistance given to third countries;*

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- *The influence of the economic and geostrategic security policies adopted by Russia-China partnership in the relation with the neighboring states of the European Union, on the eastern flank;*

- *The effectiveness of the macro-financial assistance agreement for third countries in relation to the involvement of the International Monetary Fund in the launch of emergency assistance operations.*

Using a pro-European way by the countries of the former Soviet block represents for the European Union a step that subordinates concrete actions both economically and geostrategically. The EU's responsibility, based in particular on its own interests, manifests itself in a dynamic imposed by the rapid changes in the world, dictated by the world's great economic and military powers.

In the present global context, when the self-protection measures of the highly developed countries are increasingly evident, the European Union has to provide a sufficiently strong economic and geostrategic strategy to maintain and strengthen its position in the world.

## **Content**

From the evolution of the EU adherence process of the present member states, we know both the difficult financial assistance process for candidate countries and the synopses generated by the criteria imposed in the reforms to admit accession.

Lately, MFA has become an increasingly used tool within the EU's external tools. Certainly, in a context of macroeconomic and political instability in the EU's neighborhood, the macro-financial assistance has been widely validated as an effective tool of response to crisis situations, allowing the EU to intervene in a transparent and flexible manner and with a considerable political effect. This is confirmed by the increasing demand for macro-financial assistance over the past eight years and the implicit increase in AMF volumes, which have evolved from 1.5 billion EUR in commitments for the period 2000-2008 to 5.1 billion EUR in the period 2009 until the present.

The European Commission report on macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2016 states the following:

*“Considering that the geopolitical and economic instability of the EU's neighborhood persists, it is likely that the need for macro-financial assistance from the EU will remain high in the coming years. Against this background, in the context of the mid-term review of the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, the Commission has proposed a stronger macro-financial assistance instrument<sup>1</sup>*

*This proposal, presented by the Commission on 14th September 2016, aims at strengthening the annual AMF borrowing capacity, from the current 500 million EUR, to 2 000 million EUR, by increasing the provisioning of the Guarantee Fund for external actions.<sup>2</sup>*

*In addition, the recent experience, especially the need to quickly launch new MFA operations in Ukraine in 2014 and 2015, once more stressed the need to ensure that the macro-financial assistance, as an emergency instrument, can be quickly mobilized as a response to crisis situations. Accelerating the decision-making process was one of the main objectives of the proposal for a framework*

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<sup>1</sup> SWD(2016) 299 final.

<sup>2</sup> The external action guarantee fund supports the global exposure of the EU to the default risk of MFA beneficiary countries and of BEI and Euratom external lending operations. It is provisioned at a rate of 9% of the total liabilities under the EU's budgetary guarantee at the end of each year, with a two-year gap. In order to achieve a lending capacity of 2 000 million EUR per year, an additional provision of 135 million EUR per year will be needed.

*regulation laying down general provisions of providing macro-financial assistance to third countries presented by the Commission in 2011.<sup>1</sup>*

*However, the proposal was not endorsed by the European Parliament and the Council (colegislators) and it was subsequently withdrawn by the Commission. Therefore, decisions on macro-financial assistance continue to be taken in the ordinary legislative procedure. Colegislators have made efforts to accelerate the decision-making process under the ordinary legislative procedure. This was particularly true of the last MFA operation in Ukraine, which was adopted in a little more than three months in 2015. Nevertheless, the time for accelerating the adoption of MFA decisions under the ordinary legislative procedure remains limited.”*

Therefore, we can notice a change in the EU tactics in terms of external policies for the capture and consolidation of the new economic markets, tactics adopted with the obvious aim of counterbalancing the interventionist actions of the Russia-China axis.

From our point of view, the EU's operational financial programs in the third countries, in terms of their size, represent an approach that marks the latest geopolitical changes at international level.

The main issue under discussion, from the perspective of implementing these funds, is given by the attitude and capacity of these countries to comply with the reformist calendar imposed by the European Union.

The fact that the implementation of reforms which represent the condition for the release of some money transfers involves certain internal risks, represented by the adherence and cohesion of the population to these measures, which is often a much more important factor than the terms of negotiating financial operations, determines a difficult and risky co-operation process for the European Union in relation to the funded countries. It should be noted that the countries which benefit from the EU macro-financial assistance agreement come from the former economic cooperation Soviet region and a real transition to another form of economic market is a process that will most often be exploited in favor of the assistance beneficiary. Thus, even under the extremely vigilant verification mechanisms used by the European Commission, the effectiveness and efficiency of implementing such measures does not reach the reality established by the overall objectives that the EU has set as a result.

As an objective to be pursued and an alternative to the securing of funding for the third countries, we believe that it is necessary to develop a mechanism to stimulate exports from third countries to the EU by providing funding for their production capacity. Obviously, the rules and prices of export to the EU can be established on the basis of medium and long-term funding agreements.

At this point, Russia and China have established an alliance that seeks to radically change global power relations. The alliance is one against the USA and Europe, which have been surprised by the weaknesses manifested in relation to Russia's actions and Russia and China are exploiting them.

China usually has a reserved attitude towards separatism and border revisions, its own problems with Taiwan, Tibet and Xianjiang Province being at stake, permanently invoking the non-interference principle. The Chinese government has closely watched the USA and EU response on the Ukrainian crisis, concluding that, following the Western minor reactions to Russia, it may adopt a similar attitude in its power operations in the Eastern and Southern China Sea.

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<sup>1</sup> COM(2011) 396 final, 4.7.2011.

Russia and China are working in an effective way at the UNO level by blocking resolutions in the Security Council, under the pretext of non-interference, in order to pursue their own interests. China's support for Russia's interests is based on Russia's mutual support for China in Asia.

Apart from the affinities between the two apparently democratic regimes, this solidarity is motivated by clear economic and military interests. China is one of the largest buyers of Russian armaments: combat aircraft, submarines, rocket components and combat planes.

China's interest in Ukraine is also explained by the fact that this country had become Beijing's third weapon supplier, according to the estimates of the SIPRI Institute in Stockholm. According to it, only in 2012 Ukraine provided China with arms worth 690 million US dollars.

China's interest in Ukraine is based on the fact that Ukraine is a major arms supplier for China, an estimate made by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Stockholm.

The commercial exchanges between China and Ukraine was over 10 billion dollars in 2014, China being Ukraine's second largest partner. China also has massive investments on Ukraine's territory in sectors such as energy, agriculture, financial industry and aviation.

A very important reason for these investments and everything which means cooperation for China's benefit to remain in the current terms, is that Ukraine should remain in Russia' sphere of influence.

From the point of view of these facts and events, the EU's operational financial programs to support Ukraine and other third countries are flanked by the risk of some slips because of the instability of the domestic policy, constantly fueled alimentate by China and Russia.

Against the background of these interferences and geostrategic policies of influence on the neighboring EU countries, it is necessary to develop more flexible and faster EU decision-making mechanisms for these states, obviously in order to diminish and eventually eliminate both the possible double play that these states can make in relation to the external financiers and in favor of capturing and developing the European economic market.

“At the end of 2017, the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko announced that he would organize “in a very near future” referendums on the theme of his country's accession to the European Union and NATO, saying he is convinced that Ukrainians want this. Kiev expressed its intention of Euro-Atlantic integration in 2014, after Russia's aggression in Eastern Ukraine and after a pro-Western government had been installed.”<sup>1</sup>

The international media agencies highlighted the statements of the European Commission President regarding the relation between EU and Ukraine.

In the quote below, we are citing a fragment of the article published in the financial newspaper in August 2017:

“Ukraine is not a member state of the European Union or NATO yet”, said the European Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker on Tuesday, the UNIAN agency site said.

*“There are 60 ongoing wars in the world, but none takes place in Europe if we do not take into account Ukraine. But Ukraine is not a European country in terms of EU membership. A few days ago, my friend, the Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko said that Ukraine almost joined the EU and*

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.caleaeuropeana.ro/>.



*NATO. However, it is not a member state of any of them and everyone should understand this”, Juncker said.*<sup>1</sup>

Very importantly, in an objective analysis, it is worth noting the EU macro-fiscal assistance mechanism for third countries, which operates with the International Monetary Fund. The financial operations are carried out in this way because the financial operational analysis on several levels, is carried out by the fund financial experts.

The International Monetary Fund has the following objectives to be achieved within the funding:

- Granting credits to the member states in the event of deficit of payments balances;
- Contributing and maintaining high levels of utilization of labor resources and real income and the development of productive resources of all member countries;
- Promoting expansion and harmonious growth in international trade.

This cooperation between the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, in our opinion, should be redefined. The main reason for this redefining is the IMF code of conduct, on the basis of which the states that borrowed money have to adopt or financially behave in a particular register that is not always an easy or productive one.

In order that the European Union can ensure the stability of its economic and financial security and be able to achieve the objectives proposed by the agreements of association with Eastern European third countries, it is absolutely necessary that it should develop its own mechanisms of analysis and verification regarding the emergency financial operations.

According to the EU Treaty, which is based on observing some democratic principles and values, the European Union should have a more analytical attitude towards the IMF, as it is well known that the IMF pays different rates for each installment and the granting of financial support is not always compatible with European principles and values in the field of financial contracts.

## **Conclusion**

The role of the European Union in relation to the neighboring countries of the Eastern Union, in the geopolitical context of the moment, is a major one. The economic security of the member states and of the EU population must be a decisive factor in the Union's external policies, both in terms of support operations for the third countries and in the consolidation of a quite substantial market that ensures long-term economic stability and security.

Therefore, from our perspective, the European Union, through the mechanisms which are at its disposal, must become a flexible and skillful body, built on principles that have in their core the well-being of their own citizens, as well as a neighboring environment which lacks unanticipated risks or political-military crisis situations. All these objectives are realistic and can be achieved through an amplification of economic and financial cohesion policies in relation to the associated states and by a foreign security policy based on a strong attitude meant to discourage any intrusion from other powers.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.zf.ro/>.

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EIB – European Investment Bank.

MFA – Macro-financial assistance.

EU – European Union.

IMF – International Monetary Fund.

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization.



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**International Transport Corridors and Ukraine: Benefits of Cross-Border  
Cooperation with Romania**

**Vladlen Makoukh<sup>1</sup>**

**Abstract:** One of the problems of modern Ukraine is the weak development of international transport corridors that would connect different regions of Ukraine with European countries. A separate issue is the lack of transport routes in the south of Ukraine (Odessa Region) that could become a connecting link for the development of trade, tourism and facilitate humanitarian contacts between the populations of the border regions. The main purpose of this work is to consider the potential of combining separate regions of Ukraine with the regions of European countries through highways and railroads, and to analyze the economic benefits of these transport connections. Particular attention is paid to the use of opportunities for cross-border cooperation for the implementation of promising projects in the transport sector. In particular, the paper considers international transport projects implemented over a decade (project of a transport ring around the Black Sea, the project of the Baltic Sea-Black Sea cooperation), as well as more recent projects that are worthy of attention (the project Via Carpathia). Also, the factors that may complicate the implementation of transport projects are taken into consideration.

**Keywords:** international transport corridors; cross-border cooperation; Ukraine; European Union

## **1. Introduction**

An important aspect of the development of Ukraine's regions of is the establishment of cross-border cooperation between the border regions. One of the forms of such cooperation is the Euroregion. The European Commission considers cooperation within the Euroregions as the best form of developing relations between the border areas. Moreover, as demonstrated by practical experience, the European Commission is more willing to provide financing for projects within the Euroregions. Owing to the Euroregions, economic, cultural, and interethnic links between the border administrative and territorial entities of neighboring countries are greatly simplified. An important role in this respect is given to the creation of fundamentally new international transport corridors that have a positive impact on the economic situation of the neighboring countries and turn them from competitors to partners. That is why Ukraine is determined to use the mechanism of cooperation between the border areas of neighboring countries, and this is being realized through the activities of the Euroregions.

On the Ukrainian side, an important part is played by the Lower Danube Euroregion, which was created on August 14, 1998 in the Romanian city of Galați, where the agreement on its formation was signed. This Euroregion includes the Odessa region (Ukraine), the Vulcănești, Cahul and Cantemir districts (Republic of Moldova) and the counties of Brăila, Tulcea and Galați (Romania).

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It should be noted that the Odessa region is the only region in Ukraine that is a true member of 6 European regional structures: the Assembly of European Regions, the Association of European Border Regions, the Working Commonwealth of the Danube, the Conference of the Seaside Regions of Europe, the Assembly of European Wine Regions and the Lower Danube Euroregion. An important aspect of the Euroregion's work is the ability to coordinate (directly or through the Euroregion Lower Danube Association) the efforts of participants in the preparation of bids for EU-Black Sea Bassin grant programs and the joint Romania-Ukraine program 2014-2020.<sup>1</sup>

No less promising is the Euroregion "Upper Prut", created on September 22, 2000 in Botoșani, Romania. It includes: Chernivtsi region (Ukraine), Bălți and Edineț districts (Republic of Moldova) and Botoșani and Suceava counties (Romania), later joined by Ivano-Frankivsk region (Ukraine), Briceni, Făleşti, Dondușeni, Glodeni, Ocnița, Râșcani and Sângerei districts (Republic of Moldova).

Other Euroregions of Ukraine – "Carpathians" and "Bug" - were created in 1993 and in 1995, respectively. "Karpaty" Euroregion consists of northern regions of Romania, several areas of Hungary, part of Eastern Slovakia, part of the Podkarpackie region (Republic of Poland), Lviv, Transcarpathian and Chernivtsi regions (Ukraine). The Volyn Region (Ukraine) and parts of the territories of Poland and Belarus entered the "Bug" Euroregion.

In March 2017, Ukraine joined the Memorandum of Understanding on the beginning of cooperation with the Working Community of the Danube Countries (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft Donauländer - ARGE*), which aims to enhance cooperation and coordination of the overall economic development of regions in the process of transportation, as well as the development of cooperation among neighboring river ports and seaports.<sup>2</sup>

One of the objectives of the paper is to analyze the political and economic aspects of the implementation of cross-border projects in the transport sector within the specified Euroregions.

## 2. Theoretical Framework

Among the main scientific and political researches on the issues of cross-border cooperation in Ukraine, the scientific work of scholars such as V. Tetulyak, K. Nikitovych, V. Tsekhanovytch, E. Kiss and G. Ozerskaya are of particular interest.

Tetulyak shows that the aim of European regional activity is not only expanding the existing subregional relationships, but also promoting the development of cross-border cooperation among administrative units, local authorities, institutions, businesses, non-governmental and community organizations and individuals, including members of national minorities, in the fields of economy, education, science, culture and sport, the development of new mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation and ensuring the sustainable development of the region in the framework of integration to the current Pan-European process.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Shemaev V., *Transportnyye priorityy Yevroregiona Nizhniy Dunay* (Transport priorities of the Lower Danube Euroregion), available online at: [http://cfts.org.ua/blogs/transportnye\\_priorityy\\_evroregiona\\_nizhniy\\_dunay\\_108](http://cfts.org.ua/blogs/transportnye_priorityy_evroregiona_nizhniy_dunay_108). Last accessed on: 11.04.2018, 08:23.

<sup>2</sup> Omelyan obsudil v Rumynii problematiku sudokhodstva v del'te Dunaya (Omelyan discussed in Romania the issue of navigation in the Danube Delta), available online at: <https://ports.com.ua/news/omelyan-obsudil-v-rumynii-problematiku-sudokhodstva-v-delte-dunaya>. Last accessed on: 14.04.2018, 16:40.

<sup>3</sup> Tetulyak V., *Ukrayins'ko-rumuns'ki vidnosyny: potochna sytuatsiya ta perspektyvy rozvytku* (Ukrainian-Romanian relations: current situation and perspectives of development), *Istoryko-politychni problemy suchasnoho svitu*, 15-16, Chernivtsi, Ruta, 2007, p. 193.

According to Nikitovych, within the framework of Euroregions the cooperation in the domains of transport and communications, trade, development of exhibition activity, fight against organized crime, regional development and ecology is the most significant. The success of cooperation depends largely on how and with what level of the competency partners are able to approach the elaboration of a unified strategy for developing cooperation, while taking into account the experience of the functioning of Euroregions.<sup>1</sup>

Tsekhanovytch considers that the limiting factor for the development of border relations is the lack of financial agencies specialized in carrying out payments between partners in national currency, credits and loans for implementing cross-border projects.<sup>2</sup>

According to Kiss, the integration of Ukraine's transport and road complex into European and world transport systems requires both the formation of a national network of transport corridors and the development of logistics centers, the formation of logistic clusters at the border, which are the main structures of the international transport system. Logistics is important in the cross-border region that covers the Hungarian Sabolch-Szatmar-Bereg region, the Ukrainian Transcarpathian region, the Slovak Košice region and the Romanian Satu-Mare region, where rail, road, air and river transport are combined.<sup>3</sup>

Ozerskaya argues that, in the conditions of implementation of cross-border cooperation, the creation and integration of regional transport and logistics clusters is one of the first instruments by which a state can implement regional policies aimed at increasing the living standards of the citizens of the border areas, ensuring the competitiveness of economic complex, introducing the innovative-investment model of development, harmonizing the regulatory and socio-economic conditions of industrial and agricultural production complexes, and promoting cross-border cooperation in various fields, including business, services, science and technology transfer.<sup>4</sup>

### **3. Current Projects**

The Lower Danube Euroregion should become an important transport hub for an integrated Europe and Black Sea region, as well as Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Three free economic zones have already been established within the Euroregion: Galați (Romania), Giurgiulești (Moldova) and Reni (Ukraine). The European Union has approved routes for international transport corridors that would cross the territory of the Odessa region, fixing its extremely favorable geopolitical and geo-economic situation. In particular, one of the directions is the transit of oil from the Caspian region to Western and Central-Eastern Europe through the Transcaucasian International Transport Corridor. It is also planned to use the Danube water channel to transit Caspian and Middle Eastern oil to Europe.

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<sup>1</sup> Nikitovych K., Verkhniy Prut yak nynishniy mekhanizm rozvytku transkordonnoho spivrobitnytstva mizh Ukrayinoyu, Rumuniyeyu ta Respublikoyu Moldova (The Upper Prut Euroregion as a current mechanism of developing cross-border cooperation among Ukraine, Romania and Republic of Moldova), in *Ukrayina-Rumuniya-Moldova: istorychni, politychni ta kul'turni aspekty spivrobitnytstva*, Chernivtsi, Bukrek, 2002, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Tsekhanovytch, V. (2009). *Yevrorehiony u systemi transkordonnoho spivrobitnytstva Ukrayiny* (The Euroregions in Ukraine's system of cross-border cooperation), *Ekonomika i derzhava*, No. 3, Kyiv, p. 32.

<sup>3</sup> Kiss, É. (2008). *Logisztikai klaszter létesítésének koncepciója Kárpátalján* (The concept of establishing a logistic cluster in Transcarpathia), in *Magyar-ukrán határregió. Együttműködés az Európai Unió külso határán*, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Debrecen, p. 173.

<sup>4</sup> Ozerskaya, G. (2015). *Formuvannya struktury transportno-lohistychnoho klasteru u transkordonnomu spivrobitnytstvi* (Formation of the structure of the transport and logistics cluster in cross-border cooperation), *Visnyk ekonomiky transportu ta promyslovosti*, No.50, Kyiv, pp. 162-163.

It should be noted that the Danube transport complex (consisting of water routes, roads, railways and airways) takes a leading position in the containing the EU's strategy for the Danube region is assigned to the Perspective Plan of Measures for Implementation in the Odessa Region<sup>1</sup> The Joint Operational Program Romania-Ukraine 2014-2020 also provides for the development of sustainable transport and communication networks and systems.

If by mid-2015 the implementation of cross-border transport projects between Ukraine and Romania was moving very slowly, since autumn 2015 work on them has become much more active. During 2015-2018, the Odessa-Reni highway was built. In addition, during this period the the “Orlovka-Isakcha” ferry line was initiated.<sup>2</sup> In June 2017, an agreement was reached between the Ukrainian and Romanian sides to set up the Izmail-Tulcea ferry service.<sup>3</sup> In addition, some issues related to the construction of the highway linking Odessa and Bucharest<sup>4</sup> and the direct railways connections Kyiv-Bucharest<sup>5</sup> and Odessa-Galați<sup>6</sup> have been considered in the context of establishing a communication between Ukraine and Romania.

Taking into account that the draft project of the ring road, developed by the BSEC, lost its actuality due to the conflict in the Donbas, the role of the international hub could be given to Odessa. The Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine believes that the highway, that connect in the perspective thirteen ports of continental Ukraine (from Reni to Mariupol), should have a branch towards the Orlovka-Isakcha ferry that crosses the Danube. This is especially important for the Ukrainian side in the context of the highway proximity to the port of Reni, as well as opens up the perspectives of motor transport connections to Romania and Bulgaria. In particular, it is planned that goods and passengers will be brought to Romania and Bulgaria via the Orlovka-Isakcha ferry, and in the long term the ferry should be replaced by (or remain as a supplement to) the bridge over the Danube<sup>7</sup>

Currently, transport logistics envisage the movement of goods from the EU borders to the Black Sea ports. Nonetheless, the opening of the "Orlovka-Isakcha" ferry will reduce the time of crossing the Romanian-Ukrainian border from 2 hours to 15 minutes. In addition, thanks to the ferry, the time of cargo and passenger transport traffic from Odessa to the resorts of Bulgaria will be reduced to 5 hours. The subsequent replacement of the ferry by the bridge over the Danube will increase the small border traffic and reduce the time for tourists and trucks traveling from Odessa to Romania and Bulgaria and in the opposite direction.

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<sup>1</sup> Yuriy Maslov: Plan implementatsii Dunayskoy strategii EC kardinal'no izmenit ukrainskoye Pridunav'ye” (Yuriy Maslov: The plan for the implementation of EU’s Danube Strategy of can crucially transform the Ukrainian Danube), available online at: <https://bessarabiainform.com/2017/12/yurij-maslov-plan-implementatsii-dunajskoj-strategii-es-kardinalno-izmenit-ukrainskoe-pridunave>. Last accessed: 15.04.2018, 09:14.

<sup>2</sup> Zapusk paromnoy perepravyy cherez Dunay Orlovka-Isakcha stal real'neye – v Rumynii prinyali resheniye (The launch of the Orlovka-Isakcha ferry line across the Danube became more real – in Romania they took the decision), available online at: [http://cfts.org.ua/news/2018/04/08/zapusk\\_paromnoy\\_perepravyy\\_cherez\\_dunay\\_orlovka\\_isakcha\\_stal\\_realnee\\_ofitsialnyy\\_bukharest\\_prinyal\\_reshenie\\_46620](http://cfts.org.ua/news/2018/04/08/zapusk_paromnoy_perepravyy_cherez_dunay_orlovka_isakcha_stal_realnee_ofitsialnyy_bukharest_prinyal_reshenie_46620). Last accessed: 10.04.2018, 15:07.

<sup>3</sup> „Izmail i Tulchu soyedinit paromnaya pereprava cherez Dunay” (Izmail and Tulcea will be connected by ferry across the Danube), available online at: <https://uc.od.ua/news/traffic/1194538>. Last accessed: 14.04.2018, 16:50.

<sup>4</sup> „Saakashvili planiruyet postroit' avtoban Odessa-Bukharest do 2020 goda” (Saakashvili plans to build an Odessa-Bucharest highway by 2020), available online at: <https://focus.ua/country/336602/>. Last accessed: 16.04.2018, 17:49.

<sup>5</sup> „Ot Kiyeva do Bukharesta mogut postroit' skorostnuyu zheleznuyu dorogu” (A high-speed railway may be built between Kiev and Bucharest), available online at: [https://bzns.media/ukraine/Ot\\_Kiyeva\\_do\\_Buharesta\\_mogut\\_postroit\\_skorostnuyu\\_zheleznuyu\\_dorogu-222890](https://bzns.media/ukraine/Ot_Kiyeva_do_Buharesta_mogut_postroit_skorostnuyu_zheleznuyu_dorogu-222890). Last accessed: 11.04.2018, 15:31.

<sup>6</sup> Velmozhko O., „Rel'sovyy uzel Bessarabii: ot Odessy do Reni i Galatsa” (Railroad node of Bessarabia: from Odessa to Reni and Galați), available online at: <http://traffic.od.ua/news/railua/1192908>. Last accessed: 12.04.2018, 13:32.

<sup>7</sup> „Betonnoy dorogoy cherez 13 portov Ukrainu khotyat soedinit' s Rumyniyey i Bolgariyey” (Concrete road through 13 ports Ukraine wants to connect with Romania and Bulgaria), available online at: [http://cfts.org.ua/news/2017/11/25/betonnoy\\_dorogoy\\_cherez\\_13\\_portov\\_ukrainu\\_khotyat\\_soedinit\\_s\\_rumyniyey\\_i\\_bolgariyey\\_44152](http://cfts.org.ua/news/2017/11/25/betonnoy_dorogoy_cherez_13_portov_ukrainu_khotyat_soedinit_s_rumyniyey_i_bolgariyey_44152). Last accessed: 07.04.2018, 18:16.

Thus, in the next five years, a route connecting Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece can be built. The Ukrainian side hopes that the construction of the highway will be surely implemented, and is ready to act as the organizer of interstate meetings within the project. The Minister of Transport, Information Technologies and Communications of Bulgaria, Christo Aleksiyev, promised full support to Ukraine on this issue. The Greek side also supported this initiative. Also, the EU is discussing the construction of the Via Carpathia highway, which may be branching to Ukraine.<sup>1</sup>

During negotiations among the participants to the "Lower Danube" Euroregion meeting (April 13-14, 2014, Tulcea, Romania), it was also proposed to organize regular bus connections on the routes "Izmail-Galați" and "Reni-Giurgiulesti-Galați" with an accelerated procedure of border passage. The Ukrainian carrier has already launched a weekly bus route Odessa-Izmail-Reni-Giurgiulești-Galați-București since 2016. However, possibilities of modernizing the access roads to the border crossing points within the Euroregion "Lower Danube" are taken into account, in order to develop road transport. As for rail transport, two projects were discussed: the restoration of the Berezino-Bessarabyaska section, connecting the Odessa railway with the port of Reni to bypass Transnistria, as well as the redevelopment of the Cantemir-Feliciu railway bridge to the combined (railway-automobile) bridge to reduce the distance from Cantemir to București. In addition, for the purpose of tourism development, the possibilities of creating a network of mini-ports for small-sized vessels (boats), as well as the launch of seasonal passenger boats from Izmail to Tulcea are being considered.

In addition, in the context of Ukraine's integration into European bicycle routes, it is planned to analyze the possibility of continuing the branch of the "EvroVelo 6" route from the Romanian cities of Constanța and Tulcea to the southern regions of the Odessa region. The consolidation of the new route in international classifiers will become a benchmark for the development of both cycling infrastructure and roadside service facilities.<sup>2</sup>

The heads of Lviv and Chernivtsi regional councils and the leadership of the Romanian district of Suceava also agreed to implement a project to build a high-speed transport corridor across the Eastern Carpathians. In the future, cooperation will continue at the level of working groups in order to further implement the project of highway through the Eastern Carpathians (Lviv-Chernivtsi-Siret-Suceava-Paşcani-Bacău-Focșani-București), whose aim is connecting the Baltic Sea with the Black Sea. The most important point is the financial support for the construction of this highway and other infrastructure projects by European institutions.<sup>3</sup> In case the project is implemented, the above mentioned highway may become a worthy alternative to the North-South highway, which should connect Russia with the countries of the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East.

During his official visit to Romania on July 11, 2017, the Ukrainian Minister of Infrastructure, Volodymyr Omelyan, took part in the discussion on the prospects of cooperation between the countries of the Danube region in the transport sector, in particular, on the development of navigation in the Danube Delta. Thus, the issue of inland navigation was discussed, including options for reaching a comprehensive and long-term solution to the problems of the Bystre channel. Within the framework of the meeting, the prospects of bilateral cooperation between Ukraine and Romania in the

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<sup>1</sup> „Ukraina, Rumyniya, Bolgariya i Gretsia planiruyut postroit' za pyat' let sovmeštnyu dorogu Polnyy tekst chitayte zdes” (Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece plan to build a joint road in five years), available online at <https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/ukraina-rumyniya-bolgariya-gretsia-planiruyut-1490906164.html>. Last accessed: 14.04.2018, 13:42.

<sup>2</sup> Shemaev, V., loc. cit.

<sup>3</sup> Rumyniya i Ukraina khotyat postroit' avtoban cherez Karpaty (Romania and Ukraine want to build an autobahn through the Carpathians), available online at: <http://news.bigmir.net/ukraine/1804445-Ryminiya-i-Ykraina-hotyat-postroit-avtoban-cherez-Karpati>. Last accessed: 13.04.2018, 20:17.

sectors of transport and infrastructure, including road and rail transport, navigation, interregional and border cooperation, as well as EU strategy in the Danube Region (EUSDR) were discussed.

During the negotiations, it was proposed to increase the total quota of permits for the international carriage of goods, to use piggyback transportations with the support of RO-LA type railroad platforms as an alternative to transit through the territory of Romania. It was also decided to use an expert level group to establish the status of a new border crossing point and the restoration of a road bridge over the Tisa River between the cities of Sighetu-Marmăției (Romania) and Solotvyno (Ukraine). The parties also agreed to establish a joint working group of relevant government bodies with the possible participation of the Slovakian side to resume an expert-level analysis aimed at concluding a tripartite inter-governmental agreement on the realization of freight transport. For the first time in recent years, the parties have demonstrated readiness for a constructive dialogue in all areas of concern.

It is clear that the introduction of a visa-free regime between Ukraine and the European Union had an important contribution to the activation of Ukrainian Euroregions and the planning of promising projects, the realization of which is scheduled for the following years. At the same time, there are also problematic issues of implementation of cross-border projects in the transport sector, which, however, are gradually being solved.

#### **4. Problematic Issues in Implementing Cross-Border Projects in the Transport Sector**

The main problematic issue within the Euroregions is the need to combine the strategic policy of the bordered states with the interests and peculiarities of the border regions. Given the fact that the conclusion of international agreements is the competence of the central government, while local authorities are involved in the organization of border cooperation, there is a need for redistribution of powers between the center and the region. Another legal problem encountered by participants in the border cooperation is the discrepancy between the legislative bases of the participating countries, in particular, customs and tax.<sup>1</sup> Also, there are problems with the construction of ferry complexes as well as border and customs control points in coastal zones.<sup>2</sup>

It should be noted that the implementation of Euroregions' priorities is not limited to their financing from European sources, but requires significant investments from the state and local self-government bodies. A particular problem is the reduction of state funds aimed at developing and upgrading the infrastructure of Ukrainian ports. In particular, an expert of the Ukrainian Logistics Association of the Odessa region for water transport, Vira Baryshnikova, believes that certain legislative initiatives of the Ukrainian authorities do not take into account the needs of ports in updating the port infrastructure. Thus, according to the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine no. 1156 of 30.12.2015, since 2016 state enterprises have begun paying 75% of the dividends to the state (according to the current Tax Code, the income tax and dividends make up 80-90% of the enterprise's income). Thus, the state ports of Ukraine practically do not have the means to develop and update the infrastructure.<sup>3</sup>

Equally important is the issue of assimilating the financial resources allocated by the European Union. So, in 2017, the European Commission announced the cessation of funding for development projects for more than 10 checkpoints on the western border of Ukraine. For the implementation of these projects, the European Union had to transfer 29.2 million euros. The main reason for the cessation of

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<sup>1</sup> Bostan, S., op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Shemaev, V., loc. cit.

<sup>3</sup> Dubovyk-Rohova A. Voskresit' rechnyye transportnyye arterii (Resurgence of river transport connections), available online at: <https://day.kyiv.ua/ru/article/ekonomika/voskresit-rechnye-transportnyye-arterii>. Last accessed: 08.04.2018, 14:10.



funding was delayed implementation. Part of the allocated funds were to be directed towards the re-equipment of checkpoints in Rava-Ruska, Shegina, Yagodin, Ustyluzi (Ukrainian-Polish border), two border crossing points on the Ukrainian-Slovakian border, and two border crossing points on the Ukrainian-Romanian border. In addition, within the projects, the reconstruction of the checkpoint in Luzhanka (Ukrainian-Hungarian border) for the integration of Ukraine into the international transport system was to be carried out. Despite the obvious facts of inadequate financial resources management, the former head of the State fiscal service of Ukraine (the main consumer of funds allocated for these projects) Roman Nasirov, insisted that implementation of projects on construction of checkpoints was complicated by the fact that it is sometimes impossible to provide necessary co-funding in Ukraine<sup>1</sup>. The situation has changed for the better only after the removal of R. Nasirov from the position of the head of the State fiscal service of Ukraine on January 31, 2018, according to the relevant resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Thus, one of the options for solving these problematic issues is to establish control over the absorption of financial resources both from state bodies and non-governmental organizations of Ukraine and from the relevant authorities of the European Union.

#### **4. Conclusion**

The development of cross-border cooperation between Ukraine and Romania in the transport sector has certain characteristics and advantages, in particular:

1. The application of European norms and the use of best European practices should be a guarantee of improved governance standards in Ukraine.
2. The construction of bridges, the construction of new and the reconstruction of old border crossings will significantly contribute to the modernization of the border and transport infrastructure in Ukraine.
3. The creation of regional transport and logistic clusters should become one of the priority instruments of the implementation of the regional policy of Ukraine, aimed at increasing the living standards in the border areas and ensuring the competitiveness of the economic complex.
4. Improving transport links in the border regions will contribute to the development of tourism as well as to the establishment of contacts between the population of Romania and Ukraine.

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<sup>1</sup> Ustavshiy ot Ukrainy EC zakryvayet proyekt modernizatsii KPP” (Ukraine-tired EU” closes the modernization project of the checkpoint), available online at: [https://fomag.ru/news-stream/ustavshiy\\_ot\\_ukrainy\\_es\\_zakryvaet\\_proekt\\_modernizatsii\\_kpp/](https://fomag.ru/news-stream/ustavshiy_ot_ukrainy_es_zakryvaet_proekt_modernizatsii_kpp/). Last accessed: 12.04.2018, 11:16.

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